CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY'S FEES

Appealability: Failure To Appeal Adverse Fee Order Fatal To Appellate Jurisdiction To Consider The Order.

As We Have Said Before, Always Separately Appeal A Postjudgment Fee Order.

            Drooyan v. Action Property Mgt. Co., Inc., Case No. B314211 (2d Dist., Div. 8 Nov. 30, 2023) (unpublished) is yet another case indicating what numerous posts have shown in appellate decisions since we began doing this blog in May 2008: to be safe, always separately appeal a postjudgment fees order.

            Here, plaintiff lost a case against an HOA and others for claims arising under the Davis-Stirling and Rosenthal Acts, with the lower court denying any fees under the Rosenthal Act but awarding the defense around $15,000 in fees under the Davis-Stirling Act (despite a $47,000 ask from the defense).  The appeal from the fee order could not be considered because plaintiff never separately appealed from that order. 

Allocation, Requests For Admission, Special Fee Shifting Provision: 4/1 DCA Affirms Denial Of Fees To Prevailing Defendant Under Consumer Data Access And Fraud Act, But Remands For Determination Of RFA Costs-Of-Proof Sanctions For Request Denials

Failure To Allocate Fatal On The CDAFA Claim, But Lack Of Any Evidence During A Jury Trial Meant Some Costs-of-Proof Sanctions Were in Order on Remand.

            In Yeng Midas Touch, Inc. v. Phanichkul, Case No. D080981 (4^th Dist., Div. 1 Nov. 29, 2023) (unpublished), plaintiff lost various tort and a claim under the Computer Data Access and Fraud Act, CDAFA (the latter having a prevailing party statutory provision), after plaintiff basically denied or objected to 68 RFAs, many of which involved specifying computer/internet accounts for which no evidence was introduced during a jury trial.  After plaintiff’s loss, the lower court denied the defense motions for attorney’s fees under the CDAFA and costs-of-proof sanctions for denial of the RFAs.  Plaintiff appealed, losing on the CDAFA issue but obtaining a remand on the RFA issue.

            CDAFA Fee Denial.  Although the appellate court did not affirm on this ground, the lower court denied fees on the grounds that prevailing defendants are not entitled to fees under Penal Code section 502(e)(2), citing Physician’s Surrogacy, Inc. v. German, 311 F. Supp.3d 1190, 1195 (S.D. Cal. 2018), so everyone keep this case in mind.  However, the fee denial was affirmed because defendant failed to allocate fees between CDAFA work and non-CDAFA work.

            Costs-of-Proof Sanctions Issue.  This issue resulted in a reversal and remand.  Many of the RFAs sought admissions relating to specified accounts which plaintiff could not prove at trial.  The appellate court did not believe the defense had a reasonable basis to deny the RFAs given they failed to produce any evidence at trial to back up the denials, with the RFAS having substantial importance in the case.  So, a remand was warranted for purposes of awarding some sanctions to plaintiff.

Prevailing Party, Probate: $61,557 Fee Award To Removed Trustee For His Attorney’s Work On Trust Petition Affirmed On Appeal

Trustee and Challenging Beneficiaries Got Mixed Results, So Trustee Entitled To Fees, Inclusive Of “Fees On Fees.”

            In Farnocchia v. Harms, Case No. A164639 (1^st Dist., Div. 1 Nov. 29, 2023) (unpublished), two beneficiaries of a trust filed a petition to remove Harms as trustee, for an accounting, and for breach of fiduciary duty.  Although trustee was removed and provided asset documentation acceptable to the beneficiaries, the petition was resolved by a stipulation through which the asset information was deemed adequate, and no finding of fiduciary duty breach was made.  The lower court then granted trustee’s attorney’s fees in the amount of $61,557 for the work of the attorney helping trustee reach the stipulation resolving the petition, including “fees on fees” on the fee entitlement issue.  Beneficiaries appealed the order, but it was affirmed on appeal.

            Initially, the Court of Appeal provided a nice review of the situations giving rise to fee entitlement under these circumstances.  “In People ex rel. Harris v. Shine (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 524, our colleagues in Division Five summarized when such fees are appropriate:

“ ‘ “The underlying principle which guides the court in allowing costs and attorneys’ fees incidental to litigation out of a trust estate is that such litigation is a benefit and a service to the trust,” ’ and not for the personal benefit of the trustee. [Citation.] Courts have found a trustee’s legal services were for the benefit of the trust, and thus payable from trust funds, where the attorneys helped prepare an accounting [citation]; successfully defended an accounting [citation]; litigated to preserve trust assets [citation]; successfully defended against a petition to invalidate the trust [citation]; or successfully defended against a petition to remove or surcharge the trustee [citation].

“Fee awards have been denied or reduced where the attorneys helped prepare an inaccurate accounting [citation]; unsuccessfully defended an accounting [citation]; or unsuccessfully defended a petition to remove or surcharge the trustee [citation]. Where the results of such proceedings were mixed, courts have either awarded fees based on the trustee’s overall success in the proceeding [citation] or apportioned fees according to the trustee’s success [citation]. [¶] Fee awards have also been found inappropriate where the trustee acts from personal interest or motive. [Citations.]

“In short, the costs of a successful defense to a removal or surcharge petition are generally chargeable against the trust even though the trustee personally benefits as a result. [Citation.] However, a trustee is not entitled to indemnity for fees incurred in an unsuccessful defense of such a petition absent an additional showing that ‘the trustee subjectively believed that the expense was necessary or appropriate to carry out the purpose of the trust and that belief was objectively reasonable.’ ” (Id. at pp. 534–535.)

            The appellate court found that beneficiaries were not necessarily the prevailing party because although they got Harms removed as trustee and obtained asset information, the trustee did successfully defend against the accounting challenges, and no breach of fiduciary findings were made.  This mixed result allowed recoverable compensation for the work of trustee’s attorneys in reaching a stipulation with respect to beneficiaries’ petition.  Furthermore, trustee was entitled to “fees on fees” in demonstrating fee entitlement before the lower court.  (Estate of Griffith, 97 Cal.App.2d 651, 656 (1950).)

Requests For Admission, Section 998: $500,000 Costs Of Proof Sanctions Award Reversed And Failure To Consider Pre-Judgment Impact Of Defense Section 998 Was Further Error

Remands Were In Order Because Costs Of Proof Sanctions Were Not Properly Tethered To The Proof Of The Matters Denied And Defense Section 998 Offer Impact Should Not Have Been Held In Abeyance Pending Appeal

            Well, now that we are past the Thanksgiving holidays, the defense must be giving thanks for the results in Conrado v. CLS Landscaping Mgt., Inc., Case No. D081551 (4^th Dist., Div. 1 Nov. 27, 2023) (unpublished).

            What happened in this case was that plaintiff was awarded $181,605.61 by a jury in a motor vehicle negligence case where defendants were an employee and employer, with employee apparently running a red light while performing work in the course of his employment.  During trial, the defense quickly conceded negligence and did not really contest causation, so that most of a lengthy trial focused on damages.  The lower court then granted plaintiff prevailing party costs of $255,642.38, with the defense filing no motion to tax costs.  (This order was affirmed on appeal.)  Plaintiff filed a CCP § 2033.40 costs-of-proof sanction motion for the defense denying liability and causation RFAs, requesting $1,054,250 in attorney’s fees but the lower court awarded $500,000 in a contested proceeding at $500 hourly rates for the San Diego venue, although referencing Los Angeles and the Inland Empire in the ruling.   Earlier, the defense had served a $250,001 CCP § 998 pretrial settlement offer, with the defense wanting the lower court to determine its impact but the trial judge stayed any determination until the RFA costs-of-proof sanctions issue on appeal was resolved.  Defendants principally appealed the RFA and 998 issues, and they were rewarded for doing so.

            The 4/1 DCA reversed the determinations on both issues.

            On the RFA issue, there were multiple problems:  (1) fees could not be awarded for work done before the RFA denials; (2) fees could not be awarded for work throughout the litigation and had to be calibrated for work proving the specific negligence and causation matters which were denied (rather than other general litigation work or trial work relating to damages); and (3) the $500 hourly rate was not properly substantiated because the trial court referenced data sets not involving the hourly rate in San Diego County.  That left the intriguing question on the remedy—a remand or simply a reversal based on insufficiency of evidence.  The appellate court decided that a remand was in order, distinguishing trial verdict insufficiency cases from RFA costs-of-proof sanctions proceedings.

            The defense also won on the 998 issue because Oakes v. Progressive Transp. Services, Inc., 71 Cal.App.5^th 486, 503-504 (2021) (a case found persuasive by the 4/1 DCA panel) established that a section 998 offer’s impact must be considered before judgment is entered because it might be an offset to the judgment amount.  The defense did have an argument that it might have beaten the jury verdict when pre-offer costs were factored in, but that would be a remand issue for the lower court to decide along with a re-do on the RFA sanctions.

Construction, Liens For Attorney Fees: In Public Works Case, Under Unusual Circumstances, Surety Prevailed Over Attorney Charging Lien

Surety Won This One Under Attorney Lien Exceptions.

            Nichols v. North American Specialty Ins. Co., Case No. B329206 (2d Dist., Div. 2 Nov. 17, 2023) (unpublished) is an interesting (appellate court saying “messy”) dispute over the priority between the attorney’s lien of a general contractor and a surety which paid off subcontractors on behalf of the general contractor on a public works project.  The surety won the priority battle with respect to payment of proceeds, with the appellate court affirming.  Equities do matter, and it did in this opinion.  The equities, under exceptions to attorney’s lien priorities, favored the surety:  it paid off subcontractors on a public project such that it elevated itself for representing the general contractor owing moneys to the subs.

Appeal Sanctions: Appellate Sanctions Imposed In Two Cases Where Interlocutory Appeals Were Involved And A Failure To Share The Appellate Record

Real Rubs Were Attacks On Lower Court and Appellate Justices.

            In Schwartzman v. South Coast Tax Resolution, Inc., Case No. B314770 et al. (2d Dist., Div. 2 Nov. 17, 2023) (unpublished) and Czech v. Herrera, Case No. B316020 (2d Dist., Div. 2 Nov. 17, 2023) (unpublished), the appellate court in two appeals affirmed respective frivolous appeal sanctions against appellants’ attorney.  You can look up the sanctions amount, but the message is that the appellate court believed it proper to impose sanctions payable to respondents’ counsel and the DCA clerk because the appeals were meritless and cast offensive aspersions against the lower and appellate courts.  They did cite a recent published decision which allowed recovery of fees to a litigant based on an incivility rationale.

Prevailing Party: Where Defendants Prevailed On Dispositive Motions In Limine And Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings, Dismissal Without Prejudice By Plaintiffs Did Not End The Ability For Any Party To Seek Prevailing Party Fees

Case Involved The Claim That Individual Defendants Were Guarantors Under A Lease.

            In Canales v. Superior Court, Case Nos. B321796 et al. (2d Dist., Div. 4 Nov. 16, 2023) (unpublished), on the day of trial, the lower court indicated tentative decisions to grant the defense motions in limine and its own sua sponte motion for judgment on the pleadings in a case where plaintiff claimed defendants were guarantors under a commercial lease.  Plaintiff then dismissed its complaint without prejudice, a request granted by the lower court and led it to deny attorney’s fees to the defense as the prevailing party.

            The 2/4 DCA reversed on both fronts.  The principal reason was that the trial had commenced so that only a with prejudice dismissal could be entered.  So, that meant who prevailed as far as fee exposure was an open issue which had to be explored on remand.

Special Fee Shifting Statutes: Respondent Obtaining Dismissal Of Elder Abuse Restraining Case After Petitioner Died Was Properly Awarded Partial Fees For Obtaining The Dismissal

Only Motion To Dismiss Fees Were Awarded.

            Maroudas v. Carrillo, Case No. H050224 (6^th Dist. Nov. 14, 2023) (unpublished) is a situation where respondent was awarded attorney’s fees and costs under Welfare & Institutions Code section 15657.03(t), the elder abuse fee shifting statute, for obtaining a dismissal of a petition after the petitioner died.  The lower court only granted lodestar fees and costs for obtaining the dismissal, using the definition of a prevailing party under CCP § 1032 (where a defendant obtains a dismissal).  The appellate court found these limited fees and costs were justified, especially where the fees were only $5,150 and costs were $158.52.

Fee Clause Interpretation, Prevailing Party: Where Plaintiff Under An Ejectment Claim Obtained Possession Before Voluntarily Dismissing Complaint, Defendants Could Not Be The Prevailing Parties

Interpretation Of The Lease Language Led To That Result. 

            In A & N Industrial Properties, LLC v. Bart & Judy’s Bakery, Inc., Case No. B322730 (2d Dist., Div. 4 Nov. 13, 2023) (unpublished), plaintiff landlord sued a delinquent holdover tenant for breach of contract, common counts, breach of guaranty, and ejectment under a lease with a prevailing party fees clause.  After the complaint was filed, defendant tenant notified landlord that possession of the premises was being tendered back, which inspired landlord to dismiss its suit without prejudice.  Under Santisas (our Leading Case No. 6), no fees were recoverable on the contract claim.  However, tenant argued it was the prevailing party on the noncontractual ejectment claim, and the lower agreed by awarding it attorney’s fees.  The 2/4 DCA reversed as a matter of law because tenant did not prevail since landlord achieved its objective of obtaining possession from tenant.

Costs, Section 998: In A Dispute Spanning About A Decade, Court Of Appeal Resolves Costs Issues Under General Principles And CCP § 998

Bottom Line Is That Some Routine Costs May Have To Be Paid On Remand By Prevailing Defendant.

            Hussein v. Razin, Case Nos. G061491/G061681 (4^th Dist., Div. 3 Nov. 13, 2023) (unpublished) is a decades-long dispute which finally resulted in plaintiff failing to prove his claims, in plaintiff defeating cross-claims against the defendant/cross-complainant, and with plaintiff then recovering $11 million in costs and attorney’s fees against defendant in an arbitration based on successfully defending against the cross-complaint.  There also was a defense CCP § 998 offer for a “paltry” $4.5 million, never accepted by plaintiff, based on indications that a multi-million dollar verdict was in the offing.  The lower court denied all parties’ request for routine costs.  That sent the matter to the appellate court based on appeals by all sides.

            Most rulings got affirmed by the 4/3 DCA, except for a reversal and remand for routine costs to the defendant, in an unpublished opinion authored by Justice Goethals.

            Defendant obtained a reversal for routine costs under CCP § 1032 based on its technical language that a defendant is the prevailing party where neither plaintiff not defendant obtains any relief, which includes a defendant as a cross-complainant.  (McLarand, Vasquez & Partners, Inc. v. Downey Savings & Loan Assn., 231 Cal.App.3d 1450, 1453-1454 (1991).)  Plaintiff argued, c’mon here, I won an arbitration award of much more so that I prevailed.  The appellate court rejected this argument because arbitral proceedings are not included within the ambit of the section 1032 language; to hold otherwise you erode the black letter law on the issue. 

            Defendant argued that it was entitled to section 998 based on its rejected $4.5 million pre-trial offer.  The appellate court agreed with the trial judge’s conclusion that the offer was not in good faith because there was evidence that plaintiff would have won a significant verdict way over this amount—a “large payday.”  So, no enhanced expert fees owed by plaintiff.

Deadlines: In Civil Harassment Restraining Matter, Lower Court Did Not Err By Awarding Further Fees Of $41,762.31 To Prevailing Petitioner After An Initial $1,000 Fee Award To Her At A Hearing Where Petitioner Was Representing Herself

Lower Court Did Not Lose Jurisdiction To Award Additional Fees.

            In George v. Hartman, Case Nos. H049735/H049886 (6^th Dist. Nov. 13, 2023) (unpublished), the court entered a civil harassment restraining order and granted petitioner $1,000 in attorney’s fees under CCP § 527.6(s) based on a request for that amount in a Judicial Council form, although noting that it would entertain a request for further fees by a separately noticed motion.  Petitioner did request additional fees of $41,762.31 in a subsequent motion, a request which was granted because it was unopposed.  Respondent appealed, arguing the lower court lost jurisdiction after awarding the initial $1,000 fee request.  The appellate court disagreed because a party can file additional or supplemental fee requests, later, depending on the status of the litigation and adherence to CRC deadlines.  (Faton v. Ahmedo, 236 Cal.App.4^th 1160, 1171 (2015).)

Appealability, SLAPP: Where Cross-Defendant’s SLAPP Motion Was Denied, Inclusive Of A Fees Request, Even Though Cross-Complainant Dismissed Its Complaint Before The Ruling Was Final, Cross-Defendant’s Appeal Of The Merits And Fees Denial Were Proper

It Did Not Matter, Because SLAPP Denial Was Affirmed On Appeal.

            Freeman v. LMA & SAI 1433 Wilshire LLC, Case No. B325212 (2d Dist., Div. 7 Nov. 9, 2023) (unpublished) goes to show you that you may hurdle procedural appealability obstacles, only to have the merits affirmed anyway.

            In this one, the procedural history was somewhat convoluted.  Cross-defendant filed a SLAPP motion against the cross-complaint, with the lower court denying the motion and further finding that he was not the prevailing party to obtain SLAPP mandatory attorney’s fees.  On the same day as this order, cross-complainant dismissed its cross-complaint without prejudice.  Cross-defendant appealed the SLAPP merits adverse ruling as well as the fee order denial.

            The 2/7 DCA ultimately affirmed the merits of the SLAPP denial.  But, first, the panel had to decide if the appeal was moot based on the cross-complaint dismissal.  It was not, according to the Court of Appeal, under the unusual circumstances of the matter.  What was determinative in this one was that the lower court denied the fee request such that a future fees motion would have been futile.  Given that the dismissal did not deprive the lower court of jurisdiction to determine if he was the prevailing party, the lower court’s actual denial of the merits and fee request properly presented a proper appeal for both issues.  The sui generis facts, we believe, led to this result, which the DCA expressly acknowledged.

Family Law: $300,000 271 Sanctions Order Against Ex-Husband Was Reversed And Remanded On A Narrow Issue

Because Ex-Husband Did Timely Pay An Earlier Discovery Sanctions, 271 Sanctions Order Had To Be Revisited Based On Lower Court Error On This Discrete Issue.

            Family Code section 271 sanctions can be steep.  This is a statutory provision that allows considerable leeway to a lower court to impose sanctions in a dissolution proceeding against a litigant not trying to settle the matter or running up the expenses in the case.  Ex-husband in Marriage of Thompson, Case No. A164210 (1^st Dist., Div. 1 Nov. 7, 2023) (unpublished) got hit with an adverse section 271 sanctions award of $300,000.  He raised two arguments on appeal: (1) live testimony was required at the 271 sanctions hearing, a request denied by the lower court; and (2) the lower court based its ruling, partially, on his failure to pay a discovery sanctions award which indeed was timely paid.

            Appellant lost argument #1, but he did obtain a reversal and remand on argument #2.

            With respect to the live testimony issue, 271 sanctions are not a substantive matter requiring live testimony under statutory or CRC provisions.  Although a lower court can in its discretion order live testimony, it no abuse of discretion for the trial judge in this case to determine that the documentary evidence and credibility inferences to be drawn therefrom could allow for a proper adjudication of the sanctions issue. 

            But the rub in this matter was an undisputed one:  appellant timely did pay the discovery sanctions.  Given that this occurred, a reversal was required to revisit whether that mistake would lead to a different 271 sanctions award in the gestalt of things.

Trade Secrets: Lower Court Did Not Erroneously Deny Civil Code § 3426.4 Fees To Unsuccessful Plaintiff In Trade Secret Misappropriation Case

Trial Judge Was Allowed To Credit Plaintiff’s Declaration Showing No Subjective Ill-Will.

            Under Civil Code section 3426.4 (see our category “Trade Secrets”), trial judges have discretion to award attorney’s fees and costs to a prevailing party if they determine that the trade secrets misappropriation claim was objectively and subjectively specious in nature.  Many times, the determination comes down to the state of mind of the plaintiff in commencing and prosecuting the case, although this scrutiny is aided by what objectively happened during the course of a lawsuit.  That is what is came down to in Attia v. Google, LLC, Case No. H049586 et al. (6^th Dist. Nov. 3, 2023) (unpublished).

            Plaintiff lost a trade secrets misappropriation case against Google, but he opposed a section 3426.4 fee motion on the basis that he had no subjective bad faith in commencing or maintaining the lawsuit.  The trial court credited his declaration to that effect.  Even though subjective intent was irrelevant for contractual interpretation purposes on the merit of the dispute, it was probative on the subjective element of section 3426.4, with the lower court’s crediting of his testimony dispositive on appeal.

SLAPP: Lower Court’s Award Of Partial SLAPP Fees To A Partially Prevailing Defendant Was No Abuse Of Discretion

Awarding Only 26% Of The Fee “Ask” Showed That Lack Of Total Success Was Credited.

            In Fitzgibbons v. Chaudhuri, Case No. E077070 (4^th Dist., Div. 2 Nov. 3, 2023) (unpublished), defendant tried to SLAPP a plaintiff’s complaint in entirety, but only obtained a grant to strike certain paragraphs and lines in the complaint.  The lower court awarded defendant $26,756 of the close to $103,000 fee “ask.”  The appellate court affirmed; although there were other issues to adjudge in the case, the award of only 26% of the requested amount showed proper judgment in reducing for the relative degree of success on the SLAPP motion on the part of the defense.

Arbitration: LASC Appellate Division Opinion Gives Guidance On MFAA Service Deadlines And Equitable Relief Theories

Technical Discussions Across The Board, But Deadlines For Practitioners To Keep In Mind.

            Folke v. Pulliam, Case No. BV033781 (L.A. Super. Ct. Oct. 6. 2023, posted for publication on Nov. 1, 2023) did consider the timeliness of serving a petition to vacate an arbitration award rendered under the Mandatory Fee Arbitration Act, Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6200 et seq. (“MFAA”).  Here are the takeaways from this opinion:  (1) if no judicial action is pending, service cannot be made via mail in the absence of serving by mail with a notice and an acknowledgment; (2) normally, a petition to confirm, correct, or vacate the award must be filed and served 100 days after service of the award; and (3) a lower court can grant equitable relief from the late service, per Law Finance Group, LLC v. Key, 14 Cal.5^th 932, 956-960 (2023) based on estoppel tolling and equitable estoppel if it meets a three-part test of timely notice to the opposing party, lack of prejudice to the opposing party, and reasonable and good faith conduct by the moving party.  Because there was no developed record on the equitable relief issues, the denial of the petition to vacate was reversed and remanded. 

Liens For Attorney Fees, Settlement: Attorney Assigned Some Of A Prevailing Party Fee Award Judgment Was Entitled To Remaining Proceeds In A Malpractice Action Settlement After Payment Of Malpractice Counsel’s Contractual Lien

Opinion Has An Interesting Discussion Of Whether A Suspended Or Disbarred Attorney Can Obtain Assignment Of A Judgment, With The Attorney Structuring The Assignment Correctly.

            In Children Solution, LLC v. Altman (Mastroianni), Case No. B317816 (2d Dist., Div. 1 Oct. 31, 2023) (unpublished), plaintiffs lost to defendants in a bench trial, with the defense receiving a $500,000 prevailing party fee award against the non-victorious plaintiffs.  Plaintiffs then sued their trial counsel for malpractice, reaching a $250,000 settlement which was approved by the lower court.  The defense subsequently assigned $345,000 of their $500k fee award to their counsel (who was suspended and disbarred, ultimately), and that counsel filed a notice of judgment lien in the malpractice action.  In approving the settlement, the lower court agreed that plaintiffs’ counsel in the malpractice case should be paid $113,500 of the $250,000 pursuant to a contractual attorney’s lien, but it denied paying the remaining balance to defense counsel holding an assignment of the partial prevailing party fee award.

            The 2/1 DCA found the lower court properly approved the settlement and allocated money to plaintiffs’ malpractice counsel.  It did, however, reverse denying payment of the remaining malpractice settlement monies to the suspended/disbarred attorney representing defendants in the first action.

            Before turning to the merits, the 2/1 DCA had to confront whether suspended/disbarred attorney could pursue the appeal in the face of the prohibition in Business and Professions Code section 6130, which provides:  “No person, who has been an attorney shall while a judgment of disbarment or suspension is in force appear on his own behalf as plaintiff in the prosecution of any action where the subject of the action has been assigned to him subsequent to the entry of the judgment or disbarment or suspension and solely for purpose of collection.”  Attorney could pursue the appeal because the partial fee award was an absolute ownership assignment, not just for collection only, so that it shows this assignment was structured correctly.

            Because an attorney’s contractual charging lien has priority over a judgment creditor’s lien, there was nothing wrong about that component of the lower court’s settlement approval/allocation order.  Nevertheless, the remaining $136,500 of the malpractice action settlement was ordered to be paid to the disbarred attorney:  no equities demonstrated that payment should have been withheld.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 708.440(b) [authorizing approval of a settlement agreement on “such terms and conditions as the court deems necessary”].)

Civil Rights, Private Attorney General: Plaintiff’s Obtaining Of Prior Mandamus Relating To Her Nursing License Did Not Mean She Was Entitled To Private Attorney General Or Civil Rights Fees

Her Win Did Not Benefit A Large Class Of Persons, And Her Mandamus Writ Petition Was Not Litigated As A Federal Civil Rights Claim.

            In Valencia v. Board of Registered Nursing, Case No. A164976 (1^st Dist., Div. 4 Oct. 30, 2023) (unpublished), plaintiff obtained a mandamus petition win vacating certain discipline imposed by defendant Board against her nursing license.  She then moved to recoup attorney’s fees under the private attorney general statute (CCP § 1021.5) and federal civil rights statute (42 U.S.C. § 1988), requests which were both denied.  She appealed, but no changes resulted.  Plaintiff righted an injustice to her personally, but failed to obtain a result which benefited the public more broadly.  With respect to the section 1988 fee request, that was properly denied because her writ petition was not framed or litigated as a federal civil rights claim, with it also being prejudicial for the Board to address a federal claim only articulated when the administrative record was closed.

In The News: Bloomberg’s Attorney Workload and Hourly Survey For First Half Of 2023 Has Some Interesting Findings For Law Professionals

Burn-Out Felt By Almost Half Of Survey Respondents.

            Based on a survey of law professionals (78% from law firms), Bloomberg has issued its Attorney Workload and Hourly Survey for the 1^st and 2^nd Quarters of 2023.  Here is a summary of some findings which we found interesting:

• • • The average hours worked were 48 per week, versus 37 average hours billed.
    • 47% of respondents were satisfied with their jobs, 38% were neutral, and 15% were unsatisfied.
    • Lawyers felt burnt out 48% of the time.
    • Disrupted sleep and anxiety were the two largest negative repercussions associated with lawyers’ jobs.
    • 72% of respondents used exercise as self-care protection during off time.
    • With respect to main tasks completed by lawyers, they broke down this way: litigators—72% did case analysis; transactional attorneys—46% engaged in direct client communications; and regulatory and compliance attorneys—93% performed regulatory compliance.