Based On Trial Court’s Analysis Under Family Code § 4320, Husband Lacked The Financial Ability To Afford His Own Attorney Much Less Contribute To Wife’s Attorney Fees.
Family Code § 2030 provides California family law courts authority to level the playing field in dissolution actions, where sufficient disparity exists between the parties in their access to legal representation, by requiring one party to pay attorney fees to the other party.
In Korkka v. Petrenko, Case No. A156601 (1st Dist., Div. 2 June 19, 2020) (unpublished), wife, represented by legal counsel, unsuccessfully moved for section 2030 needs-based fees from her self-represented husband. The trial court addressed the fees request, as well as other questions at issue between the parties, in a detailed 33-page statement of decision – basing denial of the section 2030 fees on its analysis of section 4320 factors in determining spousal support. This analysis supported husband’s contention that no substantial disparity existed where he was unable to afford his own legal counsel for the dissolution action and lacked the financial ability to contribute to wife’s attorney fees. Wife appealed.
The 1/2 DCA found no abuse of discretion and affirmed. Both parties were self-represented on appeal and provided briefing not in compliance with appellate rules or authorities. The appellate panel described wife’s arguments for reversal of the trial court’s order on fees – simply that husband had more access to funds to pay fees, the husband had a higher earning capacity, and that his spousal support payments to her were set to end in short order – as “manifestly insufficient.” As the 1/2 DCA explained, a self-represented person must follow the correct rules of procedure and expect to receive the same treatment as if represented by an attorney. (Taylor v. Bell, 21 Cal.App.3d 1002, 1009 (1971); Nwosu v. Uba, 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247 (2004).)
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