Marriage of Kaufman, Case No. B196632 (2d Dist., Div. 4 Mar. 27, 2009) (unpublished)
In this one, wife—after remarrying in a very public ceremony—was ordered to pay her former husband’s attorney’s fees of $15,000 under Family Code section 271 (out of a requested $42,000 in fees), payable in $500 monthly installments. The award was affirmed after wife appealed.
Section 271 is a sanctions statute allowing a family law judge to award fees against a party that has litigated or protracted proceedings in a way that is uncooperative or not conducive to settling the proceeding.
Wife’s primary challenge was that she was not permitted to submit live testimony, with the family law judge relying upon written declarations in deciding the section 271 fee request. That due process argument was not found persuasive: “Although section 271 requires that a party facing sanctions be given an opportunity to be heard, it does not specify the format for such a hearing. If the appellant is given an opportunity to submit declarations, but not live testimony, the hearing requirement of section 271 is satisfied . . .” (Slip Opn., at p. 14, citing In re Marriage of Petropoulos, 91 Cal.App.4th 161, 178-179 (2001) [California’s “hearing” requirement does not necessitate oral presentation, unless the context of other language indicates a contrary intent].)
Marriage of Yuen, Case No. B201276 x-ref. B195293 (2d Dist., Div. 1 Mar. 27, 2009) (unpublished)
This second case is for those with very rich pocket books.
In 2000, husband was ordered to pay more than $56 million (yes, you read this correctly--million) in spousal support to former wife in periodic payments through 2009, with this order containing a fees clause in favor of the prevailing party in any “enforcement proceedings.” The parties then entered into a 2002 agreement purporting to modify the 2000 order, although the particulars were not disclosed—even though huge amounts were still at issue.
After husband failed to pay Molly in August 2003 and thereafter, former wife moved to confirm spousal support arrearages and to declare the 2002 agreement invalid. The trial court decided that the 2002 agreement was enforceable, determining husband owed past spousal support arrearages of $46,193,076. (Earlier, the appellate court affirmed the determination in substantial part, but reduced everything by about $5.2 million.)
Wife then moved to recoup over $1.88 million in attorney’s fees and costs incurred in attempting to enforce the spousal support arrearages. Before this motion could be heard, the parties entered into a “stipulation” stating that wife would be allowed fees and costs of $1.2 million if the family law judge granted wife’s fees motion. The trial court did grant her motion, and husband appealed.
In upholding the award, the appellate court found that wife’s motion was akin to a declaratory relief action—which is an “action on the contract” for purposes of awarding fees under Civil Code section 1717. Husband tried to argue that former wife did not succeed in invalidating the 2002 agreement, but the appellate panel found that this did not impact her ability to recover on the later stipulation relating to an appropriate fee award. “[Husband] cites no authority for the proposition that a party entitled to attorney’s fees for prevailing on a motion must separate out, and cannot recover, fees incurred in advancing unsuccessful arguments in support of that motion. We are aware of no such authority. We therefore reject [husband’s] argument.” (Slip Opn, at p. 5.)