Judgment Enforcement: Fees/Costs Incurred In Successfully Adding Judgment Debtors, Including Appellate Work To Obtain That Successful Outcome, Were Prejudgment Costs Not Governed By EJL Procedures Or Deadlines

Award Of $80,000 Each In Fees To Two Successful Plaintiffs Remanded For A Re-Do.

            In Highland Springs Conference and Training Center v. City of Banning, Case No. E069248 (4^th Dist., Div. 2 Nov. 21, 2019) (published), two CEQA petitioners obtained a successful judgment relating to an EIR certification, obtaining significant attorney’s fees under the private attorney general statute, each, against the main real party in interest.  After real party lost certain property to a foreclosure and exhausted around $14 million in capital, petitioners filed a motion under CCP § 187 to add a new party as a judgment debtor to the judgment.  The trial judge denied the motion based on a lack of diligence, but the appellate court reversed in a prior decision (see 244 Cal.App.4^th 267, 273, 282-289 (2016)).  Petitioners then sought attorney’s fees connected with the 187 motion and attendant appellate work reversing the earlier denial order; petitioners sought fees over $1,274,000 in fees based on the private attorney general statute (which included a 1.5 multiplier).  The trial court refused to award fees for the 187/appellate work, primarily determining that the Enforcement of Judgments Law (EJL) postjudgment procedures/limitations applied.  The trial judge awarded each petitioner $80,000 in fees, rejecting the lodestar request, under CCP § 11021.5.

            The 4/2 DCA reversed and remanded.

            The appellate court concluded that prejudgment costs procedures, not EJL directives, applied to petitioners’ fee work for ultimately obtaining the 187 addition of judgment debtor order (inclusive of appellate work in the prior appeal).  They reached this conclusion even though petitioners had caused confusion by indicating they were making requests under the EJL, with the appellate court piercing to the substance and determining instead that prejudgment costs were at stake.  With respect to the remand, the appellate court did not voice any definitive guidance, but did remind the trial judge that private attorney general fee awards should generally be fully compensatory in nature.  This decision has a very good discussion of the differences between prejudgment and EJL postjudgment costs procedures/ limitations (especially parsing through the germane California Rules of Court).