A Reader Comments On Our Post About Willow Bend v. City of Holtville.

Above: Neideffer Camp, Holtville, Imperial Valley. Dorothea Lange, photographer. Spring 1937. Library of Congress.
Attorney Larry M. Hoffman of Vancouver, Washington, the advocate for appellants in Willow Bend v. City of Holtville, has written to us to comment about our post about that case. Willow Bend involved the Mobile Residency Law (MRL), Civ. Code sections 798 et seq., which law has special fee-shifting provisions. We welcome comments from readers, and reproduce Mr. Hoffman’s comments in full:
I've just come across your blog. I'm writing to thank you for your efforts. The blog is as entertaining as it is useful.
Also, as the lawyer for the appellants in the above-referenced case, I want to let you know I think your analysis of that case in your post dated August 23, 2014 missed the mark.
You say the question in that case was "whether the lower court denial of fees was proper as to cross-defendants, some of whom only prevailed on some MRL-oriented claims and one of whom was dismissed from the entire cross-complaint." The statement, that "some of [the cross-defendants] only prevailed on some MRL oriented claims" suggests the reason denial of fees was reversed as to only one of the three cross-defendants is that the other two did not prevail on at least one MRL-oriented claim. But that's not true. There were two MRL causes of action in the cross-complaint, and both were asserted against and dismissed as to all three cross-defendants.
The appellate court affirmed denial of the motion as to two of the cross-defendants, not because they did not prevail on an MRL-oriented claim, but because they did not prevail on non-MRL claims, namely: the causes of action they had asserted against the City which were dismissed when the trial court granted the City';s motion for summary judgment. The court reversed denial of the fee motion as to cross-defendant Barton Properties, Inc. because it was not a plaintiff; it was a party only because the City named it as a cross-defendant. According to the Court of Appeal, Barton was entitled to a fee award because it prevailed on every cause of action in which it was a party, and the other two cross-defendants were not entitled to a fee award because they were parties to causes of action in which they did not prevail.
That brings into focus the holding of the case: where a plaintiff joins an MRL cause of action with a non-MRL cause of action and dismisses the MRL cause of action prior to trial, whether the defendant qualifies as a prevailing party under the MRL fee statute depends on the outcome of the non-MRL cause of action.
That holding makes no sense. The MRL fee statute awards fees to the prevailing party, and it defines "prevailing party" to include the defendant where the plaintiff dismisses prior to trial. I can think of very good reasons for such a rule. For example, it helps weed out unmeritorious claims [a plaintiff has to think twice before asserting an MRL claim because if it finds out prior to trial that the claim lacks merit, dismissal will result in a fee award to the defendant]. But that purpose is impaired if the defendant's right to a fee award depends on the outcome of an unrelated claim with which the MRL causes of action happens to have been joined.
Moreover, this decision conflicts with two other cases. In Aleman v. Air Touch Cellular (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 495, the court rejected an interpretation of a Labor Code fee provision under which the right to a fee award would depend on whether two unrelated claims were asserted in separate actions or in one action. And, in Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140 -- decided by the same court [4th District, Div. 1 (albeit a different panel)] as Willow Bend -- the court reversed a trial court that awarded the prevailing party fees under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act and Auto Financing Sales Act but reduced the amount because the plaintiff did not prevail on other causes of action. The court said, "The relevant inquiry ... was simply whether ... [plaintiff] was the prevailing party with respect to her causes of action under the CLRA and ASFA, under which she sought attorney's fees." Here, the relevant inquiry should have been only whether the three cross-defendants prevailed on the MRL causes of action.
[Incidentally, this case will probably produce another decision of interest to you and your readers. Upon remand, the trial court made a fee award and the City has appealed from that ruling. I believe one of the City's arguments will be that the trial court committed error of constitutional proportions by issuing its ruling, in accordance with the appellate court's instructions, without first giving the City an opportunity to be heard. Based on my experience, and what I've been told by other lawyers and what I've read in the practice books, it seems that what the trial did in this case -- issue a ruling without first conducting any sort of hearing -- is highly unusual. Whether required or not, the common practice -- even where the action to be taken is ministerial -- seems to be to wait for a party to make a motion bringing the matter before the court, or for the court to set a hearing, or status conference, on its own, before making any ruling. If you are aware of cases or treatises discussing whether a hearing is required before the court can act, I'd appreciate hearing about them.]
Again, thanks for your efforts. It's a great contribution to the development of the law.