Significant Disparity Between The Parties' Income And Assets Mandated The Fee Award.
In In re Marriage of Gibson, Case No. B294875 (2d Dist., Div. 1 November 1, 2019) (unpublished), ex-wife sought $170,890 in Family Code §§ 2030 and 2032 needs-based attorneys fees when ex-husband, singer/actor Tyrese Gibson, moved for a move-away order to allow him to move their daughter to his home in Atlanta, Georgia. The trial court, looking to avoid a lot of back-and-forth on the fees issue throughout the duration of the litigation, requested a declaration from ex-wife’s attorney itemizing the specific anticipated legal work to be conducted through trial on the move-away petition.
After a 51-hour reduction for unnecessary/ unreasonable time and for time to be spent on work irrelevant to the move-away petition, the trial court ordered Mr. Gibson to pay $147,140 in ex-wife’s attorneys’ fees through a schedule of installment payments set forth in the order. The trial court further ordered that – should Mr. Gibson’s move-away petition be successful, and he subsequently seek an order modifying child support – he pay an additional $14,725 in needs-based attorneys’ fees.
Mr. Gibson moved for a new trial regarding the fee award, but his request was denied as an improper remedy as no “trial” had been held – with a motion for reconsideration being the appropriate vehicle. Additionally, the trial court issued an order conditioning its further consideration of Mr. Gibson’s move-away petition on compliance with the attorney fee award.
Mr. Gibson appealed – claiming the trial court: (1) failed to consider his monthly expenses and obligations, including his own attorney fees; (2) had improperly viewed his real property assets as a source of funds; (3) had abused its discretion in awarding fees because of wife’s ability to pay some of her own legal expenses; (4) abused its discretion by requiring him to pay additional fees if he succeeded on his move-away petition and sought a child support modification; (5) ordered fees in an amount greater than what it deemed reasonably necessary; and (6) that the installment schedule set forth in the order was not manageable.
The 2/1 DCA rejected Mr. Gibson’s arguments and affirmed, with one exception – that the attorney fees award be reduced to $99,655 due to a calculation error made by the trial court, and that a new installment schedule be entered in line with the reduced amount.
There was no abuse in discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees to ex-wife under sections 2030 and 2032. Significant income disparity brought section 2030 into play – which allows an award of attorneys fees even if the party receiving the award has some ability to pay – in order to assure parity in the parties’ legal representation.
The 2/1 DCA found that unlike the trial courts in In re Marriage of Keech (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 860 and Alan S. v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 238, the trial court here had not failed to consider Mr. Gibson’s expenses and other obligations, and ability to afford his own attorney. It further agreed with the trial court – that even if Mr. Gibson had a monthly shortfall in meeting the scheduled payments, he has the ability to obtain funds through the approximate $1.8 million equity in his homes, his $100,000 bank account, and the ability to adjust his discretionary expenses. Following the reasoning in Alan S. v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 238, 255, the 2/1 DCA found the trial court appropriately considered the equity in Mr. Gibson’s real property assets in determining his ability to pay.
Finally, there was no error and no abuse of discretion as to the trial court’s contingent fee order tied to, and derived from, the success of Mr. Gibson’s move-away petition. If Mr. Gibson’s move-away petition were unsuccessful and he, therefore, did not seek a modification in child support as a result thereof, the contingent fee order would not come into play. Fee awards under section 2030 necessitate that courts make educated estimates on work yet to be performed, and provides them the discretion to do so. The trial court had reduced from ex-wife’s attorneys’ fees request the amount anticipated to conduct financial discovery. Financial discovery would, however, become necessary if Mr. Gibson moved for a modification of child support as a result of the move-away outcome. Having the fee information for the financial discovery already before it, the trial court simply shifted the burden, with respect to fees, to Mr. Gibson. It would be up to him to request a revision to that fee award before filing a modification request.
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