Reason Was That Applicable Consumer Statutes—Moss-Magnuson Act, Song-Beverly Act, And Consumers Legal Remedies Act—Trumped Section 1717 Because They Only Allow Fee Recovery To A Prevailing Consumer Or Plaintiff.
Martinez v. Sai Long Beach B, Inc., Case Nos. B320441 et al. (2d Dist., Div. 5 Jan. 28, 2025) (partially published; fee discussion published) is part of a growing trend by appellate courts to find that specific consumer or Labor Code statutes “trump” more general fee-shifting statutes such as Civil Code section 1717.
Plaintiff in this one purchased a car from defendant under a retail installment sales contract with an attorney’s fees clause. Defendant then obtained a complete summary judgment based on lemon law claims, specifically brought under the Moss-Magnuson Act, Song-Beverly Act, Consumers Legal Remedies Act, and derivative unfair competition claims. The lower court awarded defendant routine costs (which were affirmed on appeal when the summary judgment was upheld) and attorney’s fees of $109,703.50 under section 1717 based on the contractual fees clause.
The 2/5 DCA reversed the fees award in the published part of the opinion, although acknowledging that defendant did prevail “on the contract” so as to be entitled to fees under section 1717. It determined that the applicable consumer statutes only allowed fee recovery to either a plaintiff consumer (Moss-Magnuson Act), a prevailing buyer (Song-Beverly Act), or a prevailing defendant only where plaintiff’s case was frivolous, with no such frivolity found in the case (CLRA). These were specific statutes which prevailed over the more general section 1717 fee-shifting provision.
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