CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY'S FEES

Homeowner Associations, Lodestar, Reasonableness Of Fees: $125,000 Attorney’s Fees Award To Plaintiff Adjacent Property Owner For HOA Encroaching On His Easement Was Affirmed On Appeal

Both Sides Appealed The Fee Award, But It Was Affirmed In Entirety.

               After an adjacent property owner and HOA settled an easement dispute in which $350,000 was paid to plaintiff, an attorney’s fees motion based on the settlement agreement contractual fees clause was partially granted in plaintiff’s favor.  Plaintiff moved for $164,258.50 in fees, but the lower court only granted $125,000 after observing that the claimed hourly rates were high for an easement dispute venue in the Northwest District of LASC (Van Nuys) and that the work was excessive.  Both sides appealed in Haghnazarzadeh v. Sun Tree Townhomes Owners’ Assn., Inc., Case No. B331492 (2d Dist., Div. 2 July 8, 2025) (unpublished), but the award was affirmed—no one got any more fees or a further fee reduction.

               There was nothing in the record suggesting that the lower court did not follow lodestar principles, given it did comment on the hourly rates and on the excessiveness of the work.  No detailed statement of decision is required on fee decisions in California state courts, for fear that fee adequacy would “assume massive proportions, perhaps dwarfing the case in chief” (citing the leading case of PLCM, 22 Cal.4^th at 1098).  Because the lower court did not specify the hourly rates that it was using, the result could have been just a reduction based on the perception that the work was excessive for a case of this nature.  The appellate court expressly declined to “define the boundaries of the community for the purpose of determining a reasonable rate,” because that would be tantamount to an advisory opinion and was not necessary to sustain what the lower court did as no abuse of discretion.

Costs, Employment, POOF!, Prevailing Party: Plaintiff Proving Whistleblower Case, But Obtaining No Relief As Employer Proved A “Same-Decision Defense,” Was Erroneously Awarded Attorney’s Fees Under One-Way Whistleblower Statute, Labor Code 1102.5

$400,000 Fee Award Reversed As A Matter Of Law, With County Entitled To Routine Costs As The Prevailing Party Below.

               In a “mixed-motive” whistleblower case, plaintiff proved the elements of his whistleblower claim, but he obtained no relief because defendant employer proved the “same-decision defense.”  The lower court in Lampkin v. County of Los Angeles, Case No. B336806 (2d Dist., Div. 4 July 8, 2025) (published) awarded plaintiff routine costs of $52,043.65 and $400,000 in attorney’s fees under Labor Code section 1102.5 (a one-way fee shifting provision working in favor of a “successful” plaintiff).  Those awards went POOF! on appeal, with County given the chance to seek routine costs as the prevailing party.

               The appellate court found that plaintiff did not bring a “successful action” for purposes of a statutory fee award.  It refused to extend reasoning in Harris v. City of Santa Monica, 56 Cal.4^th 203 (2013), a FEHA case allowing for fees involving a same-decision defense situation, on numerous bases—most of all that FEHA and the whistleblower statutes have different nuances.  County then argued it was entitled to routine costs as the prevailing party, with the 2/4 DCA agreeing, because County fell within costs entitlement under two categories of CCP § 1032—remanding for a determination as to whether County followed the correct procedures to claim costs.

SLAPP: $24,880 Fee Award Based On Frivolous SLAPP Motion By Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Is Reversed And Remanded

The Reason Was That The Lower Court’s Order Failed To Make Written Findings About The Sanctionable Conduct.

               SLAPP litigants and their counsel can be liable for attorney’s fees if they lose a SLAPP motion which is deemed frivolous, based on CCP § 128.5.  In Szeto v. Chen, Case No. G054497 (4^th Dist., Div. 3 July 2, 2025) (unpublished), plaintiff/cross-defendant lost a SLAPP motion directed against a cross-complaint, with the lower court deeming the motion frivolous and awarding $24,880 (out of a requested $54,975) against cross-defendant and his counsel.  The 4/3 DCA reversed and remanded because the lower court’s order did not set forth in writing the sanctionable conduct underlying the award, as required under section 128.5.  So, that had to be specified on remand or the sanctions request had to be denied.  However, the appellate panel—in a 3-0 opinion penned by Justice Scott—did reject these arguments:  (1) an appeal of the SLAPP motion itself did not stay matters such that the lower court could entertain the fee motion; (2) the sanctions were properly assessed against the losing litigant and its counsel; and (3) the lower court did not award an unreasonable amount of fees because it did over a 50% reduction by finding the requested fees were excessive (especially because there was no delegation of work to less expensive associates). 

Homeowner Associations, SLAPP: $6,300 SLAPP Fee Award In HOA’s Favor Affirmed On Appeal

Main Reason Is That Homeowner Did Not Oppose the Fee Request, So Waiver Occurred.

               In Trabuco Highlands Community Assn. v. Loeffler, Case No. G063862 (4^th Dist., Div. 3 July 1, 2025) (unpublished), HOA SLAPPed a state collection statutory action brought by a homeowner, with the lower court awarding mandatory SLAPP fees of $6,300 to HOA.  Homeowner appealed, not getting much traction.  Homeowner did not oppose the fee request below so any appellate challenges were waived based on not opposing at the trial court level.  (So. Cal. Gas Co. v. Flannery, 5 Cal.App.5^th 476, 483, fn. 7 (2016).)  Justice Delaney penned the 3-0 opinion.

Employment, Multiplier, Reasonableness Of Fees: Plaintiff’s Win On Some FEHA Claims Justified A $1,385,546 Fees/Costs Award

Compensatory Award Was $709,555, With Counsel’s Skill And Multiplier Request Supporting The Fee Award Affirmed On Appeal.

               The trial judge in Ramirez v. Bala, Case No. H049689 (6^th Dist. June 30, 2025) (unpublished) awarded a FEHA plaintiff $1,385,546 in attorney’s fees and costs (about the full request, inclusive of a 1.5 multiplier) after plaintiff won a compensatory award of $709,555.  The defense appeal of the fees/costs award was not successful.  Although losing a retaliation claim, the winning claims were intertwined such that no reduction was in order.  The $450 hourly rates claimed by plaintiff’s counsel in Monterrey County were reasonable given the lower court had seen requests in the $800-plus area.  Finally, the litigation was hard fought such that the skill of plaintiff’s counsel justified the multiplier.

Homeowner Associations, Prevailing Party: Homeowner’s Voluntary Dismissal Of HOA Without Prejudice Did Entitle HOA To Attorney’s Fees Under The Davis-Stirling Act Fee Shifting Provision

$148,142.26 Was The Fee/Costs Award Against Homeowner, Affirmed On Appeal.

               We frequently have posted on homeowner-HOA disputes.  They are contentious.  However, whoever prevails—and that can be a discretionary call—or if no one prevails can be a game changer in these disputes, much to the chagrin of one side or both sides.

               Jennings v. Bayside Court Owners Association Inc., Case No. A171339 (1^st Dist., Div. 5 June 27, 2025) (unpublished) is a good illustration of our opening observations, although the homeowner was on the losing end of the stick. 

               Homeowner sued HOA and many others for fraudulent deeds allegedly made in connection with common areas, with homeowner eventually dismissing HOA without prejudice after 16 months of litigation and after homeowner says he obtained relief against other defendants (but not the HOA).  HOA moved for costs and attorney’s fees under the Davis-Stirling Act fee shifting provision, with the lower court granting its full request—a total award of $148,142.26 based on a determination that the HOA prevailed.

               The 1/5 DCA affirmed.  Because the prevailing party determination under the Davis-Stirling Act is a pragmatic one, the lower court can determine that a party dismissed without prejudice did still obtain its litigation objectives.  In this case, HOA did obtain its primary objective to be dismissed from the case after 16 months of litigation, with homeowner not demonstrating that it obtained any significant relief against HOA (obtaining relief against other defendants was immaterial).  No abuse of discretion in this one.

Ethics: Defense Counsel’s Failure To Notify Plaintiff Or Lower Court About Ineligibility To Practice Of Plaintiff’s Attorney Led To A Reversal And Remand Of An Adverse Fee Award Against Plaintiff

Plaintiff Was Not In Pro Per, But Basically Unrepresented By Ineligible Counsel And No One Gave Her Notice Of The Ineligibility—Civility Again Stressed In The Fees Area.

               Civility has been stressed in many recent appellate opinions, with fee reductions affirmed and with multipliers denied based on incivility by a litigant’s claiming attorney asking for fees.  Prato v. Giola, Case No. G064139 (4^th Dist., Div. 3 June 27, 2025) (published) may be even the strongest testament to how civility will impact attorney’s fees awards. 

               There, plaintiff’s case was dismissed because her ineligible practicing attorney did not appear for trial, a fact known by defense counsel and with no one providing plaintiff notice about her counsel’s ineligibility.  Defendants moved for attorney’s fees under a contractual fees clause, with the lower court granting over $70,000 in fees against plaintiff and her company even though she did hire an attorney to oppose by bringing the lack of ineligibility notice to plaintiff as an argument against the fee motion.  Plaintiff prudently appealed.

               The 4/3 DCA, in an opinion authored by Acting Presiding Justice Moore, reversed and remanded.  The panel chided defense counsel for failing to notify plaintiff about the ineligibility either through direct notice or a request to send such a notice before the lower court.  It was inequitable for plaintiff to have to bear an adverse fee request, with the appellate court strongly suggesting it was wrong to even impose fees under the circumstances.  Nevertheless, the panel reversed and remanded, but this opinion does bring civility themes clearly at the forefront for California practitioners to ponder as they are litigating cases, no matter what side they represent.

               BLOG OBSERVATION—Co-contributor Mike recently attended at ADR Services Webinar by Retired Judges Kathleen Kelly and Suzanne Ramos Bolanos on high-stakes mediations.  They did mention that incivility can result in reduced fee awards, citing Snoeck v. ExakTime Innovations, Inc., 96 Cal.App.5^th 908, 927 (2023) and Karton v. Ari Design & Construction, Inc., 62 Cal.App.5^th 734, 747 (2021) among other cases.