CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY'S FEES

Civil Rights, Reasonableness Of Fees, Substantiation Of Fees: Third Circuit Court Of Appeals Denies Unreasonable Civil Rights Fee Petition And Affirms Sanctions Of $25,000 Against Attorney

Entire Fee Motion Denied For Misconduct And Inflated Fees, A Companion To Our Post On The Clemens Decision.

            While co-contributor Mike was out on a short vacation, his legal assistant Shanna Strader was kind enough to post on Clemens v. New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 17-3150 (3d Cir. Sept. 12, 2018) [see our September 15, 2018 post], where the Third Circuit affirmed a district court’s entire denial of a fee petition where it was outrageously excessive in nature and was chock full of numerous substantiation flaws. That decision occurred under a discretionary Pennsylvania consumer statute, but its basic reasoning has now been extended to the federal civil rights arena.

            In Young v. Smith, Nos. 17-3190 & 17-3201 (3d Cir. Sept. 25, 2018) (precedential) [opinion linked here], attorney represented a group of students in civil rights claims against a school district and a teacher, obtaining an initial jury verdict but with the resultant judgment vacated based on her misconduct. The second trial, only against the school district, resulted in a complete defense verdict. The third trial schedule against teacher was settled when plaintiffs accepted a Rule 68 $25,000 offer of judgment, with the settlement allowing fees and costs against teacher only up until the date of the offer. However, attorney submitted a fee petition for all work against both defendants, requesting $733,002.23 in fees!

            No one was impressed. The district judge ordered an OSC as to why attorney should not be sanctioned for requesting such an excessive fee, with some of the requested fees connected to her vexatious conduct. The district judge denied the entire fee request and sanctioned attorney $25,000 for presenting such a fee petition (including doing so through pleadings with an inconsiderably small font size), finding that even a line-by-line review of entries was unproductive and not tied to nonvexatious work as limited by the settlement with the teacher. The district court also found that hundreds of entries in the fee petition were fraudulent.

            The Third Circuit affirmed. The fee petition was not honest and was not accurate in nature, allowing for a denial of a request in entirety under the federal civil rights fee-shifting statute where the fee petition sought outrageously excessive fees in egregious fashion. Just the fact that $733,002.23 was sought in a $25,000 settled case confounded the Court of Appeals as much as the district court. So, the reasoning in Clemens was extended to civil rights fee petitions, and the $25,000 sanctions was sustained too.

Civil Rights: Plaintiff Seeking Injunctive Relief Under California’s Disabled Person Act Improperly Assessed With $28,008 In Attorney’s Fees After Defendant Modified A Grocery Store Parking Lot To Create An Accessible Path For Disabled Persons

Defense Fee Recovery Reversed, But No Fees To Plaintiff Because She Did Not Seek Fees Below.

            This one is somewhat of an object lesson because the 2/4 DCA not only reversed fee recovery against a disabled person dismissing an action for injunctive relief under the Disabled Person Act (DPA), but would have found that plaintiff was the prevailing party entitled to attorney’s fees herself had she sought them below (although she didn’t).

            After plaintiff dismissed her DPA and Unruh Act action after a grocery store made modifications to a parking lot such that there was an accessible path for disabled persons, defendant moved for attorney’s fees against her and was awarded $28,008 (the full defense request) in Baskin v. Hughes Realty, Inc., Case No. B279645 (2d Dist., Div. 4 Aug. 6, 2018) (unpublished). The 2/4 DCA reversed the fee award against plaintiff/appellant.

            The DPA has a unilateral fee provision applicable to prevailing plaintiffs under the remedial provisions of the statute, and it also has a bilateral fee provision when injunctive relief is sought. Under the Unruh Act, no matter what the remedy, the fee provision is unilateral in favor of a prevailing plaintiff. Plaintiff, although not requesting fees, argued she was the prevailing party under the “catalyst” theory, rather than defendant. She next argued that defendant grocery failed to show that the fees it requested pursuant to the one bilateral fee-shifting provision were not inextricably intertwined with the defense of the other claims involving prevailing plaintiff only fee-shifting provisions (see Turner v. Association of American Colleges, 193 Cal.App.4^th 1047 (2011)). The appellate panel agreed that plaintiff, not grocery store, was the prevailing party under the catalyst theory and that her action was not frivolous given that lot modifications were made. (Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732, 739-740 (9^th Cir. 1995).) Finally, the reviewing court agreed that the defense efforts on the one putative fee-shifting statute was intertwined with the defense of the other claims, accepting the rationale of Turner in this regard such that fee recovery was not warranted. (Turner, 193 Cal.App.4^th at 1027.)

Civil Rights: $100,000 FEHA Award In Favor Of Defense For Frivolous Suit Affirmed On Appeal

Defense Had Asked For $325,584, But Trial Judge Carefully Considered “Pocketbook” Factor.

            Not all defense motions against plaintiffs for filing/prosecuting a frivolous FEHA claim result in a nothing fee award. Raseknia v. County of Los Angeles, Case No. B271912 (2d Dist., Div. 2 June 27, 2018) (unpublished) illustrates this, although trial judges usually will reduce the defense request based on a belief that the plaintiff has precarious financial ability to pay.

            Plaintiff’s FEHA-dominant action was found to be frivolous, which allowed the defense to recover fees. It moved to recoup fees of $325,584, but the trial judge wanted some supplemental submissions on plaintiff’s financial condition and a billing matrix by the defense to support the fees request. Ultimately, the trial judge awarded the defense $100,000 in fees, reducing principally for plaintiff’s financial situation.

            Plaintiff’s appeal of the fee order was unsuccessful. The trial judge did not abuse its discretion in awarding some requested fees and denying costs based on plaintiff’s financial condition.

Civil Rights, Lodestar, Reasonableness Of Fees: Over Vigorous Dissent, Ninth Circuit Rules That C.D. Cal. Local Rule Default Judgment Fee Schedule Does Not Apply Where Plaintiff Obtaining Default Judgment Asks For Lodestar Fees In ADA Case

Dissenting Circuit Judge Believed That Not Adhering To Local Rule Suggestions Would Lead To Potential Abuse.

            The Ninth Circuit, in Vogel v. Harbor Plaza Center, LLC, No. 16-55229 (9^th Cir. June 25, 2018) (published), visited the issue of how attorney’s fees in an American with Disabilities Act (ADA) case should be handled in an uncontested default judgment situation. This issue actually produced a majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions, although the majority opinion (agreed to by the concurring judge) found that the lodestar approach should be used where a successful plaintiff requests ADA fees which exceed the caps under a Central District of California Local Rule which has a much lower limit tethered to the amount of the default judgment.

            What happened here is that a plaintiff obtained a default judgment in an ADA case after the defense failed to appear at a pretrial conference. Plaintiff then sought $36,671.25 in attorney’s fees after winning statutory damages of $4,000 and costs of $3,590.83. However, the district judge awarded only $600 fees under C.D. Cal. Local Rule 55-3 which did allow fees in excess of this amount to be determined by the district judge under certain conditions. Plaintiff appealed, with no appearance filed by the defense.

            The Ninth Circuit majority opinion found that it was error for the district judge not to use the lodestar fee approach even in an uncontested default judgment proceeding, rather than presumptively apply the Rule 55-3 caps. The district court did, in the majority/concurring view, have to consider a lodestar request over the default judgment rule schedule of fees. In essence, the ADA lodestar approach prevailed over the C.D. Cal. default judgment fee schedule.

            The majority opinion did indicate that the district court did have to scrutinize plaintiff’s request, if one over the scheduled amounts, for reasonableness.

            Concurring Circuit Judge Christen believed that the district court did not have to adhere to local default judgment fee schedules in a civil rights case like the ADA case before it.

            Dissenting Senior Circuit Judge Kleinfeld believed that uncontested default judgments should be governed by the Local Rule as a starting point and that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in rejecting an increase in this matter. Otherwise, ADA plaintiffs will abuse requests by “puffing” up the presumptive schedule fee in many cases, in the dissent’s view.

Allocation/Civil Rights/Costs/Reasonableness Of Fees: $158,880.50 Fee Award To Unruh Act Plntf Remanded For Review To Exclude Fees For A Co-Defendant’s Work, Limited Success In Light Of injunctive Modification, And Elimination Of Clerical Work Billing

Costs Award Affirmed, But Fee Award Remanded For A Further Re-Do.

             In Hernandez v. Starbucks Coffee Co., Case Nos. H042848/H043393 (6^th Dist. June 20, 2018) (unpublished), plaintiff successfully sued Starbucks for Unruh Act accessibility barrier discrimination at a San Jose store. Plaintiff was awarded statutory damages of $4,000 (although not winning all accessibility claims) and $158,880.50 in attorney’s fees (out of a requested $170,880.50) and a majority of its $8,260.39 in costs. Starbucks appealed.

            It raised a litany of challenges to both awards. A few resonated so as to require a remand.

            The appellate court found that costs associated with an unsuccessful summary judgment motion and oversized copies/scans of exhibits were properly found to be necessary to the litigation or useful to the trier of fact.

         With respect to fees, here is how things panned out:

• Given that the appellate court modified a permanent injunction, the matter had to be remanded to see if the “limited success” factor made a difference in the amount of the fee award;
• The fee award had to be reduced by $12,210 for work attributable to another settling defendant (with Starbucks doing a good job of identifying the work precisely, so that the appellate court itself could order this reduction);
• No apportionment was required because overlapping facts and legal theories were involved against Starbucks and the other defendant sued on a joint and several basis;
• No reduction was necessary for block billing because the legal descriptions were sufficient to identify the nature of the work;
• No reduction was required for interoffice conferencing, rejecting the notion that anything over 4% of total billings is per se unreasonable; and
• Reductions on remand did need to be made for purely clerical tasks.

Civil Rights/Multiplier: Ninth Circuit Affirms $5,378,174.66 Civil Rights Fee Recovery, Inclusive Of 2.0 Positive Multiplier, For Five Prisoners Winning Compensatory And Punitive Damages Against County Of Los Angeles And Supervisory Jail Officials

Prison Litigation Reform Act Did Not Cap Unruh Act Fee Recovery.

            In Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles, No. 13-56292 et al. (9^th Cir. May 30, 2018) (published), the Ninth Circuit reviewed and affirmed 42 U.S.C. § 1983 excessive force verdicts of $740,000 in compensatory damages and $210,000 in punitive damages (the latter against supervisory individual defendants) in favor of five prisoners severely injured during the course of a cell extraction at the L.A. County Men’s Central Jail (which included the use of taser shocks).

            The district judge later awarded plaintiffs $5,378,174.66 in attorney’s fees under the federal civil rights statute and California’s Bane Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1), utilizing separate calculations to arrive at the aggregate fee award. This award included a positive 2.0 multiplier in arriving at the award.

            The Ninth Circuit sustained the fee award in full. The fee limits in the Prison Litigation Reform Act did not apply to cap fees incurred under California Civil Code section 52.1. With respect to the multiplier, it was justified based on the financial risks assumed by the attorneys (who invested $3.4 million in a risky case), the representation of prisoners in an excessive force action against high-ranking jail officials, and the loss of opportunity costs in a litigation which required many years of intensive efforts against aggressive defendants. The district judge also did consider the impact of the award on California taxpayers, finding that the importance of civil rights litigation of this species against large/potentially powerful defendants being such as to outweigh the need for some sort of mitigating fiscal restraint.

Civil Rights: UPS Properly Awarded $52,870.50 In FEHA Attorney’s Fees For Defending Disability Discrimination Claims Found Objectively Without Foundation When Brought

Only A Quarter Of Fee Request Awarded.

          Mariano v. United Parcel Service, Inc., Case No. D071055 (4^th Dist., Div. 1 May 21, 2018) (unpublished) was a situation where a trial judge eventually found plaintiff’s associational disability discrimination theory was deficient because plaintiff had no specific relationship with a disabled person or and no such association was causally related to plaintiff’s complaint about using a disabled access ramp. UPS moved for an award of $234,982 in fees for prevailing on plaintiff’s complaint or, alternatively, sought a proportionate award of $70,494 for prevailing on plaintiff’s FEHA claims. The trial judge awarded less than a quarter of fully requested fees to UPS, to the tune of $52,870.50.

            The 4/1 DCA, in a split decision, affirmed. The majority found no abuse of discretion in the award. The apportionment arguments raised for the first time on appeal were waived, with the trial judge actually using a two-step allocation process. In dissent, Justice Dato would have reversed the entire award because he believed plaintiff was arguing for a good faith extension of the law such that ultimately unsuccessful FEHA plaintiffs should not be penalized for such advocacy.

Civil Rights/Equity/Multiplier: Although Total Judgment Offset Denied, Fee Award Based On 2.0 Positive Multiplier Reversed On Appeal

Multiplier Is Not Automatic, So Reversed To Consider Proper Factors On Appeal.

            In Campos v. Kennedy, Case Nos. B266663/B268812 (2d Dist., Div. 2 Feb. 13, 2018) (unpublished), plaintiff won a $225,000 compensatory verdict under civil rights fee shifting provisions for sexual battery.  Later, the trial court awarded plaintiff $ 2,924,830 in statutory fees, but augmented by a 2.0 multiplier to a reduced lodestar request.

            The fee award got reversed and remanded on appeal. 

            The defense first tried to argue no fee award was in order because the compensatory award got offset by a good faith settlement offer by another defendant.  The problem with this argument was one of timing, with the defense never making moves to challenge a substantively amended judgment which would take the amount to zero.  The failure to challenge the amended judgment dispatched this argument.

            With respect to the fee award, the appellate court had serious reservations about the 2.0 multiplier awarded by the trial judge.  The main flaw was that the trial judge thought a multiplier was automatic and normally should be awarded, but this is not the law given the lower court must exercise certain factors under Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal.4^th 1122, 1138 (2001) [our Leading Case No. 8] to reach such a favorable multiplier result.  However, the appellate court did go on to address multiplier factors, suggesting maybe the trial judge seriously should reconsider his decision on granting a multiplier on remand.

Civil Rights: County Defeated FEHA-Based Harassment/Retaliation Claims Through Summary Judgment, But Fee Award To County Reversed On Appeal

$17,945 Fee Award Overturned Because No Bad Faith/Lack Of Reasonable Cause Even Though Case Was Found To Lack Ultimate Merit.

            In Delgado v. County of Los Angeles, Case No. B271913 (2d Dist., Div. 5 Feb. 13, 2018) (unpublished), County defensed an ex-employee’s FEHA harassment/retaliation claims through a summary judgment motion, with the trial judge later awarding County fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1038, which allows trial courts to award public entities the attorney’s fees they incur for “unmeritorious and frivolous” lawsuits if the action was not brought in good faith and with reasonable cause.  The trial judge in this case awarded $17,945 in fees to County, 25% of its request, based on the premise that the retaliation claim was brought in bad faith.

            The appellate court affirmed the summary judgment grant, but reversed the fee award.  Although agreeing that the retaliation claim lacked ultimate merit, the record showed not all of it was untimely in nature and there was proof of record which could support the perspective that plaintiff had some evidentiary basis to bring her claim. 

Civil Rights: Bustos Decision Now Published

Opinion Affirmed Fee Denial To Losing FEHA Plaintiff Only Obtaining One Favorable Vote On Jury Special Verdict.

            In a December 22, 2017 post, we discussed Bustos v. Global P.E.T., Inc., a Fourth District, Division 2 unpublished decision affirming a denial of FEHA fees to a plaintiff who obtained a favorable vote on one jury question but ultimately lost on a causation issue.  We now report that this opinion was certified for publication on January 16, 2018. 

Civil Rights: Ibrahim No-Fly List Case Involving EAJA Fee Recovery Now Set For March 2018 En Banc Argument Before The Ninth Circuit

Whole Panel Will Now Hear EAJA Fee Recovery Dispute.

            In our September 8, 2016 post, we discussed Ibrahim v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 835 F.3d 1048 (9^th Cir. 2016), where the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court order settling the amounts of fees and costs under EAJA to be awarded to plaintiff Ibrahim, who prevailed in a terrorist/”no fly” list case.  We can now report that the Ninth Circuit on December 29, 2017 ordered the matter assigned for en banc argument during the week of March 19, 2018.  Plaintiff is being represented by the McManis Faulkner firm in Northern California, with the attorney team being Marwa Elzankaly, Christine Peek, Elizabeth Pipkin, and James McManis. 

Civil Rights: Non-Party Employee Of Defendant Correctly Assessed Appellate Fees Relating To His Dismissal Of An Appeal On A Contempt Ruling

However, Plaintiffs’ Answering Brief On The Merits Fee Request Was Properly Denied.

            In Ortega v. USA/Maricopa County/Sheridan, No. 16-16663 (9^th Cir. Jan. 4, 2018) (published), Plaintiffs obtained an injunction against Maricopa County in a civil rights case.  Mr. Sheridan, a now-retired employee of Maricopa County, appealed from a district court’s finding that he committed civil contempt by disobeying the injunction.  The Ninth Circuit granted plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss the appeal based on Mr. Sheridan’s lack of standing.  Based thereon, the appellate court granted fee recovery for time spent by Plaintiffs in moving to dismiss, determining that even non-parties can be liable for fees when they insert themselves into litigation by appealing determinations to clear their names.  However, with respect to fee requests geared to Plaintiffs’ preparation of the answering brief, that was denied because no one succeeded on the merits.  The matter was remanded to have the Appellate Commissioner calculate fees and non-taxable costs to Plaintiffs with respect to work on the appeal motion to dismiss efforts. 

Civil Rights, Employment, Section 998: Fee And Costs Award To Successful Defendants Had To Be Reversed And Remanded Based On Failure To Make Findings On Frivolousness For Purposes Of Labor Code Section 218.5 Claim

However, 4/2 DCA Denied Expert Witness Fees To Unsuccessful FEHA Plaintiff Rejecting CCP § 998 Offer, Parting Company With Contrary Results By 1/5 And 4/1 DCAs.

            We have to say that 2018 has started out with a bang, producing a decision by the Fourth District, Division 2 acknowledging it is parting company from the approach taken by two other DCAs on whether CCP § 998 gives a right to expert fee costs-shifting even though the underlying FEHA claim was found nonfrivolous in nature.

            Arave v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Case No. E061677 (4^th Dist., Div. 2 Jan. 2, 2018) (partially published; fees/costs discussion published) involved a plaintiff suing under FEHA for discrimination, harassment and retaliation based on LDS church membership as well as under Labor Code section 218.5 (wage/hour violation) and the whistleblower statute.  Either through summary judgment or trial, plaintiff lost all of his claims after a jury defensed him on claims escaping pre-trial adjudication.  The defense (both the company and some affiliated individuals) moved to recoup $1,203,225.06 in fees, apportioning $200,537.60 to the wage claim (1/7^th of total fees) and the remaining $1,002,607.96 to the FEHA claims.  The trial judge denied fee recovery under FEHA based on her feeling that the claims were not frivolous (given plaintiff survived a summary judgment motion on these claims), but did not buy into the 1/7^th apportionment on the wage claim.  After some more apportionment, the lower court awarded $97,500 in fees to the defense on the Labor Code section 218.5 wage claim, although not making any finding whether it was frivolous in nature.  With respect to “routine” costs, the defense sought $84,017.68, with the trial judge striking a small amount and awarding $83,642.68—broken down as $54,545.18 in ordinary costs and $29,097.50 in expert witness fees.  The expert witness fees were based on plaintiff’s rejection of a 998 offer as to all claims (including FEHA claims), which he did not beat.  The trial judge determined that even though the FEHA claims were not frivolous, section 998 pre-trial settlement principles effectively overrode the situation based on First District authority in the Holman decision.  She did not expressly rule on entitlement to expert fees under the unsuccessful wage claim given making no determination of whether it was or was not frivolous.

            The fee and costs award got reversed and remanded on appeal, but on interesting grounds.

            Fees Award.  This award got reversed and remanded because the lower court did not determine if the wage claim—the only basis for fee entitlement after the appellate court affirmed the nonfrivolity determination on the FEHA fee entitlement basis—was frivolous or not.  Without this finding, the fee award could not stand.

            Ordinary Costs Award.  Obviously, under Williams (a California Supreme Court case we have posted on frequently and our Leading Case No. 16), the ordinary costs award of $54,545.18 was improper because the trial judge determined that the FEHA claims were not frivolous.  However, that did leave room to argue that they might be justified based on the wage/hour claim, so a remand was in order on this issue.

            Expert Witness Fees.  $29,097.50 in expert witness fees were awarded based on the trial judge’s perception that plaintiff’s rejection of the 998 offer took precedence over the FEHA frivolity “no award” scenario.  The appellate court disagreed, finding that the FEHA frivolity precept overrode 998 in a situation where fees were not otherwise unavailable under the FEHA statute.  (The 4/2 DCA was careful to note that the rejection of a 998 offer could be considered in situations where FEHA expert fees were allowable in the absence of a “no frivolity” determination.)  In doing so, it expressly departed company from contrary determinations by the 1/5 DCA (Holman) and 4/1 DCA (Sviridov).  However, it did remand for the trial judge to determine if expert fees were allowable based on the wage claim fee-shifting statute given no ruling on whether the action was frivolous under this section (possibly requiring apportionment of fees if the trial judge decided that the wage claim was frivolous).

Civil Rights: Limited Success Did Justify District Court’s 50% Reduction In Fee Request In ADA Case

District Court’s Articulation Of Reduction Was Clear Enough.

           

Getting a shave. "Uncle Joe Cannon getting one of his last congressional shaves. Bert Broden has been Uncle Joe's barber for the past twelve years."  Feb. 26, 1923.  Library of Congress. 

               In Dunlap v. Liberty Natural Products, Inc., Nos. 15-35395/16-35113 (9^th Cir. Dec. 28, 2017) (published), plaintiff filed and won a claim before a jury for disability discrimination under the ADA and related Oregon statutes, although she lost other claims.  Her total damages came to $83,200.  She then moved for $235,038 in attorney’s fees under the ADA/state counterpart statutes.  The district granted the motion in part, reducing the requested fees by 50% based on lack of success.

            The Ninth Circuit affirmed.  After affirming the merits judgment, it concluded that degree of success (winning on one of five claims) by a prevailing party is a proper reduction factor with respect to a fee request.  The district court indicated it was discounting based on that factor, a sufficiently clear explanation of the fee award. 

Civil Rights/Costs: Trial Judge Properly Granted Losing Plaintiff’s Motion To Tax Costs With Respect To Prevailing Defendant In Case Involving FEHA/Non-FEHA Claims

$68,382.38 In Costs Not Allowed To Defense Is The Upshot.

            In Smith v. Sharp Healthcare, Case No. D069206 (4^th Dist., Div. 1 Dec. 22, 2017) (unpublished), plaintiff lost a case with both FEHA and non-FEHA claims, with the defense filing a costs memorandum seeking $68,382.38 after plaintiff rejected a CCP § 998 offer of $25,000.  The trial judge granted plaintiff’s motion to tax costs in entirety, prompting an appeal by the defense.

            Nothing changed on appeal.

            Based on one jury response, the trial judge properly found that plaintiff’s case was not frivolous so as to justify a refusal to grant costs in accordance with the reasoning in Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist., 61 Cal.4^th 97 (2015) and Roman v. BRE Properties, Inc., 237 Cal.App.4^th 1040, 1057-1058 (2015).  The defense argued that it should be granted costs on the separate Health & Safety Code section 1278.5 retaliation claim, but both courts found that it was intertwined with the FEHA claims such that costs were not justified under Roman.  Finally, the section 998 offer was governed under the frivolousness standard, Mangano v. Verity, Inc., 167 Cal.App.4^th 944, 951 (2008), such that no change in result was in order. 

Civil Rights: Plaintiff Obtaining One Special Verdict Favorable Response But Losing Based On Other Responses Was Not Entitled To FEHA Fee Recovery

Plaintiff Did Not Prevail On His Monetary Claims, And No Injunction/Declaratory Relief Found Against Defendants. 

            After obtaining a jury’s favorable answer to whether plaintiff’s physical condition was a substantial motivating reason for his termination, the jurors found against plaintiff on whether the conduct was a substantial factor in causing harm to plaintiff.  Plaintiff then moved to recover $454,857.90 in attorney’s fees under the FEHA fee-shifting statute from the defense, a request denied by the trial judge.

            That conclusion was sustained on appeal in Bustos v. Global P.E.T., Inc., Case No. E065869 (4^th Dist., Div. 2 Dec. 22, 2017) (unpublished).  The problem is that a FEHA award is discretionary, and plaintiff never prevailed--although the defense did.  No injunction or declaratory relief was entered against the defense, such that the one favorable verdict answer did not justify a fee award in these circumstances. 

Civil Rights: Prevailing Defense On Unruh Act/Disabled Persons Act Claims Seeking Injunction In Complaint Prayer Properly Granted $29,600 In Attorney’s Fees

Appellant Failed To Raise The Winning Argument For Reversal.

            Horsley v. Tourmaline Real Estate Partners, LLC, Case No. B277926 (2d Dist., Div. 3 Dec. 19, 2017) (unpublished) is a lesson in being careful what you plead in your complaint prayer for relief, because it might trigger a bilateral fee-shifting statute. 

            Plaintiff pled for Unruh Act/Disabled Persons Act violations under Civil Code sections 51, 54, and 54.1, with section 51(f) incorporating federal ADA protections.  Most of these sections only award fee recovery to a prevailing plaintiff, but section 55 is a bilateral fee-shifting provision allowing recovery to either side if injunctive relief is sought under sections 54 or 54.1.  Plaintiff lost his case after a bench trial, with the trial judge awarding the defense $29,600 in attorney’s fees under section 55.

            The fee award was affirmed on appeal.  Although not mentioning injunctive relief in the substantive claims, plaintiff did plead for permanent injunctive relief in the prayer of his Complaint, which was enough to invoke the bilateral “bite” of section 55 against the non-prevailing plaintiff.   However, the appellate court also noted that plaintiff may have failed to raise the right argument:  on appeal, but not in the trial court (hence, a waiver), plaintiff argued that he wanted injunctive relief under section 52 for a section 51 violation (which carries no bilateral “bite”); and, had he done so, this would have been persuasive because defendant may not obtain a fee award under section 55 for hours inextricably intertwined with hours spent defending the section 51 claim.  Ouch!

Civil Rights/Employment: FEHA Individual Supervising Employee Defendant Still Must Meet Frivolousness Standard For Purposes Of Obtaining FEHA Fee Shifting Award

Employer Standard Also Applies To Supervising Employee Defendant.

            In Lopez v. Routt, Case No. B269345 (2d Dist., Div. 3 Nov. 29, 2017) (published), the Second District, Division 3 DCA decided that a supervising employee FEHA defendant had to meet the same frivolousness standard as applicable to employer defendant with respect to recovering fees from an unsuccessful plaintiff.  The trial court denied individual defendant’s request for $ 374,760.75 in fees, a determination affirmed on appeal based on the appellate court’s ultimate conclusion.

Civil Rights/Multiplier: 2.0 Multiplier Fee Award In FEHA Case Was No Abuse Of Discretion

Compensatory Award Was $1 Million, With $1,945,295 FEHA Award Affirmed On Appeal.

            In Lopez v. City of Beverly Hills, Case No. B268451 (2d Dist., Div. 3 Nov. 30, 2017 unpublished; received for posting Dec. 1, 2017 unpublished), a FEHA plaintiff—after two years of litigation and a 10-day jury trial involving 24 witnesses--won to the tune of $1 million in compensatory damages.  She then sought $2,533,167 in fees (a lodestar plus a 2.0 positive multiplier), with the defense arguing plaintiff should only recover $316,645.88 based on her recovery on certain claims.   The trial judge reduced the lodestar somewhat after finding the unsuccessful claims were intertwined with the successful claims, but did grant the 2.0 multiplier to result in a fee award of $1,945,295.

            The fee award was affirmed on appeal.  The appellate court sustained the trial court’s conclusion that (1) plaintiff’s lead counsel did a good job in trying the case, (2) plaintiff’s counsel advanced $100,000 in hard costs on the case; and (3) the length of the entire matter (even before complaint filing) and contingency risk justified the multiplier enhancement. 

Civil Rights: $575,231 Bane Act Compensatory Jury Verdict Resulted In Sustained Fees/Costs Award Of $2,027,612.75 By Trial Court

Statutory Fee-Shifting Provisions Can Have Real Force In A Case For A Prevailing Party, Even If The Compensatory Damages Award Is Much Less Than Requested Fees.

           Federal Theatre.  1936.  Library of Congress

        The Bane Act, Civil Code section 52.1, is a broadly-worded California civil rights statute first enacted to combat hate crimes, but construed to protect against all conduct aimed at infterfering with rights secured by the constitutional or statutory law of the U.S. or California where the inference is carried out by threats, intimidation or coercion, whether or not the offending conduct is motivated by discriminatory animus.  It is frequently used in the police misconduct area.  The important thing, at least for this post, is that allows the trial court to award the plaintiff reasonable attorney’s fees.  (Civ. Code, § 52.1(h).)   These awarded fees can be quite hefty, even in comparison to the compensatory damages garnered by a prevailing plaintiff.  Cornell v. City and County of San Francisco, Case Nos. A141016/A142147 (1^st Dist., Div. 4 Nov. 16, 2017) (published) illustrates this well, although the facts of the case were not ones most defendants would want to defend.

            Basically, plaintiff was a police officer trainee, who while off-duty and in street clothes, went for a run one morning in Golden Gate Park, stopping for a brief rest on a knoll called “Hippie Hill.”  From there, two uniformed police officers thought plaintiff was suspicious, resulting in an altercation which result resulted in a criminal arrest/citation (he was taken into custody for six hours and then let go), no subsequent prosecution, and a lost job as a result of the arrest/citation.  Plaintiff sued for various torts and under the Banes Act, obtaining a jury verdict award of $575,231 in damages.  The trial judge then awarded $2,027,612.75 in fees/costs on the Banes Act claim.

            Everything was affirmed on appeal, the merits judgment and the fees/costs award.  The main merits issue was resolved by a holding that a Banes Act violation is tested by whether the arresting officer had a specific intent to violate the arrestee’s right to freedom from unreasonable seizure, not whether the evidence shows some “coercion” beyond the wrongful detention itself.  Once this mens rea element was resolved in a civil context, the fees/costs award was easily affirmed given that no argument was raised to overturn it except based on the merits of the jury verdict in favor of plaintiff (which was sustained on appeal).  

Civil Rights, Lodestar, Multiplier, Reasonableness Of Fees: Trial Judge Properly Cut Lodestar By 25%, And Applied A 1.5 Positive Multiplier, For Total Fee Award Of $752,925.92 In Case Garnering Compensatory Damages Of $625,000 To Plaintiff

Trial Judge Also Properly Awarded $15,000 Supplemental Fees For Posttrial Work.

            For those of you not practicing in the employment/FEHA area, civil rights plaintiffs in disability/harassment/failure to accommodate cases are entitled to recovery of attorney’s fees under a pro-plaintiff statutory fee-shifting provision to be construed liberally to allow plaintiff full compensation for prevailing in these types of cases.  The fee (which must be reasonable and not inflated or subject to other infirmities) is calculated by using the lodestar, namely the number of hours multiplies by a reasonable hourly rate for practitioners in the community where the case was venued, augmented or decreased by certain enhancement factors (with the lodestar sometimes adjusted upward for the plaintiff’s attorney carrying the risk of the case on a contingency basis).  These principles were well summarized and at play in Estelle v. Los Angeles County MTA, Case No. B268085 (2d Dist., Div. 7 Nov. 17, 2017) (unpublished), authored by a 3-0 panel by Justice Segal.

            In Estelle, Plaintiff, an MTA business driver obtained a jury verdict of $625,000 in a disability/failure to engage in interactive process case.  Under the FEHA fee-shifting statute, plaintiff then requested total fees of $1,171,128, which was inclusive of a 1.75 positive multiplier enhancement.  The lower court reduced the base lodestar by 25% for plaintiff’s unsuccessful work on some claims, but did positively adjust the reduced lodestar through an award of a positive 1.5 multiplier—resulting in a total fee award of $752,925.92.  Later, plaintiff requested supplemental fees of $75,640.50 (lodestar plus a positive 1.5 multiplier request) for posttrial work, but the trial judge found this excessive and awarded $15,000 instead.  All this prompted an appeal by the defense.

            Nothing changed on appeal.  The 1.5 multiplier was no abuse of discretion especially given that the case was taken on a contingency basis and the lawyering was found to be acceptable.  Supplemental fees for posttrial and appellate work are allowed under interpretative case law, with the trial judge exercising judgment in reducing for what he deemed to be excessive work when fashioning his $15,000 award.

Civil Rights: FEHA/Whistleblower Losing Plaintiff Properly Exposed To $94,017.50 In Attorney’s Fees

Lack of Proof/Causation, And Some Crazy Assertions, Cemented Appellate Court’s Agreement With Trial Court’s Ruling.

 

Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace practices his favorite hobby, boomerang throwing.  July 13, 1939.  Library of Congress.

            Baker v. Charles R. Drew University of Medicine and Science, Case No. B270973 (2d Dist., Div. 2 Oct. 25, 2017) (unpublished) shows how FEHA/whistleblower plaintiffs can be exposed to attorney’s fees where their case is unreasonable, frivolous or meritless in nature. 

            The trial court in this one granted summary judgment on plaintiff’s multi-count FEHA- and whistleblower-driven lawsuit.  The defense then moved for an award of attorney’s fees against plaintiff based on the theory that the action was unreasonable, frivolous, meritless or vexatious in nature.  (Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist., 61 Cal.4^th 97, 103 (2015), applying the standard set forth in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978).)  The trial judge agreed that this was the case, awarding the defense $94,017.50 in fees.

            Plaintiff’s appeal was unsuccessful.  The problem here was the record of what happened below.  Plaintiff alleged that he was born in China and was of Asian descent, although he was truly African-American—not a great credibility starter.  Beyond that, plaintiff did no discovery and submitted largely inadmissible declarations to show FEHA discrimination or whistleblower retaliation.  Even though the whistleblower claim might have deflected fees, plaintiff’s own testimony showed he had no evidentiary basis for such a claim such that the result below was sound.       

 BONUS:  Dr. Charles R. Drew (1904 - 1950) was prominent in the field of blood transfusions, and protested the practically of racial segregation in the donation of blood.

Civil Rights: Plaintiff Losing Statute Of Limitations Argument On FEHA Claim Properly Not Assessed With Adverse Fee Award

Plaintiff Did Not Attempt To Replead Certain Claims In Amended Complaint And Defense Failure On CCP § 128.5 Sanctions Motion May Have Salted Away The Result.

            “Pocketbook”, a concern in many civil rights fee-shifting cases, may be helped by subsequent efforts of a civil rights plaintiff and unsuccessful sanctions efforts by the defense.  Figueroa-Manjung v. Behroozan, Case No. B267942 (2d Dist., Div. 4 Sept. 1, 2017) (unpublished) illustrates how the interaction of these factors may influence a result both before trial and appellate courts. 

            In this one (albeit reversing a demurrer to a public policy state claim), the defense cross-appealed from a trial court’s refusal to grant attorney’s fees to defendant as the prevailing party after a demurrer based on the theory that a FEHA claim was frivolous/pursued in bad faith.  The defense sought $65,000 in fees, a request rebuffed at the lower court and intermediate appellate levels.

        The appellate court did not believe that time-barring of the FEHA claims required a merits-based determination deserving of fee recovery to the defense, relying on a refusal to award fees in and a failure to exhaust administrative remedies case.  (Hon v. Marshall, 53 Cal.App.4^th 470, 473 (1997).)  Beyond that, there were other factors which likely influenced the appellate court in affirming the denial of fees to the defense:  (1) plaintiff dropped FEHA and another statutory claim from a second amended complaint (after the demurrer on the statute of limitations issue, basically acknowledging defeat); and (2) the defense previously lost a CCP § 128.5 sanctions motion against plaintiff. 

Civil Rights/Settlement: Plaintiff Accepting $1,000 In Rule 68 Offer Entitled To Some Amount Of Fees Under Contract Principles

District Judge Erred In Denying Any Fees Based On Incorrect Civil Rights Fee-Shifting Analysis.

            In Miller v. City of Portland, No. 14-35783 (9^th Cir. Aug. 22, 2017) (published), a civil rights plaintiff accepted a defense Rule 68 offer for $1,000 with reasonable attorney’s fees to be determined by the district court.  After plaintiff moved for fees, the district judge denied any at all based on the ground that the $1,000 award was a de minimis judgment under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a provision with case law indicating that a nominal judgment does allow for a denial of fees by a district court.  The Ninth Circuit reversed, determining that the analysis below misfired by relying on civil rights principles rather than contractual principles in interpreting the Rule 68 offer.  By acceptance of the Rule 68 offer, plaintiff was entitled to some amount of fees, given that the offer did not reference section 1988.  Remanded to the district judge to fix some amount of fees to be awarded to plaintiff. 

Civil Rights/Costs/Section 998: Sviridov Decision Out Of 4/1 DCA Now Published

Decision Held Section 998 Cost-Shifting Prevailed Over FEHA/POBRA Limitations.

        On July 28, 2017, we posted on Sviridov v. City of San Diego, Case No. D069785 (4th Dist., Div. 1 July 28, 2017 unpublished). We now can report that this opinion was certified for publication on August 15, 2017. It decided that CCP § 998 cost shifting policies allowed for an assessment of costs against a losing plaintiff despite the existence of FEHA and POBRA cost limitations.

Civil Rights/Costs/Section 998: Plaintiff Failing To Beat 998 Offer In FEHA/POBRA Case Was Liable For $90,387.28 In Costs

Policies Of Both FEHA Cost Shifting And 998 Cost Shifting To Be Considered By Trial Courts, But 998 Resolution Policies Prevailed In This One.

            Sviridov v. City of San Diego, Case No. D069785 (4^th Dist., Div. 1 July 28, 2017) (unpublished) is an interesting case where a terminated police officer failed to beat several Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offers in a matter involving FEHA and Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (POBRA) claims.  The trial judge awarded defendants City of San Diego and San Diego Police Department $90,387.28 in costs based on the rejected 998 offers.

            Plaintiff appealed, arguing “you can’t do that” because costs are not awardable under FEHA unless the action is deemed frivolous and in bad faith (citing Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist., 61 Cal.4^th 97, 99 (2015)) and under POBRA unless the action is frivolous (citing Government Code section 3309.5(d)(2)).  The appellate court upheld the trial judge’s costs award.  It found that the policies of both FEHA and section 998 were worthy of consideration, but that the 998 resolution-oriented policies prevailed in this situation.  With respect to the POBRA statutory section, there was ending language indicating that it was not an express exception to other provisions such as routine costs statutes or section 998, with 998 winning out in this particular case. 

Civil Rights: Plaintiff In Unruh Act Case Not Allowed Fee Recovery For Fees Expended In Prior Federal Action Dismissed As Moot Based On Parking Lot Fixes

Plaintiff Sought $36,022, But Was Only Awarded $4,380 In Costs And Fees.

            Even in the civil rights areas, looks like a lot of cases come down to attorney’s fee rulings.  Turner v. Anand, Case No. D070433 (4^th Dist., Div. 1 July 13, 2017) (unpublished) illustrates this well.

            There, plaintiff sued defendant in state court under the Unruh Act based on alleged handicap parking accessibility issues involving a medical office building in El Centro.  Earlier, plaintiff had brought an ADA federal court action which was dismissed as moot based on defendant fixing the parking lot, with plaintiff failing to file an amended complaint or seeking fees before the federal court.  Later, in the state court action, the parties settled after the defense agreed to pay plaintiff $2,000 and reserve a fee determination for the trial judge.  Plaintiff moved to recover fees under the Unruh Act (Civ. Code, § 52(a)) fee-shifting provision to the tune of $36,022 (primarily fees spent in the prior federal action).  The trial judge refused to compensate for the federal court activities, awarding instead costs and fees of $4,380.

            The 4/1 DCA affirmed the fee award over plaintiff’s protests on appeal.  Three reasons were given:  (1) the federal action was separate, with plaintiff citing no authority that Civil Code section 52(a) allows recovery for work in this separate action; (2) the federal court was dismissed as moot, such that plaintiff should have applied for fees there but likely would have lost because plaintiff did not prevail in light of defendant’s voluntary parking lot fix; and (3) the federal court dismissal did not provide an independent Unruh Act substantive basis for relief in the state court. 

Civil Rights: Walent v. Commission On Professional Competence Of the LAUSD Now Published

 

Decision Considers Fee Shifting Under Education Code Section 44944(f)(2).

 

    As discussed in our February 23, 2017 post, fee shifting under Education Code section 44944(f)(2) was considered in Walent v. Commission on Professional Competenece of the LAUSD. Although not published at the time of its filing on February 21, we can now report that the opinion was certified for publication on March 13, 2017.

Civil Rights, Costs, Prevailing Party, Undertaking: Plaintiff’s Win Under Patient’s Rights Health And Safety Code Scheme Resulted In Substantial Fee Award, But Other Expert Fee Awards And Need For Appellate Undertaking Rulings Reversed As To Defense

 

Panoply Of Issues Faced In This Decision.

 

    In Lemaire v. Covenant Care California, LLC, Case No. B266493 (2d Dist., Div. 6 Feb. 27, 2017) (unpublished), plaintiff filed a complaint based on wrongful death, elder abuse, and "patients' rights" violations under Health and Safety Code section 1430(b) for treatment of her mother in a skilled nursing facility run by defendant. The jury found against plaintiff on certain claims, but found for her on the patient's rights claims, determining the defendant committed 540 violations under different categories of the H&S Code scheme. In a prior appeal, the appellate court reversed a statutory damages award. The trial judge eventually decided plaintiff, as the prevailing party under Health and Safety Code section 1430(b), was entitled to attorney's fees of $589,290, a 30% reduction, at the trial level; $112,500 in attorney's fees expended in the prior appellate proceeding; and $85,581.08 in trial costs for prevailing at the trial level. The trial court also ruled that defendant had to post a bond to stay enforcement of the fee and costs award.

 

    Defendant appealed, winning a little relief but not most.

 

    Because plaintiff did vindicate rights applicable to all patients at defendant's nursing home, fees were properly awarded under the H&S Code fee entitlement statute. The amount awarded in fees was reasonable, given the large number of H&S Code violations and the trial judge's 30% reduction in the trial fees requested. Fees on appeal were properly awarded to plaintiff given than the case involved important issues of first impression.

 

    However, with respect to the costs award, a reversal was warranted. Expert fees are not specifically mentioned as costs under H&S Code section 1430(b) such that they are not expressly authorized. That brought the 2/6 DCA to deciding whether the defendant had to post an undertaking for a fees and costs award. Answer: "no," given that this was not an exceptional SLAPP fee/costs award (where an undertaking is required) such that generally no undertaking was required in this non-SLAPP case. (Ziello v. Superior Court, 75 Cal.App.4^th 651, 655 (1999).)

Civil Rights: Special Education Code Fee-Shifting Statute Allows Reasonable Fee Award, Not Necessarily Limited To Attorney-Client Contingency Fee Arrangement

Education Code Section 44944(f)(2) Was At Issue.

            In Walent v. Commission on Prof. Competence of the LAUSD, Case No. B266265 (2d Dist., Div. 7 Feb. 21, 2017) (unpublished), petitioner successfully challenged her dismissal from employment from the L.A. Unified School District.  Education Code section 44944(f)(2) allowed her to seek “reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by the employee” from the LAUSD based on her win.  The trial court awarded petitioner $199,817 in attorney’s fees based on a lodestar analysis, even though she would have recovered less if the contingency fee arrangement with her attorney prevailed.

            LAUSD argued that the contingency fee agreement did create a cap on appeal, but that argument was rejected.  Case law interpreting this statute holds that the employee does not have to actually pay or become obligated to pay the fees at issue; the statute could have qualified that the fees had to be “actually incurred,” but this language was not present.  The use of the lodestar was proper, resulting in affirmance of the fee award.

Civil Rights: $626,821.22 Fee Recovery Against Non-Prevailing FEHA Plaintiffs Reversed As A Matter

 

Pocketbook, Pocketbook, Plus Lack Of Frivolity Were The Reversing Factors.

     If you do not think that judges and appellate justices are not attuned to financial disparity, Alvarez v. Bank of America, Case Nos. B238087/B242275 (2d Dist., Div. 4 Jan. 19, 2017) (unpublished) might change your mind or at least provide mollifying food for thought.

     11 plaintiffs brought various FEHA discrimination cases and lost them in a summary judgment proceeding, based primarily on a BofA independent investigation showing a true objective basis to discharge plaintiffs based upon fraudulent conduct. However, the racially-neutral basis for discharge was not revealed until some time after the onset of the litigation. Later, BofA moved to recoup about $760,000 in attorney’s fees under the theory the FEHA suit was frivolous in nature. The trial court ultimately agreed, awarding BofA $626,821.22 in fees.

     The summary judgment merit ruling was affirmed, but the fee award was reversed as a matter of law.

     First of all, the appellate court believed the trial judge likely ignored plaintiffs’ declarations that they could not pay for the requested fees, which is a relevant concern under FEHA. However, rather than remand, the 2/4 DCA decided that the fee awards could be reversed as a matter of law: BofA claimed the actions were frivolous at the outset, but the record showed that it was only during ongoing discovery stage that plaintiffs learned about the internal investigations showing fraudulent conduct which would show the actions were frivolous during the lawsuit “prosecution” stage. Given that the action was not frivolous at the outset, fee awards reversed.

Civil Rights/Lodestar: Trial Court Award Of Fees Under Section 1983 Reversed And Remanded For Impermissible Double Deduction From Lodestar And Failure To Consider Limited Success In Calculating Fees On Fees

 

Also, Costs Improperly Excluded From Fee Calculus As Permitted Under § 1983.

    The Third District in Clapp v. Terry, Case No. C076562 (3d Dist. Nov. 23, 2016) (unpublished) is an important primer on the proper methodology to be used when awarding lodestar fees, fees on fees, and costs in civil right cases to prevailing plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

    There, plaintiff won $12,533.43 compensatory and $500 punitive damages in total against two defendants in an excessive force case, although losing related claims and obtaining no verdict against the County, its sheriff, or a deputy.  Plaintiff then made two applications for fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

    On the first one where $440,473 in fees was sought, the trial judge made some lodestar reductions for efficiency and deduction of hours spent against defendants for which no recovery was had, and then made a .4 further reduction for limited success in the case, bringing the fee award down to $167,116.32.  The lower court also failed to award some costs which were included in the fee request.  Plaintiff appealed those determinations.

    The second application, for “fees on fees,” sought $72,506.50 in fees and $2,126.70 in costs.  The lower court awarded them all, determining that the limited success consideration only went to the merits and should not be factored into the “fees on fees” calculation.  This prompted an appeal by the two losing defendants.

    The Third District sorted through the lower court’s methodology, reversing and remanding the various determinations.  The main infirmity with the fee award on the first application was the lower court’s utilization of an impermissible “double deduction” by initially reducing for unsuccessful hours and then again doing a further .4 reduction for the same limited success factor.  The trial judge also failed to award costs/expenses included in the fee requests, which are compensable as fees under § 1983 (with California’s normal routine costs analysis being irrelevant).  The flaw in the “fees on fees” calculation was the lower court’s failure to consider degree of success in awarding the fees sought under the second application.  Remanded for a “re-do.”

Civil Rights: $16,175.50 Fee/Costs Award Against Nonprevailing FEHA Plaintiff Reversed Because Nothing Showed Case Was Groundless

 

Stricter Review Is Made Of FEHA Awards In Favor Of Prevailing Defendants.

“Keysville, Virginia. Randolph Henry High School. Playing baseball during gym period. Girl replaced man teacher who was drafted in the army.”  Philip Bonn, photographer.  June 1943.  Library of Congress.

     Young v. Burlingame School Dist., Case No. A147012 (1st Dist., Div. 2 Nov. 15, 2016) (unpublished) illustrates that FEHA fee/costs awards to prevailing defendants are not the norm and will be subject to intensified appellate review based on Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist., 61 Cal.4th 97, 115 (2015).

    In Young, teacher was cleared of sexual misconduct charges, but found to have engaged in “unprofessional conduct,” in an administrative proceeding resulting in her reinstatement.  She then sued school district under FEHA, but lost on summary judgment.  School district then took the offensive and moved to recover fees, with the lower court granting $16,175.50 in fees and costs.

    The fees/costs award was reversed on appeal.  A higher standard did govern the fee/costs determination under FEHA against a non-prevailing plaintiff, with the record showing she did have sufficient proof of animus (with respect to pretextual conduct, often proven through circumstantial evidence) to prosecute her suit.  Reversed.

Allocation, Civil Rights, Paralegals, Reasonableness Of Fees: Substantial Fee Recovery Remanded Based On Merits Reversal

 

However, Appellate Court Provides Remand Guidance On Allocation, Paralegal Compensation, And Reasonableness Issues.

     In Samuelson v. Dept. of State Hospitals, Case No. A143149 (1^st Dist., Div. 2 Oct. 28, 2016) (unpublished), plaintiff was awarded $1 million in damages against defendants Dept. of State Hospitals and three psychologists hired by Napa State Hospital based upon employer retaliation and whistleblower protection claims. She was then awarded attorney’s fees totaling $1,231,188.70 based on fee entitlement statutes, namely, the whistleblower fee-shifting provision allowing recovery against individual defendants, but not the employer (Gov’t Code, § 8547.8(c)), and the private attorney general statute as against Dept. of State Hospitals (CCP § 1021.5). Defendants appealed the fee award.

     In a prior appeal, the appellate court reduced the $1 million judgment down to $695,000. Based on this reversal, the appellate court then reversed and remanded the fee award based on the merits reduction. However, it did offer some guidance to the trial judge having to adjudge fees upon remand.

     First, the trial judge did not apportion fees as between the two substantive claims based upon confusing conduct by the State which suggested no apportionment was necessary under the whistleblower fee-shifting provision (given the whistleblower fees were only assessable against the individual defendants and the private attorney general fees only against the State defendant). Although no “prejudging” was done by the reviewing court, it did remand for the trial judge to look at the allocation decision again, but stressing that State’s prior positions about no need for an allocation and unified defense of the case might lead to the same result.

     Second, the work for pre-litigation administrative work that was intertwined with the subsequent court proceeding happened to be compensable, in line with what the trial judge did previously.

     Third, the trial judge’s award of fees to plaintiff’s “household partner” or “boyfriend” (a patent lawyer not licensed to practice law in California) for volunteered paralegal work was no abuse of discretion, especially given the lower court reduced the requested work amount 25% for non-paralegal work. “Defendants point to no legal authority or good reason to support the position that volunteered paralegal services may only be compensable in a public interest lawsuit” and nothing in CCP § 1021.5 cases “restricts its application” on the paralegal issue. (Slip Opn., pp. 9-10.)

Civil Rights/POOF!: Appellate Court Reversal Of FEHA Judgment As A Matter Of Law Meant Fee Award Reversed Also

 

$1.282 Million Fee Award Went POOF!

           The Flareback.  1911.  Library of Congress.

     Just to show you how the appellate court can giveth and taketh away (Job 1:21), in this case a taketh away, Hessler v. County of Los Angeles, Case No. B263088 (2d Dist., Div. 1 Oct. 27, 2016) (unpublished) is a situation where a FEHA plaintiff prevailed by winning $153,290 in damages and then being awarded prevailing party attorney’s fees to the tune of $1,282,810. However, the appellate court found that the action was barred by FEHA’s statute of limitations, requiring reversal of the damages judgment as a matter of law and—as an attendant consequence—reversal of the substantial fee award.

Civil Rights/Costs: Winning FEHA Defendants Wisely Waived Trial Court Costs On Appeal In Light Of Williams Decision

 

Respondents Did A Smart Thing On Appeal.

     Respondents in McClain v. Pacific Maritime Assn., Case No. B262952 (2d Dist., Div. 6 Oct. 27, 2016) (unpublished) did a smart thing after winning a disability discrimination case and after being awarded routine costs against the losing FEHA plaintiff. Given that FEHA costs are not awardable against a losing FEHA plaintiff unless the action was objectively without foundation, see Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist., 61 Cal.4th 97, 105 (2015), respondents waived routine costs upon plaintiff’s appellate challenge to the cost award—which was a prudent move because the action was likely not frivolous given that it went all the way to a statement of decision determination following a bench trial. Respondent’s decision resulted in the merits determination being affirmed and preempting any remand for a likely pointless hearing at which costs would not be awarded anyway.

Civil Rights/Costs: $7,660.19 FEHA/Non-FEHA Cost Award Against Losing Plaintiff Remanded In Light Of Williams/Roman Decisions

 

2/8 DCA Adopts Reasoning of 2/7 DCA In Roman Decision On Costs Apportionment.

     Metoyer v. L.A. Unified School Dist., Case No. B259458 (2d Dist., Div. 8 Sept. 22, 2016) (unpublished) is a situation where plaintiff brought both FEHA and non-FEHA claims, but was defensed after a jury verdict finding lack of causation—namely, that District’s conduct was not a substantial motivating factor in decisions which were made. However, the lower court did grant District routine costs of $7,660.19.

     Although plaintiff lost the merits appeal, the costs award was remanded for further consideration.

     The reason was the California Supreme Court’s decision in Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist., 61 Cal.4^th 97 (2015), which mandated a different analysis on FEHA costs recovery against a losing plaintiff. However, the real issue devolved into what happens to costs recovery where there were both FEHA and non-FEHA claims which a plaintiff loses. In this regard, the 2/8 DCA in Metoyer followed the 2/7 DCA’s analysis of the issue in Roman v. BRE Properties, Inc., 237 Cal.App.4^th 1040, 1059-1060, 1062 (2015) [discussed in our June 27, 2015 post], which essentially decided that post-Williams costs issues depended on how interrelated FEHA and non-FEHA claims were to each other. If inextricably intertwined, then maybe no costs award against the losing FEHA plaintiff is in order; however, if the non-FEHA claims were solely allocable, then some apportioned costs were in order. So, the costs award was remanded to relook at in light of the 2/7 DCA’s Roman analysis.

Civil Rights: Plaintiffs, Losing Two Summary Judgment Motions, Properly Assessed $35,185 In Attorney’s Fees Under Baseless FEHA Fee-Shifting Statute

 

Trial Judge Reduced Defense’s First Request By 75%.

     In Radakovic v. County of Los Angeles, Case No. B266194 (2d Dist., Div. 5 Sept. 1, 2016) (unpublished), a trial judge awarded attorney’s fees to the defense (L.A. County) in the sum of $35,185 after one plaintiff lost a summary judgment motion and then plaintiffs together lost another summary judgment motion in two FEHA case. The basis for the fee award was Government Code section 12965(b) which allows courts discretion to award prevailing parties their reasonable attorney’s fees, but only against a plaintiff if the FEHA action was objectively without foundation when brought or prosecuted after it became objectively meritless in nature. (Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist., 61 Cal.4^th 97, 115 (2015).) This was only 25% of the defense’s fee request.

     Plaintiffs’ appeal of the fee award was unavailing. The defense initially requested fees of $141,000 based on $300-400 hourly rates. However, because County’s attorney only charged $155 per hour, the defense did a smart thing: it alternatively requested reduced fees of $70,525 based on the lower hourly rate. The lower court awarded about half of the lower request and only 25% of the higher request in arriving at the $35,185 award.

     The appellate court did determine the FEHA action was objectively unreasonable based on (1) the loss of two summary judgment motions, (2) no exhaustion of administrative remedies by one plaintiff in the second suit, and (3) the absence of a causal link between the earlier lawsuit and later suspension leading to the second suit. As far as reasonableness of the fee award, the lower court certainly pared it down reasonably, with the absence of a reporter’s transcript of the fee hearing further hampering review.

     BLOG TIP—County did provide the trial judge two alternatives for the fee award, with the second option based on very low hourly rates which municipalities usually require counsel to accede to. This highlights two good fee petition tips: give the trial court some alternatives or provide some voluntary reductions to make its decision easier.

Civil Rights/Reasonableness Of Fees: Trial Court Correctly Awarded $116,925 In Fees Out Of Requested $421,130 In FEHA Age Harassment Win For Plaintiff

 

Reduction Justified Because Case Was Not Extraordinary.

    In Moran v. Forever 21 Logistics, LLC, Case No. B265988 (2d Dist., Div. 5 Aug. 15, 2016) (unpublished), plaintiff won a $199,000 damages award on age harassment/discrimination claims and sought $421,130 in attorney’s fees (inclusive of a 1.5 multiplier) under FEHA’s discretionary fee-shifting statute.  The trial judge awarded fees of  $116,925 after characterizing it as a “typical” case (although this was inclusive of a .5 multiplier).

    Plaintiff’s appeal for additional fees was unsuccessful.  Given the “typical case” characterization of the trial judge and the deferential abuse of discretion standard of review, the appellant court perceived the lower court could have reasoned that the hourly rate was too high or number of hours claimed excessive for a case which was not extraordinary in nature. 

Civil Rights/Section 1717 Two-Fer: Losing Plaintiff Hit With Substantial Fee Award In FEHA Case And Contractual Fee Award Reversed Due To No Contract With A Fees Clause

 

Gonzalez v. The Los Angeles Lakers, Case No. B265823 (2d Dist., Div. 4 Aug. 10, 2016) (Unpublished)—Civil Rights

     Nothing remarkable in this one, except that plaintiff lost a FEHA case and the appellate court affirmed a lower court’s discretionary award of fees because it deemed the case frivolous/unreasonable in nature. Plaintiff was socked with an adverse award of $121,547.58, reduced from a $340,156.38 request apparently based on plaintiff’s financial condition (which is a factor to consider in this area).

Lewin v. Goldman Sachs Mortgage Co., Case No. E062115 (4^th Dist., Div. 2 Aug. 9, 2016) (Unpublished)—Section 1717

     Here, a prevailing defendant was awarded $95,637.50 under a contractual fees clause in a note and deed of trust. This award was reversed because the losing plaintiff was sued on a subsequent contract having no fees clause such that Civil Code section 1717 could not be used to create fee entitlement.

                       

Mrs. Robert Goldman (Edith Ostend Jacobson) a chorus girl who married Robert J. Goldman, son of Henry Goldman of Goldman Sachs.  March 2, 1915. Robert Goldman sued his wife for divorce in March 1915.  Library of Congress.