Reasonableness Of Fees, Special Fee Shifting Statute: Prevailing Defendant In Civil Harassment Proceeding Properly Awarded $10,000 In Fees And $1,100 In Costs

Trial Court’s Conclusion That $181,013.63 Request Was Unreasonable/Inflated Was Affirmed On Appeal.

            Folks, we can reiterate that you need to make opening fee requests which are reasonable and bear some semblance of reality to the case involved, subject to aggressive tactics by the other side or complexity/longevity of the case which usually will justify a substantial fee request.  The prevailing respondent learned that lesson hard in Felarca v. Worden, Case No. A153633 (1^st Dist., Div. 4 July 19, 2019) (unpublished).

            Petitioner filed a civil harassment restraining order against respondent, but she dismissed it before there was a merits ruling on her petition.  Respondent moved to recover attorney’s fees under CCP § 527.6(s), which is a discretionary fee-shifting provision in favor of a prevailing party in a civil harassment proceeding, CCP § 1032 (costs shifting provision), and CCP § 128.5 (sanctions provision).  Respondent sought $181,013.63 in fees, submitting redacted work descriptions and an invoice for work totaling $113,037.50.  The lower court found the submission was unreasonable and inflated, awarding $10,000 in fees and $1,100 in costs under the section 527.6(s) fee-shifting provision.  Both sides appealed, petitioner claiming that defendant did not prevail, and respondent claiming the fee award was woefully inadequate.

            The fee determination was affirmed on appeal.

            With respect to petitioner’s appeal, courts for section 527.6(s) fee-shifting purposes do use the CCP § 1032 prevailing party test (Adler v. Vaicius, 21 Cal.App.4^th 1770, 1777 (1993)); and, under that test, the respondent did prevail despite the voluntary dismissal.  The lower court expressly found that the petition lacked substantial justification, was inspired by “politics,” and the whole matter was unreasonably prolonged by petitioner’s conduct.  That was more than enough to establish prevailing party status in respondent’s favor.

            Respondent did not gain traction on trying to get more fees.  The lower court was not required to use the lodestar analysis in civil harassment proceedings.  The severely redacted fee submissions made it impossible to review the work performed, not to mention that asking for such a substantial sum in a non-complex civil harassment proceeding presented the different case of an inflated fee request which allowed for a stark reduction.  The appellate court ended with the observation that the lower court would have been within its right to deny the fee request altogether.  This brings us to the moral of this story, one we have repeated frequently:  when you make a fee submission, remember the nature of the case and what a trial judge will think when you present a greedy request!