Lease Fees Provision Saying Everyone Bears Their Own Fees Did Not Preempt Statutory Fee Entitlement Provisions.
In Gupta v. Choy, Case No. A151582 (1st Dist., Div. 1 June 27, 2018) (unpublished), plaintiff tenant dismissed a case without prejudice against defendants, either landlords or at least their agents, on the eve of trial. Defendants brought a motion for attorney’s fees under a San Francisco Rent Ordinance and Civil Code section 1942.4, which both have fee-shifting provisions. Although asking for $25,250, the dismissed defendants garnered a fee award of $19,200.
Plaintiff’s appeal of the fee award did not result in any change.
The San Francisco Ordinance did apply to agents, representatives or successors of the landlord, such that defendants indeed were prevailing parties. However, even though Civil Code section 1942.4 did not clearly encompass agency relationships within the landlord definition, the appellate court found plaintiff was bound by binding complaint admissions that defendants were landlords.
The appellate court determined that defendants were prevailing parties on a practical level; they wanted a defense judgment and obtained that through the dismissal. (Salehi v. Surfside III Condominium Owners Assn., 200 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1156 (2011); Intelligent Investments Corp. v. Gonzalez, 1 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 8-9 (2016).)
The 1/1 DCA panel rejected the argument that the lease agreement saying everyone would bear their own fees somehow took precedence over the statutory provisions providing fee entitlement.
The amount of the fee award was no abuse of discretion, with work claimed interrelated among compensable fee claims and with attorneys being able to claim market rate fees even though they billed their clients less. (Chacon v. Litke, 181 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1260 (2010).)
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