CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY'S FEES

Family Law: 2/8 DCA Affirms Base Family Code Section 271 Sanctions Award Plus $1,000 Per Day For Non-Compliance Purposes

Justice Wiley, In Concurring, Shows Why This Is A Necessary Result Given Public Discontent About The Costs Of Modern Litigation. 

            I guess one could say that Marriage of Andrew and Rangell, Case No. B313786 (2d Dist., Div. 8 Sept. 28, 2023) (published) is simply an affirmance, primarily, of Family Code section 271 sanctions award against an ex-husband for disobeying court orders and breaching settlement agreement obligations.  But it is more than that.  The appellate court, in both majority and concurring opinions, sustained that a 271 fees award can contain a “continuing” penalty of $1,000 per day to obtain compliance with previous court orders.  Justice Wiley, the concurring justice, found these future expenditures were justified, waxing eloquent about the public’s likely distain for substantial litigation expenses: “Our ruling is important, not only to litigants and trial courts, but also to the public at large, which has an abiding interest in effective judicial administration. The public rues the glacial pace and dismaying cost of litigation. When musing about suicide, Hamlet counts ‘the law’s delay’ among the ‘whips and scorns of time.’  Bleak House jeers at litigation that ‘so exhausts finances, patience, courage, hope, so overthrows the brain and breaks the heart’ that wise counsel is to ‘Suffer any wrong that can be done you rather than come here!’”  There you have it, readers.

Retainer Agreements: Retainer Agreement Provision Did Allow For An Attorney To Recover Fees Against A Client For Prevailing In A Fee Dispute

We Quote The Successful Language Below.

            In Leung v. Alivandivafa, Case No. B323416 (2d Dist., Div. 2 Sept. 26, 2023) (unpublished), attorney won a fee dispute with a client after a lower court determined that the governing contingency agreement was valid.  The lower court then awarded prevailing attorney $98,250 in fees, reducing the requested hourly rate from $600 to $500 based on experience and the nature of the dispute.  The appellate court affirmed.  Here is the fee clause in the retainer agreement which justified the fee award: “ATTORNEY has a lien for his fees and legal costs upon the CASE, any judgment obtained thereon, or the proceeds of any settlement or recovery.  ATTORNEY will also be eligible for fees and legal costs associated with recovery of any and all monies owed by CLIENT.”

Ethics, Retainer Agreement, Special Fee Shifting Provisions: Although Fee Award Against HOA Belongs To Attorney, Attorney Had To Offset For Contingency Fee Already Received

Attorney Was Liable For Substantial Elder Abuse Fees To Prevailing Elderly Client Based On Failing To Properly Offset And Return Money To Client.

            Koehler v. Prinz, Case No. C095229 (3d Dist. Sept. 25, 2023) (unpublished) is a case which shows that attorneys need to be careful when they receive a fee award which belongs to them, discussing the fee award with the client and then agreeing on an offset for contingency fees already received.

            In this one, attorney represented an elderly client and later her son in an HOA water intrusion case, receiving a compensatory settlement from HOA/property manager from which he took an agreed contingency fee of $109,374.  Attorney successfully defeated HOA’s cross-complaint which resulted in a Davis-Stirling Act fee/costs award of $412,075.94, which he retained and used to pay personal expenses.  That brought a dispute between attorney and clients on who owned the fee award and whether a credit should have been made for the $109,374 contingency fee previously received by attorney.  The lower court agreed that the fee award belonged to the attorney, but clients were entitled to an offset for the prior contingency received by attorney.  Elderly client won her financial elder abuse claim against attorney based on these facts, with the lower court awarding her about $167,500 in fees and costs under the financial elder abuse fee-shifting provision.

            The Third District affirmed.  Based on the retainer fee language and conduct of the parties, the appellate court concluded the HOA fee award did belong to the attorney, citing analogous cases in the FEHA, private attorney general, Labor Code, and trade secrets areas.  However, it also agreed that attorney had to make a reimbursement of the prior contingency fee award already paid—which was not done, constituting an ethical violation and financial elder abuse given work on the complaint and cross-complaint were inextricably intertwined.  The wrongful retention of the entire fee award supported the financial elder abuse fee award.

Requests For Admission, Section 998: Plaintiffs’ 998 Offer Was Invalid And Costs-Of-Proof Sanctions Properly Denied

Performance Components Of 998 Offer Were Too Ambiguous; RFAs Were Either Of No Substantial Importance Or Not Unreasonably Denied.

            In Jarecki v. Zitter, Case No. D078314 (4^th Dist., Div. 1 Sept. 26, 2023) (unpublished), a drainage dispute developed between property owners and downslope neighbors, resulting in plaintiffs losing a trespass claim but prevailing on a nuisance claim.  Plaintiffs sought expert witness costs under a rejected CCP § 998 offer, a request denied by the lower court.  That court also denied plaintiffs’ request for RFA costs-of-proof sanctions.

            The 4/1 DCA affirmed those determinations.  As to the § 998 offer, plaintiffs’ request had some performance-based terms which were too ambiguous in nature.  The reviewing court explained its conclusion this way: “Term A required them to ‘abate all conditions that cause . . . the nuisance,’ but it did not identify an adequate abatement or ‘all conditions’ at issue. The Jareckis contend they ‘wanted the wall down’ and ‘specifically informed’ the Zitters of the required actions to take or avoid. But term B separately required the Zitters to ‘remove the . . . wall’—implying term A could require something more—and the offer did not specify what term A required. As for term D’s injunction on ‘unreasonably interfering with the . . . discharge of water,’ this was general enough to potentially apply to any future effort by the Zitters to manage water flow from the Jarecki property.”  With respect to the RFAs, the ones on the trespass claim were of no “substantial importance” given this claim was rejected, and the ones on the nuisance claim were not unreasonably denied.

            BLOG BONUS COVERAGE—Also, in an interesting procedural issue, the appellate court agreed that no separate statement—as allowable in true discovery disputes—is allowable in a costs-of-proof proceeding because that would allow the moving party to exceed applicable moving brief page limitations.

Civil Rights, Section 998: Summary Judgment Winning Defendants Properly Denied FEHA Attorney’s Fees And Routine Costs Because Case Was Not Frivolous

Also, FEHA And Non-FEHA Claims Overlapped Such That Costs Recovery Was Foreclosed.

            In Liza v. CKE Restaurant Holdings, Case No. B313111 et al. (2d Dist., Div. 2 Sept. 25, 2023) (unpublished), defendant won a summary judgment against plaintiff’s FEHA and non-FEHA claims, although they did overlap.  The lower court later denied the defense request for attorney’s fees and routine costs.

            The 2/2 DCA affirmed.  The appellate court agreed with the lower court’s determination that the action was not frivolous, with a loss on a case not being the automatic equivalent of the matter being specious.  With respect to the interplay between FEHA claims, non-FEHA claims, and CCP § 998, the reviewing court found that Scott v. City of San Diego, 38 Cal.App.5^th 228, 242-243 (2019) was correct in reasoning that pre-998 versions did not change the rule that frivolity had to be found in the case, which prevented recovery of routine costs by the defense given the trial judge’s conclusion that there was overlap in the FEHA and non-FEHA issues.

            BLOG COMMENTARY—Where a defendant affirms an adverse FEHA determination, appellate costs also are governed by the frivolity standard.  (See Pollock v. Tri-Modal Distrib. Services, 11 Cal.5^th 918, 929 (2021).)

Section 998: Plaintiff Was Only Entitled To Smaller 998 Attorney’s Fees After Rejecting The Defense Offer

Plaintiff’s Later Accepted 998 Offer Did Not Make Things More Valuable, Because The Defense Rejected 998 Offer Did Allow For Reasonable Fee Recovery.

            In the CCP § 998 offer area, we see cases with interesting facts, and we have them in Elmi v. Related Management Company, L.P., Case No. G061379 (4^th Dist., Div. 3 Sept. 25, 2023) (unpublished), authored by Justice Goethals for a 3-0 panel.

            What happened here is that the defense submitted a 998 offer, rejected by plaintiff, offering to pay $10,001 plus statutory costs, including attorney’s fees on an Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act claim.  Later, plaintiff submitted his own 998 offer, offering to settle for $9,999, plus defense requirement with certain investigative consumer reporting requirements, plus reasonable fees and costs as determined by the court.  Plaintiff’s offer was accepted by the defense.  Plaintiff then moved for $302,146 in fees as the prevailing party, with the defense principally arguing that plaintiff could not recover fees for the period after it served the defense offer because plaintiff did not obtain a more favorable result and the requested fees were excessive in nature.  The lower court agreed that plaintiff was not entitled to fees after the defense rejected 998 offer and further reduced fees for over-litigation, eventually awarding $19,440 in fees.

            Plaintiff’s appeal was unsuccessful.  The appellate court found that plaintiff’s 998 offer was not more successful, because the rejected defense offer fully allowed for reasonable fee recovery as the trial judge would determine.  Because plaintiff’s $9,999 offer was less than the defense rejected offer of $10,001, the lower court’s fee award was no abuse of discretion.

Private Attorney General: Where Petitioner Had Limited Success And Lost Its Primary Litigation Objectives In CEQA Action, Lower Court Did Not Err In Reducing Requested Fees By About 90% And Denying A Positive Multiplier Request For One Firm’s Work

$37,346.30 Was The Fee Award From The $225,683 Lodestar Request Plus 1.5 Multiplier For One Component Of The Fee Request.

            Limited success and excessive fee requests, even in a CEQA context, confer considerable discretion on a lower court to fashion an appropriate fee award under California’s private attorney general statute.  These factors led to about a 90% reduction of a partially prevailing petitioner’s fee request in Friends of Muir Woods Park v. The County of Marin, Case No. A166427 (1^st Dist., Div. 5 Sept. 20, 2022) (unpublished).

            There, Marin County approved real party in interest’s 3-lot subdivision plan by adopting a mitigated negative declaration, with petitioner challenging that action under CEQA and the Subdivision Map Act.  Petitioner mainly wanted an EIR to be conducted and wanted reassessment of the project for 12 homes that potentially could be built on the sites rather than the two new homes which were approved, as well as raised several other excavation/fill, environmental, human safety, local plan, and Subdivision Map Act violation issues.  The lower court granted and denied, in part, the petition, finding that the county had not violated the Map Act, that County’s initial study had failed to satisfy CEQA’s informational requirements with respect to three discrete issues, that the county was not required to conduct an EIR, that there was no substantial evidence of potential environmental impacts, and that the county was not obligated to analyze the impacts of a 12-house project.  The writ did not direct the county to exercise its discretion in any way and did not direct the preparation of an EIR.

            Petitioner moved to recover CCP § 1021.5 lodestar of fees of $225,683 plus a positive 1.5 multiplier on a $39,889 component of the request.  The lower court, based principally on petitioner’s limited success and excessive work, awarded $37,346.30, consisting of $16,420 for some “fees on fees” and $20,926.30 (10% of the remaining lodestar request after backing out the fees on fees).  Obviously unhappy, petitioner appealed.

            The 1/5 DCA affirmed.  Although the general rule is that fee awards should be fully compensatory, the appellate court agreed that the lower court properly reduced the fee request for limited success and uninflated billings.  Even where a plaintiff’s successful and unsuccessful CEQA claims are interrelated, a trial judge may reduce the fees if the plaintiff achieves only minimal success (Save Our Uniquely Rural Community Environment v. County of San Bernardino, 235 Cal.App.4^th 1179, 1185-1186 (2015)), which was appropriate here given that petitioner did not achieve its main objectives of getting an EIR mandated or getting the project analyzed under the 12-house scenario.  Further, the use of a substantial negative multiplier is warranted where the appellate record demonstrated the plaintiff attorneys inflated their billings in an uncomplicated CEQA case and succeeded on only one out of 10 arguments (SOURCE, 235 Cal.App.4^th at 1182-1187, 1189-1190), with time spent on administrative record, legal research, and other work in this case properly found excessive by the lower court under an abuse of discretion standard.  Denial of the positive multiplier request was not erroneous because the factors justifying a multiplier were built into the trial court’s lodestar calculation, such that a “double dip” was inappropriate.

Requests For Admission: Defense Request For Costs-Of-Proof Sanctions Denied Because Statute Of Limitation Issues Were Imprecisely Tied To The Merits And No Apportionment of Statute Of Limitation Tolling Issues Was Established

The Need For Precision In Allocating Fee Recovery Under CCP § 2033.420 Is Made Clear Here.

            In Flores v. Medical Holdings, Inc., Case No. B317695 (2d Dist., Div. 3 Sept. 20, 2023) (unpublished), the defense propounded denied RFAs on statute of limitation issues, ultimately prevailing on this issue at trial.  Feeling emboldened, the defense moved for costs-of-proof sanctions under CCP § 2033.420.  The lower court denied the motion, a determination affirmed on appeal.

            There were two main problems with why the lower court’s ruling was no abuse of discretion.  First, some of the “lateness” RFAs did not focus solely on the statute of limitations issue, but also merits determinations—with case law establishing that sanctions are only narrowly allowed with respect to costs incurred in making that proof (i.e., relating solely to the SOL defense).  (See, e.g., Garcia v. Hyster Co., 28 Cal.App.4^th 724, 737-738 (1994); Grace v. Mansourian, 240 Cal.App.4h 523, 529-530 (2015).)  Second, although the RFA denial relating to SOL tolling might have been a winner, the defense did not separately account for any such fees as the statute requires.  So, the outtake of this one is to request, with precision, costs of proof amounts tethered to specific issues in order to be successful.

Appealability, Family Law: Denial Of Fees To Ex-Wife Under Family Code Section 3121 Was No Abuse Of Discretion Because The Matters Before The Trial Judge Were Unrelated To Child Custody Issues

However, Ex-Wife’s Appeal From The Final Judgment Was Timely Because the Interim Order Denying Fees Was Not A Separately Appealable Order.

            The main lesson from Marriage of Davis, Case No. D080980 (4^th Dist., Div. 1 Sept. 18, 2023) (unpublished) is a simple one:  if you are seeking fees, make sure you have a fee entitlement basis which is tethered to the matter before the lower court; otherwise, you lose, as happened in the opinion upon which we now post.

            In a dissolution hearing, ex-wife orally requested her attorney’s fees to obtain counsel in a proceeding under Family Code section 3121, which allows need-based fees akin to those allowable under sections 2030/2032 where an action involves exclusive custody of children from the marriage.  The court denied the motion, prompting an appeal.

            The first issue was appealability.  Given that this matter involved the denial of a fee request, the appellate court agreed that the interim denial did not have to appealed until notice of a final judgment, with ex-wife timely appealing from that.  It did note a rift in appellate thinking, but followed the majority view that an appealable collateral order must direct the payment or money, not a denial of money.  (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide:  Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2022) § 2.78, also discussing the minority view in Muller v. Fresno Community Hospital & Medical Center, 172 Cal.App.4^th 887, 901-902 (2009).)

            On the merits, the record showed that the hearing matter before the lower court involved requests for a domestic violence restraining orders (DVROs) and a residence request, not a child custody controversy.  It was not enough that the dispute was part of the overall dissolution case, but it had to be targeted at an exclusive child custody dispute.  (Compare with C.T. v. K.W., 71 Cal.App.5^th 679, 681-685 (2021), where the DVRO petition included a request for child custody and visitation orders justifying a fee grant under analogous fee provision under the Uniform Parentage Act).

Lodestar, Prevailing Party: Reversal Of Judgment For Cross-Complainant And Increased Recovery For Plaintiffs Made Plaintiffs The Prevailing Party So A Fee Order Remand Was Necessary

Given Some Reductions For The Cross-Complaint And Other Issues, Fee Award Had To Be Reassessed—Initial Award Was $388,541, A 50% Reduction From The Original Request.

            In Perera v. Moine, Case No. B319315 (2d Dist., Div. 7 Sept. 18, 2023) (unpublished), plaintiffs were the prevailing party in a breach of contract dispute (based on an initial $750,700.16 compensatory award to plaintiffs after some reductions, including a reduction for a $61,000 on the defendant’s cross-complaint), with the lower court awarding $388,541 in attorney’s fees under a contractual fees clause—a 50% reduction from the $788,072 “ask” for excessive hours for a one-week bench trial, unreasonable charges, and duplication by having too many attorneys working on the case.  In a contemporaneous decision, the 2/7 DCA determined that no recovery was allowable on the cross-complaint and more recovery was owed to plaintiffs, which resulted in a remand of the fee award as described below.

            Defendant argued that plaintiffs were not the prevailing parties, but that was not the case.  If anything, they were more so given the contemporaneous opinion which increased plaintiffs’ recovery by more than $300,000.

            Given the reversal, a remand was necessary on the fee recovery.  The appellate court did not express any opinion on whether the original trial judge’s (Judge Terry Green’s) reductions were or were not appropriate.  It did observe that he has retired from the bench such that the fee motion should be adjudicated before a new judge who was urged to make an order indicating the amount of the award under lodestar principles, recognizing that no statement of decision is mandatory in fee proceedings.

            BLOG OBSERVATION—Judge Green (Ret.) is now a neutral with Signature Resolution.

Civil Rights, Costs: Prevailing ADA Defendant Entitled To Costs Under F.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(1) Even If The Matter Was Not Frivolous

Majority Opinion Followed Marx Decision; Dissent Would Have Followed A Contrary Pre-Marx Decision Despite Indicating The Result Might Be The Same.

            In Garcia v. Gateway Hotel, L.P., Case No. 21-55926 (9^th Cir. Sept. 15, 2023) (published), the Ninth Circuit, in a 2-1 opinion, clarified that defendants prevailing in an American with Disabilities Act (ADA) suit are entitled to seek routine costs from the plaintiff under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), not having to prove the case was frivolous, based on Marx v. General Revenue Corp. 458 U.S. 371 (2013).  The dissent, we think, did not disagree, but believed the circuit was bound by a pre-Marx decision not embraced by the majority justices.

Allocation: Major Portion Of $950,000 Attorney’s Fees Award Affirmed In Interrelated Trade Secret/Contractual Matter

However, Some Portion of The Fee Recovery On An Unsuccessful, Non-Compensable Fraud Cross-Claim Had To Be Revisited Because Billings Showed Those Expenses Could Be Assessed.

            Elations Systems v. Fenn Bridge, LLC, Case No. A165762 (1^st Dist., Div. 3 Sept. 15, 2023) (unpublished) is an allocation/apportionment opinion which we commend litigators and others to read.

            Summarized quickly, plaintiff sued on trade secret and contractual claims (breach of a settlement agreement and an NDA agreement), obtaining a jury verdict which was reversed by the trial judge through post-trial motions.  The lower court initially awarded defendants $700,000 in contractual attorney’s fees.  However, in a prior appeal, the appellate court reversed and directed a remand to determine whether fees needed to be apportioned between compensable/non-compensable claims, mainly, trade secret/settlement agreement breach claims, NDA breach claims, and a fraud cross-claim.  On remand, the lower court determined that $700,000 was entitled to the defense as well as an additional $150,000 in appellate/post-judgment fees.

            Most of the fee recovery was affirmed on appeal.  Most of the $700,000 fee award was justified because the claims were interrelated, but with one exception.  On the fraud cross-claim which was unsuccessful, an apportionment was warranted because billings showed that the work on that cross-claim could be segregated.  The additional $150,000 fee work was upheld.

            So, the moral of this one is to ask for apportionment and not give up on appeal on this allocation issue—you may get some relief!  Fee challenges should focus on a request for apportionment, where appropriate.

Private Attorney General: $32,496.75 CCP § 1021.5 Fee Request Against County Clerk And Real Party In Interest (RIP) Properly Denied Because They Were Not “Opposing Parties” And No Private Enforcement Necessity Was Present

A Dissenting Justice Believed RIP Was An “Opposing Party,” And Would Have Remanded To The Lower Court To Assess If Other Elements Of Section 1021.5 Were Satisfied.

            In Holloway v. Wylie, Case No. H050376 (6^th Dist. Sept. 12, 2023) (unpublished), petitioner prevailed on an unopposed mandate petition to delete from a voter information guide the identification of a county supervisor as a proponent of a school district bond measure.  Petitioner moved to recover private attorney general fees against the respondent county clerk and RIP, with the lower court determining that the fee motion was untimely and that county clerk was an “an opposing party” under section 1021.5.  In a prior appeal, the Sixth District found the fee motion timely but also concluded county clerk was simply a ministerial actor required to be named under the Elections Code so that the clerk was not an “opposing party.”  On remand, petitioner renewed the fee motion against RIP, requesting $32,496.75 in fees.  The lower court again denied the request, including that RIP, too, was not “an opposing party.”

            The Sixth District in its newest opinion affirmed, but on a 2-1 basis due to a dissent.  The majority concluded that RIP was not an “opposing party” based on a litigation pragmatic test set forth in McGuigan v. City of San Diego, 183 Cal.App.4^th 610, 625 (2010).   RIP never opposed the mandate writ petition, and there was conflicting declaration testimony but with RIP’s testimony showing there was no prelitigation objection to the voter information deletion.  But the majority went further.  It also found that there was no necessity for private enforcement, as an alternative ground, based on tacit findings in the minute order. 

            Acting Presiding Justice Bamattre-Manoukian dissented.  She found RIP was an “opposing party” because he had too much skin in the game—a direct interest in the litigation.  However, because of her belief that only the “opposing party” ground was the basis for the lower court’s decision, she would have remanded to have the lower court consider other factors necessary to justify section 1021.5 fee recovery.   

Special Fee Shifting Statutes: $955,500 Fee Award And $83,246.52 Costs Award Affirmed In Elder Neglect Case

Total Compensatory Damages Were $696,833.97.

            As we have observed before in line with our Mission Statement, attorney’s fees can be the game winner where there is a fee-shifting basis—contractual, statutory, or equitable.  Newton v. Enloe Medical Center, Case No. C095324 (3d Dist. Sept. 12, 2023) (unpublished) illustrates that well.

            This was an elder neglect case, which does have statutory fee-shifting provisions in favor of the plaintiff.  Plaintiff won to the tune of $696,833.97 in compensatory damages (including $50,000 in loss of consortium damages to one plaintiff).  The lower court awarded plaintiffs $955,500 in fees and $83,246.52 in costs, determinations affirmed on appeal.  See how the fees/costs stripped the compensatory award by quite a delta, confirming our Mission Statement. 

Construction, Laffey Matrix, Lodestar, Reasonableness Of Fees: Los Angeles County Superior Court Awards A Little Over $1.3 Million In Fees And About $82,000 In Costs In Construction Dispute With Contractual Fees Clause Entitlement

Decision Provides Insights Into Judicial Resolution Of Contested Fee And Costs Issues.

            Because there has not been a lot of fee or costs decisions in the last couple of weeks, we report on a Los Angeles County Superior Court (Norwalk) final ruling on attorney’s fees and costs to a prevailing plaintiff in WnG Construction JV, Inc. v. AAA Solar Electric, Inc., et al., L.A. Superior Court Case No. VC065473 [Judge Porras]. 

            Plaintiff WnG won a construction dispute with a contractual fees clause against the defense, winning compensatory damages of about $3.116 million (inclusive of prejudgment interest) despite an offset and plaintiff not winning all that it wanted.  However, given that plaintiff did gain much of what it wanted, plaintiff was the prevailing party under the fees clause.  Plaintiff then moved for fees and costs, with various law firms submitting fee requests totaling around $2.1 million and with costs claimed of over $205,000.

            After some reductions on both counts, Judge Porras awarded fees of about $1.309 million and costs of around $82,000.

            Here are some interesting highlights to show his thinking on awarding reasonable fees and costs:

• • • An attorney disqualified based on ethical obligation violations is not entitled to any fees, an almost $223,000 reduction;
    • A law firm requesting over $653,000 in fees did not get them because they were involved in a discovery dispute which showed plaintiff deliberately spoliated evidence;
    • The principal law firm did get a majority of its requested fees, although J.D. law clerk/non-J.D. law clerk/secretarial work was not allowed and the main attorney charging $500 per hour for a breach of contract case was reasonable (but not an enhanced $750 hourly rate based on the Laffey Matrix, which the lower court found did not reflect L.A. County rates);
    • A law firm billing for potential post-trial/appellate consultation was not entitled to fees until those events materialized into situations allowing for fee recovery;
    • Although a CCP § 998 offer was rejected and could have potentially resulted in expert fee recoupment (although it is not clear from the record), the failure to identify pre-offer versus post-offer costs did not allow for an award of expert fees without a clearer allocation;
    • Charges for additional or duplicate copies of court reporter transcripts resulted in a reduction of expenses for these items.

            With that said, we give a “shout out” to Thomas F. Nowland, whose law firm and whose principal work led to him receiving a substantial portion of his fees on behalf of his client.  We thank him for providing the fee and costs ruling in this case so it could be shared with you.