#1 – Marriage of Fondario, Case No. E045156 (4th Dist., Div. 2 Apr. 14, 2010) (Unpublished).
In the first one, a $13,000 fee award to wife was affirmed as a sanction against husband under Family Code section 271. The lower court did not err in considering such factors of uncooperativeness as rejection of numerous settlement offers, scheduling many unnecessary orders to show cause, and telling husband “I will break you”’/”you are going down.” (BLOG OBSERVATION--Watch what you say to an opponent; it may not result in tort liability due to the Civil Code section 47 litigation privilege, but it can sting you in other ways.)
#2 – Marriage of Torbov, Case No. H033029 (6th Dist. Apr. 15. 2010) (Unpublished).
The second case is a situation in which a court-appointed attorney for minors, prior to the divorce of the parents, was awarded $15,953.25 in fees and costs, ordered payable by father. Family Code section 3153(a) does authorize an award of reasonable fees and costs to court-appointed counsel representing the child. Fees are either to be paid by the parties or by the county, with the award being mandatory—but tempered by it needing to be reasonable in nature. (In re Marriage of Lisi, 39 Cal.App.4th 173, 1576 (1995).) Here, there was evidence that the children did not want to visit father, coupled with the fact the court-appointed attorney had no obligation to satisfactorily complete reunification efforts. No abuse of discretion occurred with respect to the fee/costs award against father.
#3 – Marsh v. Hunt-Nocero, Case No. E047910 (4th Dist., Div. 2 Apr. 15, 2010) (Unpublished).
The last decision in this trifecta involved a trial court’s decision denying mother’s fee requests under Family Code sections 2030-2032. The lower court did not error in refusing to award fees under Family Code sections 2030, 2031, or 2032(a), because mother was never married to father, with these provisions only applying to a case that involves a dissolution of marriage, nullity of marriage, or legal separation of the parties. That left section 2032(d), which allows the court to direct a case management plan including allocation of fess in cases involving complex or substantial issues of fact or law related to property rights, visitation, custody, or support. However, mother never made a noticed motion for these types of determination, so that the point was effectively waived.
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