Consumer Statutes, Prevailing Party: Abuse Of Discretion Where Trial Court Limited Attorney Fees Award Without Regard To Actual Time Expended By Plaintiffs’ Counsel In Successfully Initiating And Prosecuting Case Under The Song-Beverly Act

Trial Court Erroneously Used Plaintiffs’ Separate Net Monetary Recovery As Basis For Determining Prevailing Party Rather Than Plaintiffs’ Success In Meeting Litigation Objectives.

           Patel v. Mercedes-Benz USA, Case No. B293813 (2d Dist., Div. 4 December 17, 2019) (unpublished), includes a nice discussion on prevailing parties under the Song-Beverly Act.

            Here, a plaintiff sued Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC alleging it had leased to him a defective vehicle.  After four years of litigation, and several days of trial, Mercedes moved for nonsuit on the basis that the plaintiff had suffered no damages as the lease payments he made were reimbursed to him by his friend who was the primary driver of the vehicle.  The trial court denied the motion for nonsuit, but ordered that the friend be added to the case as a plaintiff, and the trial continued.  Plaintiffs moved for attorney fees after the jury returned its verdict against Mercedes.  Because the jury awarded damages solely to the friend who had been added as a plaintiff during the trial, the trial court awarded fees only to him – determining he was the only prevailing party as he was the only one awarded a monetary recovery by the jury.  The trial court also limited the fee award only to the fees incurred while the friend was a party to the case – from the penultimate day of trial onward. 

            Plaintiffs appealed, and the 2/4 DCA reversed – explaining that although prevailing party is not defined under Civ. Code § 1794(d), attorney fee recovery under the Song-Beverly Act is governed by the fee-shifting statute itself, rather than a rigid adherence to Code Civ. Proc. section 1032(a)(4) which defines a prevailing party as a party “with a net monetary recovery.” (Wohlgemuth v. Caterpillar Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4^th 1252, 1264 – discussed in our July 25, 2012 post.)  Civ. Code § 1794(d) provides that a buyer who prevails on an action brought under the Song-Beverly Act is entitled to recover fees and costs reasonably incurred for actual time expended in the commencement and prosecution of such an action.  Here, the trial court failed to consider the actual time expended in the commencement and prosecution of this case.  Additionally, the original plaintiff in this action was a prevailing party.  Though he was not personally awarded a monetary recovery, he had met his litigation objective because the lease payments made on the defective vehicle were returned with the jury’s award of damages.