Private Attorney General, Requests For Admissions, Section 998: Former Employee Plaintiff Winning $50,000 In Damages Properly Denied Costs Of Proof Sanctions And Private Attorney General Fees

Trial Judge Also Properly Awarded Costs To Defense Under CCP § 998 Offer.

            One of the beauties of posting on unpublished decisions is to see the array of cross-over issues in fees/costs issues at the California state level.  Chamblee v. Inland Behavioral and Health Services, Inc., Case No. D073121 (4^th Dist., Div. 1 Apr. 19, 2018) (unpublished) illustrates such issues which must be routinely resolved by both trial and appellate judges.

            There, ex-employee sued employer for constructive termination based on illegal and improper conduct, with a jury verdict returning a $50,000 total damages verdict based on her belief the conduct was illegal/improper but with no jury finding to the effect that there was any illegal/improper conduct having been committed.  Earlier, the defense had made a CCP § 998 offer to settle for $75,000, along with terms indicating that an arbitrator would determine any pre-offer costs/fees as well as a general release of claims made in prosecuting the action—an offer rejected by plaintiff.  After the jury verdict, the trial court made three decisions: (1) denied plaintiff’s costs-of-proof sanctions for denying certain requests for admissions relating to illegal/improper practices; (2) denied plaintiff’s request for an award of attorney’s fees based on a private attorney general theory; and (3) awarded the defense certain costs based on plaintiff’s rejection of the 998 offer.  Plaintiff appealed, but all of the post-trial rulings were affirmed.

            Number one—costs of proof sanctions for denying certain requests for admissions—because the jury never determined the practices were illegal, RFA denials of admissions on this issue were made reasonably and in good faith.

            Number two—private attorney general fees—because plaintiff was pursuing her own financial interests and the jury never made a “public interest” finding that any practices were illegal/improper, no findings were made of a significant nature to the general public.

            Number three—section 998 costs-shifting—the offer to have the pre-offer costs determined by an arbitrator, rather than a court, did not make a whit of difference and the general release was limited to claims in the lawsuit.  The fact that the offer was made pre-suit, in this case, made no difference because plaintiff had ample opportunity to evaluate her claims, countering at $1 million a few days later so as to show she had made a risk assessment of the case.