Those Factors Are: (1) How Far Into The Litigation Was The Offer Made; (2) Information Available To the Offeree Prior To The Offer’s Expiration; and (3) Whether The Offeree Informed Offeror That It Lacked Sufficient Information To Evaluate, And The Offeror’s Response.
We have posted many times on CCP § 998 offers, which can shift significant prejudgment interest, fees, costs if such offers are made in good faith (an implied important limiting requirement).
In Licudine v. Cedars-Sinai Med. Center, Case No. B286350 (2d Dist., Div. 2 Jan. 3, 2019) (published), the focus on whether a section 998 offer was made in good faith really did matter—otherwise, plaintiff was entitled to $2.335 million in prejudgment interest under a hefty medical mal jury verdict of $5,594,557 where the defense rejected an early-on section 998 offer for $249,999.99. The trial and appellate courts found that the 998 offer was not made in good faith. In doing so, the 2/2 DCA found three factors were especially pertinent in evaluating whether the offer was made in good faith: (1) how far into the litigation the 998 offer was made; (2) the information available to the offeree prior to the 998 offer’s expiration (such as voluntary exchanges of information or pre-existing relationships between the parties); and (3) whether the offeree let the offeror know it lacked sufficient information to evaluate the offer, and how the offeror responded. Here, the offer was made 19 days after plaintiff filed a “bare bones” complaint; the hospital needed more discovery information to evaluate the offer; and the defense requested more information. So, the hospital avoided a big chunk of prejudgment interest.
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