PROBATE ATTORNEYS PERFORMING PERSONAL SERVICES FOR ESTATE EXECUTOR NOT BARRED FROM OBTAINING FEES BASED ON PROBATE COURT DENIAL ORDER.

Sixth District Court of Appeal Found Prior Probate Court Order Denying Fees Did Not Collaterally Bar Attorneys’ Subsequent Attempts to Obtain Fees for Personal Services Rendered to Executor.

            In a rather technical opinion arising in the probate context, the Sixth District Court of Appeal validated attorneys’ efforts to recover fees from a probate estate executor where the fees were provided to the executor personally (rather than as an estate representative).  Collateral estoppel and other technical defenses did not prevail such that counsel was not shut out from recovering fees from the executor, as an individual.

            Miller v. Campbell, Warburton, Fitzsimmons, Smith, Mendel & Pastore, Case No. H030965 (6^th Dist. May 15, 2008) involved attorneys who initially lost an effort to obtain compensation from an executor because the probate court determined that the services were rendered to the executor personally rather than as an executor of the probate estate.  Later, a trial judge granted motions in limine precluding quantum meruit efforts by the same attorneys in a separate lawsuit against the executor personally.

            Because the probate court did not rule on whether fees were justified for services rendered personally to the executor, collateral estoppel did not come into play, the Sixth District determined.  This also undercut any argument that the attorneys were collaterally attacking the probate court order, which was never appealed because it only dealt with fees for which the probate estate was liable.  The end result was that the attorneys’ suit against the executor (as an individual) for recovery of quantum meruit fees was revived.

            The case has an interesting discussion of how appellate courts are viewing motions in limine that are disguised summary adjudication or nonsuit motions.  The Miller court does not like them, suggesting that “grants” are frequently viewed as the equivalent of due process violations.  It suggested that such grants will be reviewed under a de novo review standard on appeal.   

This case is must reading on the hazards of relying too heavily on “dispositive” in limine motions, especially if review is sought on appeal.

Sixth District Court of Appeal Found Prior Probate Court Order Denying Fees Did Not Collaterally Bar Attorneys’ Subsequent Attempts to Obtain Fees for Personal Services Rendered to Executor.

            In a rather technical opinion arising in the probate context, the Sixth District Court of Appeal validated attorneys’ efforts to recover fees from a probate estate executor where the fees were provided to the executor personally (rather than as an estate representative).  Collateral estoppel and other technical defenses did not prevail such that counsel was not shut out from recovering fees from the executor, as an individual.

            Miller v. Campbell, Warburton, Fitzsimmons, Smith, Mendel & Pastore, Case No. H030965 (6^th Dist. May 15, 2008) involved attorneys who initially lost an effort to obtain compensation from an executor because the probate court determined that the services were rendered to the executor personally rather than as an executor of the probate estate.  Later, a trial judge granted motions in limine precluding quantum meruit efforts by the same attorneys in a separate lawsuit against the executor personally.

            Because the probate court did not rule on whether fees were justified for services rendered personally to the executor, collateral estoppel did not come into play, the Sixth District determined.  This also undercut any argument that the attorneys were collaterally attacking the probate court order, which was never appealed because it only dealt with fees for which the probate estate was liable.  The end result was that the attorneys’ suit against the executor (as an individual) for recovery of quantum meruit fees was revived.

            The case has an interesting discussion of how appellate courts are viewing motions in limine that are disguised summary adjudication or nonsuit motions.  The Miller court does not like them, suggesting that “grants” are frequently viewed as the equivalent of due process violations.  It suggested that such grants will be reviewed under a de novo review standard on appeal.   

This case is must reading on the hazards of relying too heavily on “dispositive” in limine motions, especially if review is sought on appeal.