CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY'S FEES

Off Topic/Legislation: Some 2011 Civil Litigation Updates

California New Legislation Highlights

     There are some civil litigation updates that have changed or added features of procedures used or which will be used by many California litigators on a frequent basis, depending on practice areas. Here are our highlights:

1. Striking of Judges. Code Civ. Proc., § 170.6. Time period for judge disqualification upped from 10 to 15 days, with the moving party required to notify all other parties of the “striking” within five days after filing the “strike.”

2. Residential Foreclosures. Code Civ. Proc., § 1161a. Residential foreclosure nature of action must be included on the complaint’s face page.

3. Commercial Unlawful Detainer Actions. Revises the process for serving tenants with an unlawful detainer notice, providing three methods:

(a) personal delivery to a tenant; (b) if the tenant is absent from the rental property, sub-serve a copy on someone of suitable age/discretion at the property and then mail a copy to the tenant at the rental property address; and (c) if no sub-service can be made after reasonable diligence, affix a copy of the notice in a conspicuous place on the prperty and then mail a copy to the tenant at the rental property address.

4. Writs Issuance. Need to disclose near the case number box the type of legal entity with respect to the judgment debtor if not a natural person and include a statement indicating whether the case is limited or unlimited in nature. Sheriff likely will kick if this information is not there.

5. Expedited Jury Trials. Discussed in our January 8, 2011 post. Co-contributor Mike can vouch that Orange County judges are pushing this new procedure. At one law and motion hearing, an appearing attorney said he used this procedure in Riverside court, submitting medical reports to the jury and completing trial in a day. The attorney stated that both sides were pleased with how the trial went.

6. Electronic Service of Process. Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6. This section authorizes service by either electronic transmission or electronic notification if a party has authorized service in one of these ways. There is a two court day extension for such service, much like that for express mail, overnight delivery, or fax transmission.

7. New Judicial Council Forms. Among others, there is a Proposed Order cover sheet, Exppedited Jury Trial Information Sheet, and Notice of Court Hearing form.

E-Discovery: Defendants Ordered To Pay $1.049,850.04 In Fees And Costs For Electronic Spoliation

U.S. Magistrate Judge Grimm Had Earlier Ordered Imprisonment If Payment Ducked, But Defense Did Remit Partial Payment Of What Was Ordered.

     In our September 21, 2010 post, we discussed Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497 (D. Md. 2010), in which U.S. Magistrate Judge Grimm determined that defendants repeatedly failed to comply with multiple court orders compelling the preservation and production of ESI in response to Plaintiff's discovery requests. He ordered monetary sanctions, including costs and legal fees allocable to spoliation under penalty that an individual defendant be imprisoned for two years if not promptly paying the monetary sanctions.

     Well, the final tally of the fee/costs spoliation sanctions is now in.

     On January 24, 2011, Magistrate Judge Grimm, in Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., Civil No. MJG-06-2662 (D. Md. Jan. 24, 2011, Doc. No. 448), decided defendants should pay $1,049,850.04 for fees and costs, which left $712,053.67 to be paid within 30 days because defendants had already remitted an earlier payment of $337,796.37.

     In determining the lodestar, Magistrate Judge Grimm did not feel he was bound to the district court's guidelines for determining attorneys' fees in certain cases, labeling them "guidelines, not holy writ." He also credited the American Intellectual Property Law Association's report of the economic survey showing the mean average billing for partners in the Washington, D.C. CMSA. (See Leviton Mfg. Co. v. Universal Sec. Instr., Inc., 613 F.Supp.2d 670, 732-733 (D. Md. 2008) [citing report], vacated on other grounds, 606 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2010).) In most instances, he found it was not improper to have multiple attorneys at hearings and it was acceptable for attorneys to bill for conferences among themselves.

Family Law: Breach Of Fiduciary Duty To Spouse Mandates Fee Award Under Family Code Section 1101(g)

Majority So Holds, But Dissent Argues Contention Forfeited and Section 1101(g) Needs Revision By the Legislature.

     Here is an interesting one in the family law area, drawing a dissent by a former family law jurist that now sits on the appellate court.

     In Marriage of Fossum, Case No. B214824 (2d Dist., Div. 1 Jan. 28, 2011) (certified for publication), a family law judge determined wife breached her statutory duty to her spouse under Family Code section 721(b) by taking a $24,000 cash advance on a credit card without disclosing the transaction to husband. The trial court refused to award husband fees under Family Code section 1101(g), which has mandatory "shall" language indicating that remedies do include "attorney's fees and court costs."

In The News . . . . Mel Gibson Asked To Reimburse A Lot Of Oksana’s Fees And City Of Laguna Wood Hit With Substantial Fee/Expert Expense Award In Eminent Domain Case

Lawyers Requesting Over $1.5 Million More in Gibson Dissolution Proceeding.

     As reported in a January 27, 2011 post by the TMZ staff, Oksana Grigorieva’s lawyers are asking Los Angeles County Superior Court Judge Scott Gordon--the same judge who heard the McCourt case--to order Mel Gibson to pay substantial attorney’s fees on top of $500,000 in fees previously awarded so that Oksana can fight it out in court. Her current lawyers are asking for $1.2 million in fees for work performed since September 2010, another firm is asking for $250,000, a third lawyer wants $163,000 for one month’s work, and other lawyers/firms are requesting hundreds of thousands more. Judge Gordon has yet to rule on the latest requests.

City of Laguna Woods Ordered to Pay Raintree Realty $851,005.94 In Eminent Domain Lawsuit.

     Claire Webb, in a January 26, 2011 post in the on-line version of The Orange County Register, reports that a superior court judge on January 22 ordered the City of Laguna Woods to pay $851,005.94 in attorney’s fees and expert expenses to property owner Raintree Realty in eminent domain proceedings related to the acquisition of the City Hall Building after a jury verdict in Raintree’s favor. The superior court judge found Raintree’s final demand for compensation reasonable while the city’s final offer was adjudged to be unreasonable in nature. However, the judge disallowed $49,911 in travel expenses. In our category “Eminent Domain,” we have explored two recent cases discussing the comparative final demand approach factors used in granting/denying fee/litigation expense awards. See People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. Acosta, 178 Cal.App.4th 762 (2009) [discussed in our October 26, 2009 post]; Tracy Jt. Unified School Dist. v. Pombo, 189 Cal.App.4th 889 (2010) [discussed in our October 30, 2010 post]. Looks like City will appeal, which may well produce another decision in the eminent domain jurisprudential arena.

Fee Clause Interpretation: Contractual Fees Clause Led To Affirmance Of Substantial Fee Award, Because Cross-Complaint Did Not Implicate Contract Claims

$401,654 on Sole Contract Claim Sustained on Appeal by Sixth District.

     In this category, the breadth of a fees clause may be case determinative when measured against the actual claims or cross-claims brought by a party. No more and no less, as the next case demonstrates--with the appellate court carefully analyzing the cross-claims at issue.

     Defendant in Smith v. First Principle Church, Case No. H034075 (6th Dist. Jan. 27, 2011) (unpublished) won $401,654 (out of a requested $536,275 in fees, reflecting the work of 6 attorneys) after prevailing in a religious pension agreement dispute where there was a fees clause in the pension agreement. However, losing plaintiffs said hold on, there may be unresolved defense cross-claims under which I might prevail, so no go.

     The appellate court gave a “red light” to the losing plaintiffs in this one.

     Losing plaintiffs seem to argue that defendant’s cross-complaint, which was alive and well, may have been “on the contract” so that no final prevailing party analysis could be made until the cross-claims were resolved. After a very careful microanalysis of the cross-claims (recovery of corporate distributions, money had/received, and breach of fiduciary duty), the appellate court concluded these were statutory or tort claims (or spins on the same) not giving rise to fee exposure. As a result, losing plaintiffs could never recover fees on these cross-claims such that winning defendant’s fee award was vindicated in full.

Special Fee Shifting Statute: Teacher’s Win Under Education Code Section 44942 Does Not Guarantee Fee Win Under Education Code Section 44944(e)(2)

Third District Affirms Fee Denial in Technical Education Code Area.

     Okay, folks. We told you early on in this blog we would cater to all areas. We hold true to our promise, summarizing a recent decision from the Third District on a fee-shifting provision contained in Education Code section 44944(e)(2), which contains a mandatory fee-shifting provision when and if it applies.

     Whether it applies was at issue in Jane Doe v. Lincoln Unified School Dist., Case No. C064262 (3d Dist. Jan. 27, 2011) (unpublished), with the appellate court reversing an Education Code fee award to teacher in the amount of $29,715.

     Teacher and Classroom.  c1902.  Tuskegee.  Library of Congress.

     The fee award to teacher was not legally justified, said the reviewing court.

     Teacher won a battle under section 44942, which governs procedures on whether a teacher is suffering from a mental illness and then requires that the teacher be placed on administrative leave in the process. However, the mandatory fee-shifting provision of secrtion 44944(e)(2) deals with a different subject, namely, dismissal or suspension of a teacher. Forker v. Board of Trustees, 160 Cal.App.3d 13 (1984) was distinguishable because this was no “end run” of the mandated Education Code procedures so as to trigger fee shifting.

      The school board, in this case, had not “run the gauntlet” of section 44942 procedures so as to be entitle the teacher to fees--especially given no ultimate finding of dismissal or suspension. Given that the fee entitlement statute was express, no fees were warranted.

Family Law: $20,000 Fee Award To Wife Affirmed Based On Husband’s Failure To Provide Adequate Appellate Record

Fourth District, Division 3 Reaffirms Fundamental Precept of Appellate Practice.

     If one is going to do appellate work, creating an adequate record is a must. After all, the appellate court has nothing before it in a case except for what the litigants provide it. The lack of an adequate appellate record in the next case was damning indeed.

     Acting Presiding Justice O’Leary, in a 3-0 decision in Marriage of Benice, Case No. G043392 (4th Dist., Div. 3 Jan. 26, 2011) (unpublished), affirmed a family court decision awarding wife $20,000 in “need based” fees, payable by husband. The reason for affirmance was that husband failed to provide an adequate appellate record by not including all the pertinent law and motion paperwork (such as the paperwork filed by wife in support of the fee request). Without a proper record, the presumption of correctness accorded to the fee order was a presumption that prevailed because it was unrebutted in nature.

Appealability: Recent Case Reinforces Lesson We Have Stressed In the Past--Separately Appeal Adverse Fee Orders

Notice of Appeal of Merits Motion Denial Did Not Give Appellate Court Jurisdiction to Rule on Later Fee Ruling.

     One nice thing about our blog is that the appellate courts have to decide disputes all the time and, in doing so, reinforce lessons that we have discussed as arising from prior posted cases. One more time, folks . . . . protectively appeal separate adverse fee orders, even if you think the fee orders are encompassed with some prior merits determinations. The litigants in the next case did not appeal the fee order, much to their chagrin.

     What happened in Auto Auction Group, Inc. v. Ritz Leasing, Inc., Case No. B216247 (2d Dist., Div. 3 Jan. 26, 2011) (unpublished) is that certain parties had a motion to amend a judgment denied, which denial was appealed straightaway. The winning litigants in the amendment motion moved for fees, which was litigated after the date of the appeal notice relating to the amendment motion. The lower court granted the winning litigants fees of $81,028.99. The losing litigants on the motion to amend judgment appealed both the merits and the adverse fee orders.

     With respect to the fee order, the appellate court determined it did not have jurisdiction to consider the propriety of the order. Reason? The fee order was the product of a motion that was litigated well after the filing of the notice of appeal relating to the judgment amendment motion. As such, the appellate court was without jurisdiction to act on the fee issue. (Colony Hill v. Ghamaty, 143 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1171-1172 (2006).)

     By now, we hope the moral of the story is clear on appealing adverse fee orders. We can’t give legal advice, but believe this case illustrates what happens when protective action is not taken.

Reasonableness Of Fees: Appellate Court Affirms $611,544.75 Fee Award Where Compensatory Damages Were Only $271,682

No Proportionality Required Under Section 1717; Defense Expenditure Of More Proved Reasonableness.

     In Big Ring Holdings, LLC v. Van Ness Mgt., LLC, Case No. A126692 (1st Dist., Div. 2 Jan. 26, 2011) (unpublished), plaintiff tenant was awarded $271,682 in damages for a leaking ceiling in a dispute over a yet-to-be-opened laundromat where there was a lease with a fees clause. Later, the trial court awarded prevailing plaintiff attorney’s fees of $611,544.75 (out of a requested $635,445.25) for three years of litigation toil. The defense appealed.

     The defense did not succeed on appeal.

     The trial court properly calculated the lodestar and then determined its reasonableness (including any reductions) under the Ketchum v. Moses methodology. It also properly allowed recoupment of fees spent on a dismissed alter ego claim.

     The appellate court also rejected the notion that Civil Code section 1717 fees had to bear some set percentage to a compensatory damages award.

     Finally, the reasonableness argument of the defense was undermined when it implicitly conceded the issue by submitting some proof indicating that the defense expenditures exceeded those of the plaintiff.

 

  Leaking roof. 1827.  Library of Congress.

In The News . . . . L.A. County Superior Court Judge Says Bell Mayor Hernandez’s Request For Fee Reimbursement In AG Lawsuit Is Premature

Judge Kalin Ruled Request Can Be Renewed Later.

     As reported in a January 25, 2011 post by Richard Winton in the Los Angeles Times online version, Los Angeles County Superior Court Judge Joseph R. Kalin has rejected, for now, Mayor Oscar Hernandez’s request to have legal expenses picked up in his defense of the Attorney General’s civil case containing accusations he misappropriated hundreds of thousands of dollars from the City of Bell’s treasury. Judge Kalin ruled the request was premature because Mr. Hernandez had yet to prove his defense in the civil case brought to recoup the alleged misappropriations.

     Click here to read a Wikipedia article about the 2010 City of Bell salary controversy.

Consumer Statutes/Equity: Attorney Denied Appellate Fees For Beating A Client’s Claim Requesting A Refund Of Unearned Fees Based On A Technicality

Failure to Award Fees under B & P § 6204(d) Was No Abuse of Discretion.

     Here is an interesting case in the continuing saga of prominent civil rights attorney Stephen Yagman. The case is also poignant in showing how trial and appellate courts will use equitable principles to resolve fee recovery matters.

     In Yagman v. Colello, Case No. B223412 (2d Dist., Div. 4 Jan. 25, 2011) (unpublished), former client obtained a nonbinding State Bar arbitration award against his former attorneys requiring them to refund him $261,000 of a $290,000 fee after the district court disqualified Yagman from representing Colello (even though Colello was convicted and then imprisoned for over 2 years). Yagman then challenged the award through a de novo procedure in court, successfully arguing that former client could not recover any damages based on a one-year statute of limitations. The appellate court, earlier, affirmed the dismissal on the technicality. Yagman then moved to recover $64,768.50 in attorney’s fees incurred in the prior appeal under Business and Professions Code section 6204(d), which does allow the trial court discretion to award such fees to the prevailing party. The lower court, however, found it “would be a gross abuse of discretion to grant the fee request” based on Yagman’s refusal to refund any of the unearned fees when he won on a technical defense rather than refute the arbitrator’s findings that the unearned fee should be returned. Yagman appealed.

     He lost.

     The appellate court, clearly siding with the equities as it saw things, found no abuse of discretion in what the lower court did. It credited the State Bar arbitrator’s findings that Yagman should return the unearned fees and did not find that these findings should be disregarded. The presumption of correctness accorded to the trial court’s order prevailed in this particular appeal.

No POOF!: Affirmance Of Merits Ruling Means Private Attorney General Fee Award Stands

Second District Illustrates the “No POOF!” Rule.

     If you have followed our blog, you know about our “POOF” rule. This is the principle by which a fee award will generally go POOF! (goes away) when there is a material reversal of a merits award that was the predicate for the fee award.

     Now, ta! da!, we introduce the “no POOF!” rule.

     The Second District, Division 6 is our victim on this one. The decision that happens to be the victim is Citizens Planning Assn. v. City of Santa Barbara, Case No. B216006 (2d Dist., Div. 6 Jan. 25, 2011) (certified for publication).

     There, the appellate court affirmed a merits judgment which also produced a private attorney general fee award of $175,888. The appellant did not challenge the fee award, except to argue that it would go POOF! if the merits judgment was reversed. Well, that did not happen. So, no POOF! The fee award stood based on the absence of any other arguments.

     We thank Justice Coffee and his colleagues for helping us set forth the no POOF! rule as a corollary to our POOF! category.

Prevailing Party: Attorney’s Fees Motion Properly Denied Where Moving Party Could Not Point To Contract For Fee Entitlement

Lack of Signatory Status in Moving Documents Was Dispositive.

     One of the ABC’s in moving for fee entitlement is to show a contract or statute forming a predicate basis for a fee motion. Without it, a litigant is generally left with the American Rule, which does not allow a party to recover for fees. That reality stung the next plaintiff moving for fees, even though it did receive moneys under an accepted CCP § 998 offer.

     The trial court in Classic Excalibur Holdings, L.L.P. v. Palm Springs Auctions, Inc., Case No. B218875 (2d Dist., Div. 5 Jan. 24, 2011) (unpublished) denied plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees after the defense accepted its 998 offer. The appellate court affirmed the fee denial under the abuse of discretion standard.

     Reason? Very simple. Plaintiff never produced a contract under which it was a signatory. Even if prevailing under a 998 offer, the prevailing party must demonstrate it had a substantive basis for fee entitlement. This was missing here. Plaintiff attached various car documents and a deposit receipt, some having fee clauses. However, none of the the documents showed plaintiff was a signatory to a contract with a fees clause. Under these circumstances, defendant could not be subject to fee exposure. (Canal-Randolph Anaheim, Inc. v. Wilkoski, 78 Cal.App.3d 477, 486, 496 (1978).)

Private Attorney General Statute: Cypress Marina Heights Decision of January 10, 2011 Is Now Published

Sixth District Certifies Decision for Publication.

     In our January 10, 2011 post on Monterey/Santa Cruz Building, etc. v. Cypress Marina Heights, Case No. H034143 (6th Dist. Jan. 10, 2011), we reviewed a decision awarding attorney’s fees under the private attorney general doctrine in a construction prevailing wage ruling for 900 benefitted construction workers. We can now report that the Sixth District, on January 24, 2011, ordered this decision certified for publication.

In The News . . . . Boston Law Firm Sues Merrill Lynch For Predecessor’s Failure To Disclose Fee Cap

Suffolk County Superior Court is the Venue of this Legal Dispute.

     In yet another interesting twist on attorney’s fees in the news, Sheri Qualters, in a January 19, 2011 post in The National Law Journal, reports that the Boston law firm of Davis, Malm & D’Agostine is suing Merrill Lynch, as successor to Banc of America Securities LLC (BOAS), for BOAS’ failure to disclose that it had agreed on a $50,000 cap on legal fees with the South Shore Tri-Town Development Corp. relating to certain bond issue work for a redevelopment project.

     Not only does the suing firm claim that the fee cap was not disclosed, but it also claims that that BOAS led it on by assuring full payment until the firm received only $50,000 from South Shore.

     The case is venued in Suffolk County Superior Court and was filed on January 5, 2011.

Celebrities/SLAPP: Pageant Is Seeking To “SLAPP” Beauty Queen’s Lawyer’s Lawsuit

Case Arises Out of Settlement Reached With Former Miss California USA Carrie Prejean.

     Seems like lots of controversy as well as lawsuits arise out of beauty queen pageants. Also seems like celebrity lawsuits result in a lot of SLAPP motions. The next “in the news” item is no exception.

     As reported by a January 17, 2011 post in The Beverly Hills Courier, a law firm defending the Miss California USA pageant has moved in Los Angeles County Superior Court to “SLAPP” a lawsuit brought by an attorney who represented Carrie Prejean, a Miss California USA stripped of her title putatively because she missed scheduled appearances and failed to repay a breast implant loan. The lawsuit basically alleges that Ms. Prejean’s attorney reduced his attorney’s fees in exchange for the pageant maintaining the secrecy of a settlement between the pageant and the beauty queen, where Ms. Prejean received nothing but her attorney received $110,000 in fees as part of the settlement. (Rumor has it that the case settled largely because the pageant officials had a sex tape of Ms. Prejean – see Larry King interview.)

     The hearing on the motion is scheduled for February 17, so we assume that there will be a follow-up post unless matter, too, is confidentially resolved.

Probate: Attorney’s Fee Reduction In Accounting Reversed Because Fees Did Have To Be Spent And Not Out Of Proportion to Trust Assets

Fourth District, Division 2 Saw No Basis For Fee Reduction.

     Although abuse of discretion is the guiding standard for fee amount reductions, it will not prevail where the record showed there was a lot of work, the fees were not out of proportion to trust assets, and no reason for the reduction was set forth.

     Scott v. Key, Case No. E049906 (4th Dist., Div. 2 Jan. 20, 2011) (unpublished) is a situation where a lower court slashed

an attorney’s fee request by a trustee in an eighth accounting. However, it did so after observing that numerous court hearings were required and not indicating why fees should be cut. Aside from that, the trust assets were not insignificant.

     Result on appeal? Reversed. The requested fees were not out of proportion to the size of the trust and the reduction was counterintuitive to the trial court’s own comments on the attorney needing to attend numerous hearings.

Civil Rights: Ninth Circuit, In Sharply Divided Opinion, Finds That Pro-Rata Allocation Of Fees Between Frivolous And Nonfrivolous Claims Is Impermissible

Majority Acknowledges Tough Burden Resulting to Defense Under Its “But For” Documentation Test, Drawing a Sharp Dissent from Circuit Judge Bybee.

     The next Ninth Circuit decision is an interesting one for defendants seeking fees in civil rights cases. It involves a situation where there were multiple claims, some based on civil rights, some on contract, and some on state law theories. The district judge, in essence, based a fee award on a pro-rata allocation of fees on the number of claims that were comparatively speaking found to be frivolous in nature, reduced by a financial hardship factor (a factor typically recognized in civil rights case fee reduction matters). This pro-rata allocation methodology drew a reversal by the Ninth Circuit, although there was a strong dissent by Circuit Judge Bybee.

     In Harris v. Maricopa County Superior Court, Case No. 09-15833 (9th Cir. Jan. 20, 2011) (for publication), the district judge awarded defendants fees of $85,514.84 and non-taxable costs of $40,150.23 (out of a defense request of $315,974.65 in fees and $ 53,533.66 in costs). However, the district judge basically used a formulaic approach of dividing fees equally across the total 10 claims and then allocating to each claim for which he determined fees to be appropriate one-tenth of the total general fees, reduced by a financial hardship factor.

Indemnity: $47,124 Fee Award Vacated Because Fees Clause Was Not A Real Fees Clause

Fourth District, Division 3 Reverses Fee Award, Because Only An Indemnity Agreement Was Involved.

     Under our category “Indemnity,” we have discussed several cases which explore the difference between an enforceable attorney’s fees clause giving rise to fee recovery and an indemnification clause which does not. Here is one from our local appellate court to add to this list, albeit in the form of an unpublished decision.

     Md7, LLC v. Seidner, Case Nos. G042498/G042755 (4th Dist., Div. 3 Jan. 18, 2011) (unpublished) involved a lease rescission lawsuit that did not turn out well for plaintiff tenant’s assignee. Based on a fee prayer in the complaint and a clause in the underlying lease, defendants moved to recover fees, which the trial court awarded to the tune of $47,125.

     Defendants lost the merits appeal, but did obtain a reversal of the fee award.

     Here are the reasons:

SLAPP: California And Oregon Anti-SLAPP Fee Recovery Is Substantive Under Erie

 

Ninth Circuit Grants Fee Award To Winning Defendant For Fees On Appeal.

     This next case takes us all back to law school, with the substantive/procedural

distinction of import arising from the Erie doctrine.

     In Northon v. Rule, Case No. 07-35319 (9th Cir. Jan. 18, 2011) (for publication), defendants won an anti-SLAPP motion under Oregon law, which has a mandatory fee-shifting provision in favor of winning defendants (similar to the anti-SLAPP statute in California). After sustaining the SLAPP win on appeal, defendants moved to recover $21,253.53 in appellate fees, a motion addressed to the Ninth Circuit.

     The Ninth Circuit granted the motion, holding in the process that Oregon law governed the fee motion because state SLAPP fee provisions of this sort protect substantive rights and apply in federal court. (See also United States ex. rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Inc., 190 F.3d 963, 972-73 (9th Cir. 1999) [same result; California anti-SLAPP statute].)

Erie Railroad Workers.

Celebrities: Lucasfilm Tentatively Ordered To Pay Nearly $1.3 Million In Attorney’s Fees To Winning Lawyers In Pregnancy Discrimination Case

Plaintiff Had Won $113,830 In Compensatory Damages From a Jury Earlier.

     As reported by Gary Klien and Erin Sherbert in respective January 13, 2011 posts of the Marin Independent Journal and SF Weekly, Marin County Superior Court Judge Lynn O’Malley Taylor tentatively ruled on Thursday, January 13 that Lucasfilm Ltd. should pay nearly $1.3 million (out of a requested $1.5 million) in attorney’s fees to the lawyers who won a pregnancy discrimination suit against the company. Plaintiff won $113,830 in past economic losses after a lengthy jury trial. The fees apparently were awarded under California’s private attorney general statute, with Judge Taylor observing that plaintiff’s lawyers risked hundreds of hours on a difficult case. A Lucasfilm spokesperson said the company will appeal the jury verdict and the fee ruling if the tentative stands. One blogger noted that the lawyers gained fees that were ten times the amount of the compensatory award, which is frequently the case in civil rights cases.

Allocation: None Necessary In Financial Elder Abuse Case Where Issues Were Intertwined

First District, Division 4 Sustains $320,748.25 Fee Award to Plaintiff Conservator.

     Plaintiff conservator won a $99,900 compensatory jury verdict against certain defendants, but only one defendant was found liable under the elder abuse statute containing a mandatory fee shifting provision against unsuccessful defendants. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.5(a).) Later, the trial court ordered the same defendant liable for elder abuse to pay attorney’s fees of $320,748.25. Defendant appealed the fee award.

     It was affirmed in Conservatorship of the Estate of Ida McQueen, Case No A126825 (1st Dist., Div. 4 Jan. 14, 2011) (certified for partial publication on other issues, fee discussion not published).

     Entitlement was not an issue, once the appellate court rebuffed merit challenges to the elder abuse verdict. Appealing defendant argued that much of the time spent by the fee requesting attorneys was expended on other defendants and other causes of action.

     Allocation or apportionment, however, is a matter for a trial court’s discretion, especially where a common core of facts or legal theories are involved--as it was in the instant case. (Thompson Pacific Construction, Inc. v. City of Sunnyvale, 155 Cal.App.4th 525, 555 (2007); Drouin v. Fleetwood Enterprises, 163 Cal.App.3d 486, 493 (1985).) The lower court did not err in refusing to allocate given that the various claims were “factually intertwined,” making it impracticable to separate the conjoined activities into compensable or noncompensable time units. (Fed-Mart Corp. v. Pell Enterprises, Inc., 111 Cal.App.3d 215, 227 (1980).)

Family Law Awards: $175,000 Fee Award For Child Custody, Visitation, and Support Issues Affirmed On Appeal

 

Second District, Division 6 Finds that Prenuptial Agreement Fee Waiver Only Related to Property/Spousal Issues and that California Would Not Enforce Waiver With Respect to Child Issues.

     Husband and wife entered into a prenuptial agreement under Michigan law where, among other things, they agreed to waive any attorney’s fees resulting from any divorce, separation or annulment proceedings. Later, they moved to California and bought an expensive Montecito residence to which pricey improvements were made. Once the relationship broke down, a divorce proceeding resulted in an order that husband pay $6,000 in monthly child support payments. Because wife had to rebut claims of negative net worth advanced by husband (claims found unpersuasive), the trial court awarded her fees of $175,000 out of a requested $313,000.

     Husband, on appeal in Marriage of Lane, Case No. B215911 (2d Dist., Div. 6 Jan. 13, 2011) (unpublished), principally argued that the fee award was barred by the fee waiver clause in the Michigan prenuptial agreement.

 

 

Madame Ganna Walska’s Lotusland, Montecito.

 

Fee Clause Interpretation: Later Independent Contractor Agreement Did Not Extinguish Fee Clause In Earlier Purchase Agreement

Fifth District Finds No Novation Under the Circumstances.

     Here is a contractual interpretation/novation case that presents a set of circumstances we have not reported on to date.

     In Miller v. London Properties, Case No. F059259 (5th Dist. Jan. 13, 2011) (unpublished), defendant brokers prevailed in a contractual dispute with plaintiffs over their purchase of an Oakhurst salon known as Sakani Spa. The trial court awarded defendants $78,262.50 in attorney’s fees under an unambiguous fee clause in the purchase agreement.

     On appeal, plaintiffs argued that a subsequent independent contractor agreement superseded the purchase agreement, meaning the fee clause also went POOF!

     Both the trial and appellate courts disagreed.

     The only holistic, reasonable contractual interpretation was that the independent contractor agreement only superseded any prior understandings about one of the plaintiff’s relationships with the spa. Alternatively, under novation principles, there was no clear and convincing evidence of an intent to extinguish the purchase agreement when all the terms of the independent contractor agreement were examined.

     Fee award affirmed.

Spa.  Hada kurabe hana no shōbuyu kurabe (hoso?), koshi yuki no ya.  Artist:  Kunichika Toyhara.  1833-1904.  Library of Congress.

Probate/Substantiation of Fees: $693,876.02 Extraordinary Fee Award To Estate Administrator’s Attorney Affirmed On Appeal

No Res Judicata Impact From Prior Fee Denial; Daily Substantiation Requirements Do Not Govern Probate Fee Awards.

     This post will definitely interest probate practitioners. Aside from the fact that it involves a fairly substantial “extraordinary fee” award, it also demonstrates that the appellate courts will be demanding on application of res judicata principles and will not require overly stringent substantiation requirements for extraordinary fee requests (at least as compared to other areas, such as lodestar oriented requests).

     Estate of Goldstein, Case No. A126507 (1st Dist., Div. 2 Jan. 12, 2011) (unpublished) is the case, where a lower court awarded Downey Brand an award of $693,876.02 for “extraordinary fees” in representing an attorney’s estate in litigation against former firm members for fee entitlement in several settled flood cases and in a separate interpleader--all involving about 3 years of work.

Civil Rights/Sanctions: Federal Court of Appeals Provides Guidance on When Fees Should Be Awarded Against Losing Civil Rights Plaintiffs

 

First Circuit Finds Excluded Trial Evidence Could Be Used to Determine Reasonableness of Suit, Reversing Fee Award; Reviewing Court Also Scaled Down Sanctions Against Plaintiffs’ Attorney.

      In a civil rights political discrimination case, a district judge granted the defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law after a 15 day trial, in a ruling adverse to suing public employees. Plaintiff officers were then hit with an attorney’s fees award of $194,808 in favor of defendant mayor when the district judge found the suit was groundless and unreasonable. The district judge also ordered plaintiffs’ attorney to pay a third of the fee award ($64,936) for vexatious trial conduct under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, reducing the fee award against the plaintiffs to $129,872. The First Circuit, in Lamboy-Ortiz v. Ortiz-Velez, No. 09-1640 (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 2010), reversed the fee award against plaintiffs and scaled back the sanctions award against plaintiffs’ attorney.

     Fee Award

     The major problem with the district judge’s approach was putting too much weight on the ultimate failure of plaintiffs’ claims and ignoring excluded trial evidence that showed the reasonableness of the claims. Because the reasonableness compass focuses on circumstances existing at the time the complaint was filed, the fee order contravened the “non-hindsight” test of Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978).

     Attorney Sanctions

     F.R.Civ. P. 11 was out as a basis for sanctions, because the “safe harbor” provisions were not satisfied and it only applies to misconduct in written papers filed with the district judge. The sanctions here were imposed for plaintiffs’ attorney’s trial conduct, meaning that they had to be gauged under 27 U.S.C. § 1927.

     Although finding that § 1927 has both compensatory and punishment purposes (agreeing with the Seventh and Tenth Circuit versus the punitive goal singularly latched onto by the Second, Third, Sixth, and Federal Circuits), the sanctions were justified given the trial misconduct at issue. However, it was the amount of the sanctions that troubled the First Circuit. It found that the nearly $65,000 amount was “outside the mainstream in this circuit,” reducing the sanction to $5,000. (The federal court of appeals also noted the earlier sanctions would impose an unjustifiable hardship on plaintiff’s attorney, who operates a small law office with his son--a rationale we would label the “pocketbook mitigation rule.”)

Special Fee Shifting Statute: Losing Patent Plaintiff’s Case Was Not Exceptional So As To Warrant Adverse Fee Award As Sanctions

 

Federal Circuit Reversed $660,351.93 Fee Award to Google.

     Here is an interesting patent decision where a substantial fee award of $660,351.93 to Google was reversed by the Federal Circuit.

     In iLOR, LLC v. Google, No. 2010-1117, 1172 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 11, 2011), Google moved to recover fees and costs from a losing plaintiff in a patent case under 35 U.S.C. § 285, which does allow district courts authority to award fees to a prevailing party in “exceptional cases.” The district judge obviously thought this was one of them, awarding $660,351.93 in fees to Google.

     The Federal Circuit reversed.

     It likened the “exceptional case” standard under § 285 for a suit brought by a patent plaintiff to that of willful infringement, absent evidence of patent prosecution or litigation misconduct (evidence not present in the case under review). The Federal Circuit found iLOR’s claims were not objectively baseless, so it did not need to scrutinize any subjective bad faith proof. Simply being wrong in a claim construction should not subject a losing patent plaintiff to § 285 sanctions where its construction is not objectively baseless in nature.

Section 998: “Early On” 998 Offer Did Not Give Rise To Cost Shifting Because There Was No Free Flow Of Information Or Pre-existing Relationships Between Litigants

 

Fifth District Passes On Impact of Third District’s Opinion in Barba v. Perez.

     Just to show you how California intermediate appellate opinions do indeed enter into the jurisprudential “flow” of decisions, we now can report on how another appellate court has reacted to Barba v. Perez, 166 Cal.App.4th 444 (2008), an interesting CCP § 998 decision from the Third District resulting in a split result.

     The Fifth District weighed in on the impact of this prior decision in Najera v. Huerta, Case No. F058850 (5th Dist. Jan. 10, 2011) (certified for partial publication, including § 998 and costs decision).

     In Najera, plaintiff was awarded $728,708.83 in an automobile-motorcycle accident case, with a new trial granted on a specific damages component only. The defense failed to accept a 998 offer, served at the time of the original summons and complaint, and then moved to tax costs after plaintiff won. The trial court granted the motion to tax costs in entirety, consisting of requests for expert witness fees and routine costs.

     The trial court determination was affirmed on the costs issue.

     A 998 offer must be evaluated early on, but only if the defense has a flow of sufficient information to evaluate it. Here, the facts showed that the defense did not commit error in providing an early 998 offer under the deferential abuse of discretion standard, with the opinion engaging in a scholarly review of the Third District’s decision of Barba v. Perez, 166 Cal.App.4th 444 (2008) in reaching the result--with the Fifth District suggesting it liked the dissenting viewpoint more than the majority decision in Barba. Very interesting reading as to how courts are interpreting Barba.

In The News . . . . Attorney’s Fees Paid To County Law Firm From Criminally Seized Assets

 

Riverside County Did So, Drawing Some Publicity and Fees With a Twist!

     As reported by Richard K. De Atley of The Press-Enterprise in a January 10, 2011 post, Riverside County apparently paid some of its defense lawyers in a suit against outgoing District Attorney Rod Pacheco through funds gained from criminally seized assets. Records obtained by The Press-Enterprise showed 11 checks at $10,000 each to the Santa Monica firm of Bingham McCutcheon, because $10,000 amounts are the maximum that can be spent without the county obtaining supervisors’ approval. Professor Laurie Levenson of Loyola Law School, L.A. said that the use of asset forfeiture money to pay lawyers “is unusual, but that does not mean it is illegal or improper--just very creative.” A blogging commentator named Guest observed that many other prosecutors throughout the U.S. had been called to task for using asset forfeiture funds for illegitimate purposes, disagreeing with Professor Levenson’s quotation on the subject. Indeed, this is fee payment with an unusual twist!

Section 1717: Wife’s Defeat Of Contractual Action On Technicality Still Entitled Her To Fee Recovery

 

Broad Fee Clause and Compulsory Cross-Complaint Issue Sealed the Deal.

     You knew that this next case would be interesting when the appellate court said the following: “The records make it abundantly clear, however, that the litigation became extremely contentious, and even the parties’ lawyers became infected with the rancor and ceased to act reasonably or with professional civility.” Whew! And the appellate court even urged the parties to reach a global resolution notwithstanding how it ruled.

     The case is Rosen v. Cook, Case No. A123548 (1st Dist., Div. 1 Jan. 11, 2011) (unpublished). As germane to this blog, wife defeated a contractual claim, which had a broad fees clause in a trust deed, based on the failure to bring the claim as a compulsory cross-complaint. The appellate court found that Civil Code section 1717 mutuality principles were invoked, with it being material that wife prevailed on a technicality for fee recovery purposes.

     The Court of Appeal, although it could fix fees, found the better practice was to remand to the trial court for determination. (Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino, 185 Cal.App.4th 866, 901 (2010).) However, one got the distinct impression that it still wanted the parties to see if they could settle this 6-year-long litigation epic.

E-Discovery: N.D. Illinois Court Clarifies Cost Shifting Factors In Non-Party E-Discovery Context

 

Degeer v. Gillis Examines Factors to be Weighted For Shifting Costs in Third Party Electronic Discovery Disputes.

     In Degeer v. Gillis, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129745 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 8, 2010), U.S. District Judge Nan R. Nolan examines the obligations of parties and non-parties under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 as it relates to cost-shifting in the e-discovery context.

Private Attorney General Statute: $73,167.50 Worker Prevailing Wage Construction Fee Award Affirmed On Appeal

Sixth District Finds that Construction Prevailing Wage Ruling For 900 Construction Workers Met CCP § 1021.5 Requisites.

     Monterey/Santa Cruz County Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Cypress Marina Heights LP, Case No. H034143 (6th Dist. Jan. 10, 2011) (unpublished) involved a situation where plaintiffs won a proceeding against a defendant which acquired Ford Ord for a development project, with plaintiffs vindicating certain construction workers claiming they should be paid a prevailing wage on the project. The trial court awarded plaintiffs $73,167.50 in attorney’s fees under CCP § 1021.5 (California’s private attorney general statute) out of a requested $212,550 in fees.

     Fee award affirmed. Plaintiffs’ vindication of prevailing wage requirements did vindicate a public interest and revitalized a local economy, with the result benefitting a large class of individuals--900 construction workers. The amount of the fee award was reasonable, given that only 35% of the requested amount was awarded.

  NYC Construction Workers 200 Feet Above Ground.  1907.

Pleading: Simply Pleading Fee Recovery For Negligent Misrepresentation Does Not Do The Trick!

No Entitlement, No Fees.

     In SMDM Properties, Inc. v. Developers Diversified Realty Corp., Case No A126643 (1st Dist., Div. 2 Jan. 10, 2011) (unpublished), the appellate court reminded us of a pivotal lesson in the attorney’s fees area: you need a proper predicate for fee entitlement. If not, no fee recovery. There, plaintiffs took issue with a lower court striking an attorney’s fees prayer alleged as an adjunct to a standard negligent misrepresentation claim. No error, said the appellate court. No authorities demonstrated that plaintiffs should get fees as consequential damages if they win a negligent misrepresentation claim. The alleged fee clause was not broad enough and no “tort of another” exception was pled. Result: no harm in striking a fee prayer.

Sanctions: Vexatious Litigant Does Not Need Prefiling Permission When Represented By Counsel In A Case.

Fifth District So Holds.

     In Flores v. Georgeson, Case No. F059173 (5th Dist. Jan. 10, 2011) (certified for publication), the Fifth District held that a vexatious litigant does not need to satisfy the CCP § 391.7(a) permission-prefiling requirement when the litigant is represented by counsel in a case.

     The 3-0 decision was penned by Justice Detjen.

Section 998/Routine Costs: 998 Offer Not In Bad Faith And Routine Costs Are in Order Except for FedEx Charge

Court of Appeal Disagrees that FedEx Charge Allowable Under Costs Statute as “Postage” Charge Equivalent.

     Many of the decisions we review are fairly technical, and the next one is no exception. It does show that 998 offer rejection decisions will be reviewed for abuse of discretion, but that costs decisions on legal entitlement will frequently draw de novo review except to the extent that “necessary/reasonable” determinations are involved.

     Vigliotti v. Harkleroad, Case No. D055638 (4th Dist., Div. 1 Jan. 10, 2011) (unpublished) involved a “parking lot bump” personal injury action in which the defense won a jury verdict (even after an appeal sustaining the verdict). The defense moved to recover costs of $21,090.84, which was granted in full after the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion to tax costss. Following an appeal by plaintiff, the appellate court affirmed the costs award, except to strike $67.54 in FedEx expenses from the costs award.

     Plaintiff appealed, but was rebuffed in the costs award challenges.

     The main challenge was to the defense CCP § 998 pretrial offer of $3,501 as being a “bad faith” 998 offer. (Arno v. Helinet Corp., 130 Cal.App.4th 1019, 1024-1025 (2005).) Did not work. All of the challenges were rejected because the defense offer had to be evaluated based on evidence available at the time of the offer, which worked in the defense favor for purposes of showing no abuse of discretion. (Elrod v. Oregon Cummins Diesel, Inc.,, 195 Cal.App.3d 692, 699 (1987).)

     The amount of expert witness fees were found to be reasonable; after all, credibility and fee amount challenges are hard to win on appeal.

     That brings us to the one item that resulted in a slight (and, we mean, very slight) reversal. Plaintiff did challenge a FedEx costs charge of $67.54, which was meritorious. The Fourth District, Division 1 disagreed with Foothill-De Anza Community College Dist. v. Emerich, 158 Cal.App.4th 11 (2007) to the extent it held that a FedEx costs charge was not the equivalent of a “postage” charge not recoverable under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5(b)(3). With that exception, costs award affirmed in toto.

Probate: Trustee’s Attorney Not Entitled To Full Fees Where Record Showed Attorney Did Not Protect Remainder Beneficiary Interests

$7,500 Fee Award Out of Requested $36,000 In Fees Sustained On Appeal.

     Here is one showing how lower courts will balance the interests of trustees and trust remainder beneficiaries when crafting fee awards. (Boy, these terms take us back to law school probate classes, don’t they?)

     In Clare v. MacCarley, Case No. B223107 (2d Dist., Div. 5 Jan. 10, 2011) (unpublished), attorney representing a former trustee appealed a $7,500 fee award because she only gained this amount of a requested $36,000 fee request following objections by two trust remainder beneficiaries. She appealed, but lost.

     The problem here was that trustee and his wife conveyed trust property to themselves and took actions that made clear wife was trying to manipulate trust assets to her benefit, all in derogation of the interests of the two remainder beneficiaries. The key concern here was to determine whether there was an abuse of discretion in only awarding less than one-fourth of requested fees to trustee’s attorney, which required balancing what fees were spent to benefit the trust versus fees spent to benefit the trustee.

     No abuse of discretion in this instance because a lot of the efforts went to benefitting the trustee (and wife), rather than the trust. (Donahue v. Donahue, 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 269-270 (2010) [one of our Top 20 Cases for 2010].) The lower court has authority to protect the interests of remainder beneficiaries (Salter v. Lerner, 176 Cal.App.4th 1184, 1189 (2009)), something which was apparently done in the fashioning of the fee award reducing the fee request to former trustee’s attorney in this particular case.

Requests For Admissions: Deny The Obvious And Face Monetary Sanctions

Failure to Admit Four Specific RFAs Propounded By Defense Justified $7,741.48 in Attorney’s Fees Under CCP § 2033.420.

     In our category “Requests for Admissions,” we have explored the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420 which, in a nutshell, authorizes imposition of fees and costs for denying a request for admission unless there was good cause. Even then, the award is limited to costs-of-proof expenses rather than burdening the losing party with all the fees and costs of a case (unless there is some other fee-shifting clause or statute allowing recoupment by a prevailing party).

     The next case demonstrates that a litigant should not deny an admission request dealing with a core issue within the litigant’s knowledge. If this happens and costs-of-proof expenses are allowed, it will be hard to obtain reversal of any adverse award.

     In Moore v. California Surety Investigations, Case No. D055253 (4th Dist., Div. 1 Jan. 7, 2011) (unpublished), employee filed a disability discrimination and failure to engage in interactive process claims against employer, which asked him to admit that he could no longer physically apprehend bail fugitives without compromising the health/safety of himself or other investigators as a result of a back injury. He denied four specific RFAs on these circumstances, arguing that “physically apprehend” meant only peaceful apprehension so that denial was proper. The trial court disagreed, awarding employer costs-of-proof attorney’s fees of $7,741.48 under section 2033.420.

     The appellate court affirmed the costs-of-proof award. The lower court could reasonably find that the term “physically apprehend” was not ambiguous and aimed at obtaining employee’s admission that he could not physically apprehend bail fugitives rather than handle a peaceful surrender by a fugitive. Employee’s reliance on Miller v. American Greetings Corp., 161 Cal.App.4th 1055, 1066 (2008) was found misplaced, because the admissions requested occurred in the context of an unsettled area of the law--hardly the situation at play in Moore. No abuse of discretion attended the lower court’s award.

The Fugitive - Final Episode Epilogue

           To hear the “Dog the Bounty Hunter” theme, click here.

Prevailing Party: $79,267.65 Winner Of Contract Dispute After Jury Trial Garners $261,176.50 Fee Award And $22,312.87 Costs Award

Fee Award Does Not Have to be Proportional to Damages Award for Civil Code Section 1717 “Prevailing Party” Purposes.

     Here is one which, yet again, reiterates that trial courts have tremendous discretion in determining the “prevailing party” under Civil Code section 1717 as well as the amount of damages to be awarded--which do not have to be proportionate to the damages award.

     Monarch Consulting, Inc. v. Karkehabadi, Case No. B214178 (2d Dist., Div. 2 Jan. 6, 2011) (unpublished) concerned a defendant who lost a contract dispute with plaintiff to the tune of $79,267.65 (about half of what plaintiff sought). The trial court then determined plaintiff had prevailed under a contractual fees clause, assessing against defendant a fee award of $261,176.50 plus $22,312.87 in costs.

     After losing a merits based appeal of certain issues, defendant challenged the “prevailing party” fee determination of the lower court. That was not persuasive, either.

     Hsu v. Abbara, 9 Cal.4th 863, 876 (1995) [one of our Leading Cases], which bases prevailing party status on a comparative analysis of the success or failure of litigation objectives by each side, “does not suggest that the trial court’s prevailing party determination need be inflexibly applied based on the monetary award,” preferring instead resort to an “equitable considerations” compass. (Slip Opn., p. 15.) Even though plaintiff did not get every penny that he requested, the lower court was well within its discretion in awarding the fees that it did--especially after a hard fought battle that went to a jury for eventual resolution.

Employment: Regents Of The University Of California Cannot Be Socked With

 

Fee Recovery In Pension Eligibility Funds Dispute

Regents Is Constitutionally Immune from Labor Code section 218.5 Exposure in this Context.

     In a first-impression case, the Fourth District, Division One decided that the Regents of the University of California cannot be saddled with fee exposure under Labor Code section 218.5, a normal mandatory fee-shifting provision, in a proceeding where a UCSD professor settled a dispute in a way by which he established his eligibility for pension fund benefits. The case is Goldbaum v. The Regents of the Univ. of Cal., Case No. D055845 (4th Dist., Div. 1 Jan. 6, 2011) (certified for publication).

Regents of the University of California Meet to Discuss the Loyalty Oath.  1950s.

New Legislation: Expedited Jury Trials Are Now Possible, With Attorney's Fees Motions Among The Allowable Motions

 

AB 2284 Became Effective January 1, 2011.

     Effective January 1, 2011, litigants can opt to participate in an expedited jury trial before a reduced jury panel of eight jurors with a goal to complete the trial in one day. Participation is completely voluntary, but the parties do agree to waive certain post-trial motions and limit the issues to be appealed drastically. The parties can also enter into high/low agreements. Voir dire and pre-trial procedures are much more truncated in nature and much more flexible.

     The only post-trial motions allowed, fortunately for the litigants, are motions relating to costs and attorney's fees, motions to correct a judgment for clerical error, and motion to enforce a judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 630.09(c).) So, there appear to be no procedural changes for bringing costs or fee issues before the trial court under this new procedure.

     For more on this expedited jury trial process, see Patrick Cathcart's recent LexisNexis Emerging Issues Analysis on the subject. (See 2011 Emerging Issues 5474.) Mr. Cathcart is a colleague of co-contributors Marc and Mike at AlvaradoSmith, APC. The new procedure is codified at Code of Civil Procedure section 630.01 et seq.

   First Woman [sic] Jury, Los Angeles.  1915.