Family Law: No Abuse Of Discretion In Trial Court’s Denial Of Fees And Costs For Appeal Of Companion Case To Mother In Parentage Action Who Earned Significantly Less Than Father, But Remand Was In Order For Denial Of Needs-Based Fees For DVPA Action

Family Code Section 7605 Allows For Needs-Based Fee And Costs Awards In Parentage Proceedings, But Can Apply To Separate Domestic Violence Prevention Act Proceedings Where They Involve The Same Or Similar Subject Matter.

            The mother of a 12-year-old boy, who has been involved in a contested parentage action with the boy’s father for roughly the last 12 years, sought an award from father of $60,000 in attorney fees and $5,000 in costs.  Specifically, Mother sought $50,000 to retain counsel to appeal a companion case, $10,000 to retain counsel to prosecute Father for her claims under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (“DVPA”) relating to his alleged hacking of her laptop, and $5,000 in costs for computer forensics work and subpoenas to support Mother’s accusations regarding her laptop.  When the trial court denied her requests – under Family Code §§ 2030, 7605, and 6344 – she appealed.

            The 4/3 DCA agreed with the trial court and affirmed with regard to Family Code §§ 2030 and 6344 in Douglas S. v. Jennifer E., Case No. G059942 (4^th Dist., Div. 3 April 29, 2022) (unpublished).  Although the trial court had previously determined Father made significantly more money than Mother, section 2030 was inapplicable as it allows for needs-based fee awards in actions for dissolution of marriage or legal separation, and neither the companion appellate case nor the DVPA case involved divorce or separation.  As to section 6344, which allows prevailing party fees and costs in domestic violence restraining order and protective order actions, Mother provided no proof that she had prevailed in a domestic violence restraining or protective order action except for the one addressed in the companion case for which she had already been awarded attorney fees.  Additionally, as to the $50,000 sought by Mother for the companion appeal, the trial court – in its broad discretion – determined that Father did not have the ability to pay that amount to Mother, and in such cases, appellate courts will not reverse absent a showing that no judge could reasonably have made the order. (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke, 203 Cal.App.4th 964, 975 (2012); In re Marriage of Winternitz, 235 Cal.App.4th 644, 657 (2015).)

            However, the 4/3 DCA reversed and remanded for further proceedings as to the fees and costs Mother sought in the DVPA proceeding as the panel found the trial court’s interpretation of section 7605 too restrictive.  The trial court had denied the DVPA proceeding fees and costs under section 7605 because the statute allows for a needs-based award of attorney fees and costs in a parentage proceeding, and a DVPA proceeding is not a parentage proceeding.  However, as set forth in C.T. v. K.W., 71 Cal.App.5th 679, 685 (2021) and N.S. v. D.M., 21 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1055 (2018), section 7605 can apply to separate DVPA proceedings that, as here, are “related” to the parentage action, where they “involve the same or similar subject matter.”