Public Interest and Financial Burden Elements Met Based on Detailed Moving Submissions; Multiplier Request Denied.
In Indio Police Command Unit Assn. v. City of Indio, Case No. G050051 (4th Dist., Div. 3 Sept. 15, 2014) (unpublished), Presiding Justice O’Leary, the author for the assigned panel hearing the case, confronted a $102,900 fee award to a police officer union association prevailing on an injunction to force City of Indio’s compliance with good faith meet and confer requirements of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA), which requires a public agency to notify and offer to meet with a recognized employee organization directly relating to matters within the scope of representation (which usually does include a panoply of wage/hour and employment issues). It is the purpose of the MMBA “to promote full communication between public employers and their employees by providing a reasonable method of resolving disputes regarding wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment between public employers and public employee organizations.” See Cal. Gov. Code, section 3500.
The basis for the award was the private attorney general statute.
After finding that the appeal was not moot after City’s compliance with the injunction (given that the fee recovery was still under controversy), our local Santa Ana appellate court affirmed the fee order.
A public interest was involved, with many cases recognizing that statutory rights (including in the POBRA area) qualify as such. (E.g., Riverside Sheriffs’ Assn. v. County of Riverside, 152 Cal.App.4th 414, 422 (2007); People ex rel. Seal Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Seal Beach, 36 Cal.3d 591, 594 (1984).) A significant benefit was conferred on the general public given that the result benefited other employee unions within the City of Riverside. Fee claimant also demonstrated that the financial burden of private enforcement was great, with the fees constituting at least six years of membership fees and with fairly small benefits to the officers directly benefitted.
In addition, fee claimant was entitled to fees for prevailing on appeal.
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