SLAPP: $107,524.03 Fee Award To Defendants Affirmed On Appeal

First District, Division 2 Finds No Statement of Decision Required on Fee Ruling and that Lodestar Rates For Out-of-County Counsel Could Indeed Be Higher.

     By now, most of you readers know that the anti-SLAPP statute has a mandatory fee-shifting statute in favor of prevailing defendants. That means the issue generally devolves to how much, not entitlement. The next case is one where a substantial fee award was affirmed, even though out-of-county defense counsel presented hourly rates that were well in excess of local attorneys.

     Keene v. Lake Publishing Co., Case Nos. A125371, A123619 (1^st Dist., Div. 2 Mar. 18, 2010) (unpublished) involved a situation where defendants won an anti-SLAPP motion against a plaintiff bringing a libel claim. The lower court also granted winning defendants’ request, in entirety, for recovery of fees and costs totaling $107,524.03 (with fees being $105,058.50 of the total award).

     Plaintiff appealed; plaintiff lost.

     Plaintiff argued that the superior court erred by failing to provide a “reasoned explanation” for denying specific objections to the fee award, basically contending that no statement of decision was issued in connection with the fee award. Not required, said the Court of Appeal. (Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal.4^th 1122, 1140 (2001); Christian Research Institute v. Alnor, 165 Cal.App.4^th 1315, 1323 (2008).)

     Plaintiff next contested the lodestar award, specifically awarding defense counsel hourly rates of $155-$450 per hour, which were argued to way exceed the normal hourly rates for attorneys in the Lake County venue of the case. Aside from the fact that case law does not require the lodestar must be based solely upon the prevailing hourly rate for comparable work in the specific city or county where the case arose (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4^th at 1133; PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler, 22 Cal.4^th 1084, 1096 (2000)), the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding higher rates in light of the fact Lake County had a relatively small bar not necessarily experienced in this type of libel case.

     Finally, recognizing that defendants were entitled to fees on appeal for prevailing, plaintiff tried to argue that the appellate court should remand the case to a special master with directions to limit respondents’ fees on appeal to $10,000. Not a chance said the Court of Appeal, given that appellant “provides neither argument nor authority to support these requests.” (Slip Opn., p. 24.) Rather, the matter was remanded to the trial court to fix the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees to be awarded to respondents based upon prevailing in the appellate court.

    Slaps, slaps, and more slaps.