Family Law: 1st District, Division 3, Upholds Refusal to Award Mother Full Amount of Fees Requested

 

Result Follows from Application of Abuse of Discretion Standard.

     In Marriage of Lilyquist and Dova, Case No. A121052, A121716 (1st Dist., Div. 3, July 24, 2009) (unpublished), the Court held (1) that a retroactive order reallocating child support obligations of the father was not an abuse of discretion; and (2) that failure to award the mother the full amount of fees requested was not an abuse of discretion.  Both rulings show that in child  support cases, the appellant who must carry the burden of overcoming an abuse of discretion standard can have a tough row to hoe.

     Justice Siggins authored the 3-0 opinion.  The first part of the ruling, involving the retroactive modified support order, implicated attorney's fees, because the order allowed the father to offset amounts that he had overpaid against his obligation to pay the mother's attorney fees.

     As to the attorney's fees award, the trial court had discounted the mother's request for $130,000 to $75,000:  "because (1) it included services rendered by her counsel on issues not related to the child support litigation, and (2) services provided by her trial counsel and posttrial counsel were, in part, duplicative."  Again, the Court found no abuse of discretion.

     Of interest to family law practitioners in San Mateo County, the Court found that Local Rule 5.7(H) created no presumption that conflicted with sections 2030 and 2032.  The local rule provides, in part, "Absent unusual circumstances, it is highly unlikely the court will order any party to pay 100% of the other party’s attorney’s fees and costs. Each party should expect to bear a significant portion of his/her own attorney’s fees and costs even after a need/ability analysis."  Covering all the bases, however, the Court also found that the trial court had applied the analysis required by sections 2030 and 2032.  "Section 2032, subdivision (a) provides that fees may be awarded under section 2030 'where the making of the award, and the amount of the award, are just and reasonable under the relative circumstances of the respective parties.'"