Private Attorney General Statute: Fourth District, Division 1 Reverses Trial Judge’s Refusal To Allow Supplemental Trial Fees To Plaintiffs That Obtained Appellate Success For CEQA Claims

Appellate Panel Also Has Good Things to Say for Appellate Attorneys—Their Work is Specialized and May Command Higher Fee Awards Despite Some Duplication With Trial Work.

     Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino, Case No. D056972 (4^th Dist., Div. 2 Sept. 17, 2010) (certified for publication) is an interesting case mainly for appellate attorneys but also for Bar members that win an appeal and then seek to obtain supplemental trial work fees based on the appellate win.

     Boiling down the procedural posture of the case, plaintiffs (environmental groups) brought three claims against County and developer relating to the Blue Ridge project at Lake Arrowhead. Initially, they won a claim but lost two CEQA claims, requesting $191,729.05 in fees but only receiving an initial award of $50,000. All sides appealed, eventually stipulating to dismiss with prejudice their appeals of the initial attorney’s fees order. The appellate court (4^th Dist., Div. 2), on the merits, held the lower court erred by denying the two CEQA claims. On remand after assignment to a new trial judge, plaintiffs moved for a second fee award, primarily trying to recoup (1) attorney’s fees for prevailing on appeal; and (2) supplemental trial work fees based on their greater success on appeal. Plaintiffs sought a total of $563,926.45, broken down this way: (1) $136,230.45 for trial work; (2) $180,324.65 for appellate work; (3) $256,967.10 based on a 2.0 multiplier for the contingent portion of the representation; and (4) $40,405.25 for “fees on fees” in bringing the fee motion (although offsetting $50,000 for the first fee award). The new trial judge awarded nothing more for trial work, determining it lacked jurisdiction in light of the dismissal of the first fee appeal, but did award $62,530 for appellate work—after determining there had been two much duplication of work by appellate attorneys and disallowing out-of-town counsel hourly rates exceeding Inland Empire $370 hourly rates—and $10,000 “fees on fees.” Plaintiffs appealed again, this time going before the Fourth District, Division 1 (a panel to which the appeal was transferred).

     Plaintiffs obtained another reversal and remand in a 27-page Slip Opinion authored by Presiding Justice McConnell on behalf of a 3-0 panel.

     The appellate panel first found that there was nothing wrong with plaintiffs’ efforts to obtain supplemental trial work fees based on the appeal success on two CEQA claims previously denied. Plaintiffs did not have to appeal the first fees award to get supplemental fees given the subsequent appellate win.

     Plaintiffs sought hourly rates between $370-625 for specialized Santa Monica environmental attorneys, but the trial court only allowed $370 Inland Empire attorney hourly rates. The appellate court found this was an abuse of discretion given the contrary proof of reasonableness presented by plaintiffs: (1) a National Law Journal annual survey showing L.A. rates that were in the requested range; (2) declarations showing that the requested rates were in the range of what other courts had awarded in other California venues; and (3) testimony showing qualified environmental representation in the local area was slim (if not nonexistent). The Court of Appeal noted that fee awards do not have to invariably be limited to local rates, depending upon whether there is a reservoir of attorneys in the local area that could prosecute the matter—something not established in this case. (See, e.g., Horsford v. Board of Trustees of Cal. State Univ., 132 Cal.App.4^th 359, 397, 399 (2005).) The appellate panel also rejected that a reduction in hourly rates was necessary just because the Santa Monica firm occasionally entered into fee arrangements with lower hourly rates. (Chacon v. Litke, 181 Cal.App.4^th 1234, 1260 (2010).)

     Then, in a discussion that should make appellate attorneys feel more appreciated, the Center for Biological Diversity court found that trial and appellate work is quite different—such that it was an abuse of discretion to reduce the claimed hours because the appellate attorneys had to duplicate some of the efforts of the trial attorneys. “ . . . trial court preparation and appellate work are not commensurate tasks. As [real party’s] counsel acknowledged at oral argument, preparation of an appellate brief and record is far more complicated than merely ‘repackaging’ the trial court brief.” (Slip Opn., p. 21; see also In re Marriage of Shaban, 88 Cal.App.4^th 398, 408-410 (2001).) Often times, the appellate court observed, duplication by appellate attorneys is necessary duplication, with it being an abuse of discretion to cut 56% of the hours claimed by plaintiffs for appellate work.

     Matter reversed and remanded, which will likely result in a much higher fee award for plaintiffs this time around. (The multiplier issue was left to be reconsidered on remand, but the appellate court did caution against double counting.)