Homeowners Association—Anaheim Hills Planned Community Assn. v. Chen, Case No. G053128 (4th Dist., Div. 3 Nov. 9, 2017) (Unpublished).
In this first one, homeowner appealed a trial court’s award of appellate fees to HOA in a CC&R dispute under both a prior settlement agreement and the Davis-Stirling Act. The appellate fee award of $36,830.50 was affirmed. An action to enforce a settlement agreement does permit a fee award under the Davis-Stirling Act. (Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Assn. v. Hazelbaker, 2 Cal.App.5th 252, 259-260 (2016).) HOA also did prevail, given that it forced the homeowner to remedy the CC&R violations—its primary litigation objective. Justice Moore authored the decision on behalf of a 3-0 panel.
Family Law—Marriage of Aubry, Case No. E066624 (4th Dist., Div. 2 Nov. 9, 2017) (Unpublished).
The second one involved an ex-wife’s appeal of a needs-based $10,000 fees award to ex-husband under Family Code sections 2030 and 2032. The award was reversed because the trial judge was unaware of a capped $6,000 fee arrangement between ex-wife and her counsel, it was unclear if consideration was given to any net income received by husband from assets, and it was unclear if the trial court considered wife’s monthly income. These vagaries required a reverse and re-do by the court below.
Prevailing Party—Law Offices of Mark B. Plummer PC v. Bayuk, Case No. G053836 (4th Dist., Div. 3 Nov. 9, 2017) (Unpublished).
The last opinion in the trifecta reviewed here involved a battle between attorneys representing a client in various proceedings, with the appellant suing for more compensation before finally admitting at trial that he basically received what was owed, leading the trial judge to enter judgment in favor of the opposing attorneys. Opposing attorneys were granted fees under a contractual fees clause in an operative settlement agreement between some of the parties (although the provision could encompass even another non-party attorney to the settlement agreement). The trial judge’s entry of an actual judgment precluded appellant’s argument that it really voluntarily the dismissed the matter so as to rise to the Santisas bar to fee recovery. Appellant argued that attorneys represented themselves in defense, but the record showed that one co-defendant represented another defendant attorney and that another attorney had independent representation (both completely proper), dashing hopes that a Trope v. Katz defense would apply. Justice Moore also authored this one on behalf of the 4/3 panel.