Reason For Civil Code Section 8157(d) Reversal Was That Winning Respondent Needed To Show That Nonprofit’s Action Was Frivolous, Unreasonable, And Groundless Under Christiansburg.
Proposition “A” Protective Assn. v. Mountains Recreation and Conservation Authority, Case Nos. B272381/B281923 (2d Dist., Div. 1 July 17, 2018) (unpublished) involved a situation where conservation authority sued an oil company and City of Whittier in a challenge to Whittier’s approval of a project to extract oil and gas from land that Whittier had purchased with funds approved by a Los Angeles County, voter-approved law known as Proposition “A,” which eventually led to a settlement agreement between the parties. The trial court in a subsequent action brought by various nonprofit, public interest parties held that the agreement was illegal and ultra vires based on plaintiffs’ arguments. On the merits, the appellate court reversed the principal argument that the settlement agreement was illegal and ultra vires. This had consequences as far as the fee awards were concerned, not to mention the need to apply a frivolousness standard with respect to a nonprofit’s exposure for fees under a statute.
The trial court below awarded PAPA (one of the nonprofit plaintiffs) $500,000 out of a requested $918,125.20 against two defendants (one of which was Whittier). The basis was CCP § 1021.5, California’s private attorney general statute. Because the appellate court reversed the merits ruling, the fee award to the conservation authority went POOF! also.
The lower court also awarded $187,456.86 against another nonprofit plaintiff and in favor of defendants (including Whittier). The basis for this fee award was Civil Code section 815.7(d), which allows a trial judge in his/her discretion to award fees to a prevailing party in an action to prohibit/restrain injury to or impairment of a conservation easement. The appellate court found that this section did provide a basis for a fee award, especially where the defendant prevailing party showed it was inapplicable in an action. However, the 2/1 DCA panel did reverse and remand the award. It did so based on its concern that this was public interest litigation, such that the losing nonprofit plaintiff should only face a fee award under section 815.7(d) if its action was frivolous, unreasonable and groundless in nature, importing such a standard from Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978). The lower court did not rule based on Christiansburg, so a remand was in order to see if fees should be awarded.
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