Special Fee Shifting Statutes: $125,000 Fees/Costs Award Under Public Records Act To Petitioner Was Reversed On Appeal, While The Lower Court’s Denial Of Fees To Responding Party Was Correct

Reason for Reversal As To Petitioner Was That The Responding Party Did Not Improperly Withhold Production Of Documents Responsive To The Original Records Request.

            The scope of request made under the California Public Records Act (Gov. Code, §§ 6250-6276.40—the PRA) took on special significance in Muchnick v. Regents of the University of California, Case No. A162259 (1^st Dist., Div. 5 Nov. 1, 2022) (unpublished).

            In this matter, petitioner sent a PRA request to Regents asking for a specific category of documents, with the parties then engaging in meet and confer sessions over certain nonexempt-claimed documents.  Petitioner sought new documents in the meet and confer sessions, with Regents confirming it had not withheld any documents under the original PRA request and with the lower court not ordering further production of documents under than those previously produced.  However, the lower court did award petitioner $125,000 in fees and costs as the prevailing party under PRA, but it denied Regent’s request for fees under the same statutory scheme.

            The appellate court reversed the fees/costs award in Petitioner’s favor and affirmed the denial of the University’s request for fees.

            With respect to petitioner’s argument that the Regents’ appeal was untimely, that required consideration of whether two subsequent judgments were substantial modifications so that the time to appeal ran from the initial judgment.  The appellate court determined those subsequent judgments were not substantial modifications, but Regents’ appeal was timely from the initial judgment under the longer 180-day period because no one served a notice of entry as to the initial judgment.

            On the merits, the appellate court determined after a review of the record that Regents was not obligated to produce any further documents because they were not responsive to the Petitioner’s PRA request.  The scope of that original request guided Regents’ production obligations, such that its production of records during the PRA post-litigation process, which were not responsive to the prelitigation request, could not support a finding that petitioner was the prevailing party.  As to the University’s fee request, nothing showed that petitioner’s PRA litigation was frivolous so there was no need to consider it on remand.